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ABSTRACT
SEA CONTROL AND MARITIME POWER PROJECTION FOR AUSTRALIA:
Maritime Air Power and Air Warfare

Australia is a maritime nation in one of the most complex open ocean, littoral
and archipelagic maritime regions in the world. The sea is the defining physical
characteristic in the region. The overwhelming significance of this is that Australia
has no land borders. This is a strategic advantage that must be better understood to
avoid it becoming a strategic liability.

Strategic realities endure. There are many more effective ways to overcome
Australia other than via a military invasion. However, defence against such an
invasion is currently the prime force structure determinant in Australian defence
planning. As an alternative to this, Australia should better appreciate that a mature
maritime capability would provide the mobility and power projection to deter
aggressors engaged in operations against Australia’s interests at distance from
Australia itself.

Such an understanding would lead to the implementation of a

credible maritime strategy.

Underpinning such a maritime strategy is the strategic concept of sea control.
Sea control requires control of the air. Without sea control maritime power projection
cannot occur and forces cannot be operated ashore. Additionally trade to and from
Australia can be interdicted at will. However, the central role of sea control for
Australia’s strategic security remains obscured by Australia’s consistent continentalist
approach.

It is time to bring maritime strategy to the fore, to re-engage the aircraft carrier
issue and to stress the fundamental imperative for capable surface combatants. This
would ensure that sea control is the enabler that underpins Australia’s defence policy.
A mature Australia should relegate the vitriolic single-service oriented debates that
concluded in 1983 about aircraft carriers to that era. A study should be conducted to

rigorously review the technology, operational concepts and strategic realities of 2003
to 2040, with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic circumstances.

As the Australian Defence Force makes decisions on new projects that will
affect force structure for the next 30 years, a maritime sea control and power
projection requirement should input significantly to the new aerospace combat
capability, Project Air 6000, and the project for the maritime air warfare capability,
Project Sea 4000.

Introduction
Notwithstanding the success of the East Timor operation in 1999, Australia’s
ability to project national power is limited by a maritime capability that is orientated
towards self-defence and sea denial operations rather than sea control. This does not
reflect the fact that in an era of uncertainty Australia may well need to project force
through the maritime environment. Australia’s national interests are integrated with
the environment beyond the coast and need to be expressed in terms other than purely
war or peace but as part of a spectrum of conflict with many overlaps. This is
something very relevant to maritime forces because they interact constantly with
various points on the spectrum. One of the central features of a maritime strategy is
that it has an application throughout the continuum of operations. What this means is
that benign operations are just as relevant to a comprehensive maritime strategy as
combat operations and that maritime strategy has a well defined peacetime dimension.

Australia exists in a region of instability and significant military spending.
Although a western liberal-style democracy, it cannot assume that there is no threat to
its national survival over the longer term. The German strategist Carl von Clausewitz
in avoiding what he termed ‘abstruse definitions of war’ 1 wrote in 1832 that; ‘war is
…an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’2 However, in
the chapter that he dedicates to defining what is war, Clausewitz moves from this
narrow definition to describe war as a political instrument, a continuation of political
commerce. The statement that ‘war is a mere continuation of policy by other means’ 3
is important if Australia is to properly comprehend diplomatic and international
realities.

For Australia the different cultural outlooks that determine policy, especially
in the Asian-Pacific region must be acknowledged for war to be understood.
Australia must be prepared to employ stratagems that reflect the realities of the Asia-

1

Clausewitz, C von, On War, Rapoport, A (ed), Pelican Books Ltd, Hammonsworth, Middlesex,
England 1968, p.101.
2
Ibid, p.101.

Pacific region. This includes the fact that the region is a maritime geo-strategic
environment. Despite statements in Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force that
Australia’s strategy is fundamentally maritime, 4 which should be expected if the
correct emphasis was placed on geo-strategic issues, this is not so when maritime
doctrine is assessed and the term ‘maritime’ is analysed.

To redress this dichotomy Australia ought to comprehend better that strategic
force structure development and the drafting of national policy documents such as
Defence White papers should be built on a rigorous doctrinal base. This paper argues
that contemporary strategic circumstances, Australia’s maritime environment and
likely future requirements should drive force structure decisions, rather than the
current ‘top down’ strategic thinking. The foreseeable strategic situation is
characterised by uncertainty, operational variety, and potential danger. In short,
capabilities should be tailored to reflect this variety. The traditional flexibility of
maritime power revolving around sea control is a most valuable strategic asset in the
face of uncertainty. This leads to a conclusion in favour of achieving adequate
surface capability, as well as a balanced, integrated, and interoperable fleet.

In plain terms Defence 2000 reduces the defence of Australia in its explicit
sense to ‘the defence of Australia and its direct approaches.’ 5 Next to this the report,
Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update 2003 does reflect an increasing
likelihood for Australia to be affected by events outside the immediate
neighbourhood, but the report focuses more on niche capabilities for specific and
limited involvement in coalition operations. 6 The maritime nature of Australia’s
environment is ignored. Maritime strategy, maritime doctrine and strategic realities
in the Asia-Pacific would indicate that defending Australia’s national interests is
more problematical than this.

The post Cold War period has been witness to a shift in emphasis for military
forces from the traditional concepts of the decisive battle, territorial conquest and
inter-state wars to a more uncertain period. This is not to state that the traditional
3

Ibid,,p.119.
Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p XI
5
Defence 2000, p X
4

military role has been made irrelevant, but rather that additional and often more
complicated and delicate roles have been added. It is also true that the changes have
been most pronounced for western liberal democracies. However, statements that
there is now little identifiable conventional threat to national existence are
indulgences that at best should be restricted to the North American landmass and
Western Europe. Nations in the Asia-Pacific region that do not have the historical
thread of liberal democracy are still establishing national identities and in some cases
borders, and these nations are still very much rooted in the traditional military outlook
of survival of the nation state.

The existence of radicalism and terrorism outside of state-on-state conflict is
not new. In fact state-on-state conflicts are pre-dated in history by terrorism and
anarchy. Terror against civilian populations was common in the Crusades for
example, as it was in the Viking raiding parties that attacked Britain and with notable
historic figures such as Ghenghis Khan and his forces. What is new is its reach and
impact on civilian populations that are not directly involved. This is due in the most
part to the immediacy and intimacy of modern media reporting. This fact needs to be
understood for the era post 11 September 2001 to be seen in perspective.

Issues such as these require analysis not only from an Australian perspective
but also in the light of other contemporary maritime doctrines and the global
influences that formulate a national strategy. It is self evident that the maritime
environment should be the principal factor influencing the nature and attributes of a
maritime power. Australia, however, displays many attributes of being a maritime
nation with a continentalist outlook, most notably in the mythology of the bush and
the ANZAC tradition in its military history. The bush mythology is used as the
defining characteristic of the true Australian. The sea is reduced to the beach and its
immediate vicinity. That this reality is also true of Australia’s military history will
also be examined. The challenge is to bring the air power, sea power and land power
necessary to execute a maritime strategy to the area of operations via sea.

6

Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, p.24

These matters necessitate review by taking into account the development of
maritime strategic thought, highlighting the lessons of history and examining
contemporary maritime operations and doctrine. The issue of legal jurisdiction and
how concepts such as innocent passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage and high seas
permit maritime forces to operate with great flexibility in support of government
policy need to be considered as well.

Australia cannot conduct a meaningful maritime strategy in the absence of
organic maritime air power and air warfare. These capabilities would enable Australia
to achieve sea control, which is required before any power projection operation can
take place. There is a fortunate juncture in technological development and Australian
Defence Force (ADF) equipment obsolescence, which provides the opportunity to
implement a sea control capability whilst acknowledging the reality that Australia can
only ever be a medium power with a limited ability to project force. This military
capability is restrained by the realities of economic power, weak national industrial
infrastructure and sparse population. In noting these geo-strategic realities, this paper
will highlight some of the issues, which should leave little doubt that the requirement
for a credible maritime power projection and sea control capability is entirely
justifiable.
Australia’s need for a credible maritime strategy 7 is greater than the
requirement to obtain maritime air power and capable surface combatants. Maritime
strategy also requires a logistic capability, both sea and air, amphibious platforms, an
effective mobile army, long range maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, industrial
maritime repair, maintenance and construction infrastructure and a credible merchant
marine.

To a large extent given Australia’s economic capacity, with the possible
exception of Australian flagged merchant shipping, these others all exist within
Australia to a reasonable degree. Therefore, this paper will not address these aspects
in detail. This does not reduce their importance. However, the emphasis will be on the

7

A credible maritime strategy is one which focuses on sea control as the basis for the defence of
Australia with an emphasis on manoeuvrist not attrition based warfare and operations across the

fact that the current force structure has resulted in the absence of critical maritime
enablers such as in-theatre air power and the powerlessness to ensure sea control in
anything but a low-level contingency. This means there is an inability to defend sea
lines of communications and poor power projection capability. The absence of these
capabilities means in essence that Australia does not have a credible maritime
strategy. The challenge for Australia is to have the meaningful debate and mature
strategic development that leads to a truly joint maritime capability.

continuum of conflict in a location of Australia’s choosing and not on the mainland of Australia or its
direct approaches.

Aim
The aim of this paper is to explore the strategic significance to Australia of the
maritime environment and history and to advocate that Australia grasp the
requirement for sea control and power projection by moving away from a
continentalist approach to defence capability planning and the implementation of a
credible maritime strategy and force structure.

Australia’s Region – A Maritime Environment

FIGURE 1:
THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
Graphic: Australian Maritime Doctrine

Any paper on Australian strategic realities must begin with the understanding
that Australia is a maritime nation, albeit a flawed one. A maritime nation could be
defined as a nation in which the maritime environment impacts extensively in the
geographic, economic and strategic dimension. Even if these factors are all a reality
the nation will remain an incomplete nation, a flawed entity in the maritime
dimension if the psychology of its people is not rooted in the sea. This is the case for
Australia.

Australia is located in one of the most complex open ocean, littoral and archipelagic
maritime regions in the world. Australia’s regional neighbours include archipelagic
states and island groups. Almost all states in the wider region have long coastlines. In
and around Indonesia, the Philippines and the South China Sea, are situated the
greatest cluster of strategically significant straits in the world. The Asia-Pacific region
is central to Australia’s security, and its geography affects all aspects of Australia’s
security policy, in the political, legal, military and physical dimensions. Maritime

boundary delimitation gives one example of the importance of maritime geographic
issues to Australia. Australia has already negotiated a number of maritime
delimitation agreements with other countries, specifically Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and France The other major outstanding delimitation
that Australia has is with New Zealand. 1 Negotiations on the maritime boundary
between Australia and New Zealand are ongoing.

In both geographical and political terms Australia is unique. This is because
unlike the other inhabited continents it is an insular landmass, surrounded by seas, for
the most part empty of islands. 2 It is the only continent to be occupied by a single
State, making Australia by far the largest State in area in the world without a land
border. By virtue of both these factors, Australia claims one of the largest maritime
areas of all States, 3 with an Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf covering
an area of 16 million square kilometres, including tropical islands and hazardous
Antarctic waters. 4 This increases to over 20 million square kilometres when the
features of the extended continental shelf and access to the resources of the seabed
within this area is included. 5

When looking at the geographic features of the globe it is relevant that 70
percent of the earth’s surface is covered by sea and over two-thirds of the world’s
population lives within 100 miles of the coast. This population figure is well over 95
percent for Australia itself, and is even higher for most of Southeast Asia. Australia’s
region is thus a maritime littoral environment to a greater degree than any other in the
world. 6 Despite the extensive use of aircraft, ships still account for 99.5 percent of
1

- France in relation to New Caledonia and Kurguelen Island. Additionally, with the separation of East
Timor from Indonesia, it was necessary to negotiate a new agreement with East Timor. The Timor Sea
Treaty, which was signed in 2002, relates to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
Timor Gap. This treaty provides a temporary settlement, pending the negotiation of a permanent
maritime boundary. See Campbell, B. ‘The Australia – New Zealand Maritime Boundary’ in Heath, R
& Snushall, B (eds) Protecting Maritime Resources, Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conflicts and
Constabulary Responsibilities, Paper in Australian Maritime Affairs, Sea Power Centre Australia,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p. 19
2
Kaye, S. Australia’s Maritime Boundaries, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No.12 (2nd
edition), University of Wollongong, 2001, p.1.
3
Ibid, p. 1
4
Australia’s Navy for the 21st Century, Navy Plan Blue (Unclassified) 30 Aug 02, p.7
5
Symonds, P. Australia’s Extended Continental Shelf, Sea Power Centre’s Maritime Study Period
(MSP) 7/8 Nov 02.
6
Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 13

trans-oceanic trade (by volume not value), the volume of which has increased by a
factor of eight since 1945. 7 Oceans provide access to nearly all parts of the globe,
with 85 percent of states having a coastline. Professor Geoffrey Till notes that the
increase in the world’s population and living standards will increase the need for
global movement of bulk cargoes. He also notes that the World Bank’s current
forecast is that by 2012 world seaborne trade will have doubled in terms of ton-miles
and this trend will continue. 8 Importantly the World Bank notes that this trend is
partly fuelled by the growth in the economies of Southeast Asia, China and India.

This then is of direct relevance to Australia’s maritime environment. Noting
that Australia is a net exporter of energy, especially coal and raw materials such as
iron ore, it is of vital importance that a true understanding of the role of maritime
strategy for Australia is pursued. The Australian economy is absolutely dependent on
shipping. Globalisation has meant that Australia’s economy is more integrated with
other nations and less self-sufficient. 99 percent of this trade by bulk and 73.5 percent
by value is carried by ship, 9 with about 95 percent of that in foreign flagged vessels.
The percentage of trade carried by foreign flagged vessels is increasing as the number
of significant merchant ships registered in Australia and crewed by Australians is
decreasing. The Sydney Morning Herald of 31 July 2002 reported in its editorial that
in the previous six years Australia’s fleet of major trading ships has shrunk from 78 to
45 and that more would go this year. 10
Australia is the fifth largest user of shipping in the world 11 in terms of tonnage
carried and distance travelled.

In 2000-2001 there were approximately 13000

overseas shipping arrivals and departures with 550 million tonnes of international
trade moved by sea. In concentrating on the relationship between Australia and
7

BR 806, British Maritime Doctrine, The Stationary Office, 2nd Edition, 1999, p. 14.
Till, G. ‘Maritime Trade Introduction,’ Till, G. (ed), Seapower at the Millenium,, Sutton Publishing
Limited, UK, 2001, p.177.
9
Bureau of Transport & Regional Economics (BTRE), Australian Transport Statistics – 2002,
www.btre.gov.au/docs/trnstats02/trnstats.htm. This BTRE report indicates that in 2000-2001 550
million tonnes of international trade and 101 million tonnes (1999-2000) of domestic cargo was
carried by sea as compared to 644,000 tonnes and 148,300 tonnes (1999-2000) respectively by air. This
amounts to 99% of international trade being carried by ships. Additionally international trade in
A$billion for 2000-2001 was A$248billion with A$182.3billion by sea and A$65.7billion by air or
73.5% by sea by value.
10
Revell, A, Sea Battle Not All It Seems, Sydney Morning Herald, Fairfax Press, Sydney, 31 July 2002,
p. 12
8

international trade the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE) figures
indicate that the total value of Australian merchandise exports in 2000-2001 was
AUD$124.4 Billion, and the total value of Australian merchandise imports was
AUD$124.1 Billion. In 1999-2000 Australian domestic coastal shipping cargo alone
totalled 50.3 million tonnes. By comparison, scheduled international airline traffic
carried a total of 644,000 tonnes of freight to and from Australia by air routes over the
sea.’ 12 Australian registered vessels carried approximately 2.2% of the total
international trade. 13

In acknowledging the vital role that air transport plays in supplementing sea
borne trade the role of the maritime environment is still relevant. This is because all
trade which goes by air flies over the sea and is just as influenced by Australia’s
ability to control the sea, as is the overriding proportion which goes by sea. This point
needs to be considered as part of the strategic development process within Australia.
Sea lines of communications within the Australian context also includes the air travel
over the sea of people and trade. Without control of the maritime environment air
services to Australia can also effectively be interdicted and as a result Australia could
be virtually isolated.

The 2002 paper, Strategic Trades To and From Australia notes;

‘Australia's prosperity depends upon commercial engagement with
other nations. The country, along with other regional nations, is
vulnerable to disruption of seaborne trade. A number of regional nations
(e.g. Japan, South Korea, SW Pacific islands) are highly vulnerable to
any disruption of sea transport. Sea transport follows recognised trade
routes, or sea lines of communications, that have been established over
many years of use, dictated by geography, port location, navigational
hazards and weather. In the Asia Pacific region straits through
archipelagos and island chains confine these trade routes. The open ocean
trade routes are vulnerable to interdiction, while straits and associated

11
12

Australia’s Navy for the 21st Century, Navy Plan Blue, p.7
Bureau of Transport & Regional Economics (BTRE), Australian Transport Statistics – 2002,

choke points are vulnerable to closure. The protection of these sea lines
of communications is vital for the safe movement of sea transport.
Seaborne trade may be subjected to a range of threats, varying in
intensity from open warfare between nations to piracy (on the high seas)
and armed robbery (in territorial waters). This threat spectrum is wide
and significantly increases the difficulties in ensuring the unhindered
passage of sea transport. The passage of merchant shipping, free from
threat or hindrance requires a close relationship between the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) and the maritime industry.’ 14

FIGURE 2:

AUSTRALIAN REPORTING POSITIONS – MERCHANT SHIPPING
Australian Maritime Doctrine p. 42

Graphic:

When considering sea lines of communications in the Australian context it
becomes apparent that Australia’s sea communications have two important
vulnerabilities. The first is that shipping moving to and from trading partners in East
Asia must pass through many archipelagic choke points to reach its destinations. The
13

Naval Control & Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) draft paper Strategic Trades To and From
Australia, June 2002, p. 4
14
Strategic Trades To and From Australia, June 2002, p.8

only alternative is to divert through much longer, time and fuel consuming deep ocean
routes. The second vulnerability is that shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans can
be identified from some distance away as being bound only for Australia or New
Zealand. 15 This fact is also true of much air travel operating to and from Australia.

Trade is not the only issue that makes Australia a maritime nation. Other
important areas that could be targeted by any adversary include tourism, employment
and resources, especially offshore oil and gas installations and infrastructure.
Employment and trade are intrinsically linked. One in five jobs in the city and one in
four jobs in the country are directly related to the export of goods. 16. Targeting
Australia effectively is not merely a matter of a conventional invasion through the
north.
When considering the littoral nature 17 of Southeast Asia, it is also often
forgotten that Australia, despite its vast inland areas, is as littoral in nature as any of
the other nations of the region. Not only is most of the population within the coastal
margin but so is most of the strategically essential industry and infrastructure. This
coastal margin is not located solely in the north of the country. It is sometimes
overlooked that, unlike land with its mountains, deserts and forests, the sea removes
much of the impact of geography from the equation. Distance is not removed, but then
again the characteristics of maritime power, such as flexibility, reach, poise and
persistence, mean that distance impacts less in the maritime domain then it does on
land or in the air. As such the route by which an attack to Australia can occur is as
multi-faceted as is the sea itself.

15

This effect is referred to as that of the Sandison Line and was defined by J.M. Sandison J.M.
Sandison, Article in the Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1986, p.4. cited in Australian Maritime
Doctrine, p. 42
16
Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT) Fact Sheet: Why Trade Matters, 22 Dec 02.
17
The definition of littoral is subject to debate. Littoral involves the influence of the sea over the
adjacent landmass and the landmass over the adjacent seas. In the Asia-Pacific region such influence
could extend 100 nautical miles plus, both at sea and over the land. It is dependent on the technology in
use by the coastal state and the maritime power. Ranges of up to 12 nautical miles are typical for a
nation such as Australia, due to the limited range of sea-based munitions, lack of sea-based precision
guided munitions and poor communications with elements ashore. Nations such as the United States
utilise ranges in excess of 100 nautical miles due to sea-based air power, precision guided weapons,
data burst digital communications and data links.

Thus both Australia’s strategic environment and sovereignty is maritime in
nature. Within this context there are at least five major ways in which future strategic
issues are uncertain. First, Australia exists in an uncertain landscape of political and
economic development within the region. Second, Australia faces a spectrum of
possible conflict and threat environments ranging from peace to high intensity conflict,
which may involve the ADF in diplomatic, policing, peacekeeping and enforcement,
and war fighting roles. Third, Australia’s maritime forces may have to conduct various
combinations of littoral and blue water operations. Fourth, these operations may
involve various combinations of coalition, allied, and self-reliant operations. Finally,
Australia needs to understand that these operations may be either within the AsiaPacific region or out of area. The last point is predicated on Australia’s responsibilities
in Antarctica, and on the economic and strategic importance of Indian Ocean issues
which is likely to increase. Influencing these five issues is the increasing legal
complexity of maritime jurisdictions in the region.

The Asia-Pacific is a maritime region, Southeast Asia particularly so, as the
population lives close to the sea and the nations are heavily dependent on trade. Sea
lines of communication are, therefore, very important, and nations are dependent on
living and mineral resources from the sea. At the same time, regional maritime forces
are growing steadily more sophisticated. These forces, by their nature, have
considerable access to the people, infrastructure and nation states of the region.
Therefore they are ideally positioned to enforce the policy of their governments in
peace, transition to war and in hostilities should that be necessary. As a result these
maritime forces exert considerable influence.

Regional economies will increasingly depend on energy imports from locations
both in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia itself, and from outside the region.
This includes the Persian Gulf, an area which already features in Australian
deployment considerations. Such an array of uncertain circumstances implies a wide
variety of possible sea power roles. Goodwill activity and coercive diplomacy require
presence and visibility in the form of port visits, exercises or simply the strength of
presence, so as to influence the maritime security environment in line with Australian
national interests. Constabulary tasks may involve issues of migration, drugs and
contraband, fishing and resources, piracy, and the environment. All of these tasks are

likely to have a higher profile in the future. High intensity operations are likely to
involve both sea control and denial for purposes of defence of sea lines of
communications, blockade, support of amphibious and land operations. In short, there
is no truer example than that in the Asia-Pacific region of Sir Julian Corbett's
fundamental principle that maritime strategy revolves around lines of sea
communication. 18 This can only be more true of the region with the continuing pace of
economic globalisation. This results in nations being more inter-dependent than
previously for economic growth, societal stability and prosperity, and even the
survival of the government or political structure.

What does this imply for Australian military strategy given the
maritime nature of the region? Australia's current military concept of strategy, as set
down in Defence 2000, reflects an enduring strategic preference for prevention of the
conditions under which a threat could develop to the Australian mainland by
achieving decision in the maritime approaches rather than the mainland itself. 19
Australia’s approaches include the archipelagos of Southeast Asia and the Southwest
Pacific, referred to as the inner arc. The inner arc is characterised as a littoral
environment in which the three operational domains of sea, land and air converge.
However, this emphasis in Defence 2000 on the Australian mainland and maritime
approaches needs to be carefully scrutinised. Threats to Australia’s national interests
may develop which do not involve threats to Australian territory itself or to the
maritime approaches.

Despite the increasing importance of trade to Australia’s economic, social and
political stability, the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (The Dibb
Report) down played the importance of trade. The report stated that a widespread
interdiction of trade would only occur in a global war in which Australia could plan
on being ‘practically self-sufficient in most food, raw-material, and energy
resources.’ 20 The emphasis that military strategy is almost solely focused on combat
operations, on the defence against a direct military attack to Australia itself, has been
18
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at the heart of Australian strategy since this report, and it reflects the report’s
continentalist nature. The 1986 Dibb Report based this reasoning, with respect to
trade issues, on the fact that Australia is a net exporter of energy. However, with
globalisation resulting in greater interdependence of economies, great harm could be
done to the economy and the people of Australia by low-level economic warfare
against Australian trade at distance. This impacts on the likelihood of interdiction of
trade. Such interdiction would not require global war, as it could be accomplished via
low technology, locally based attacks in choke points such as straits and via high
technology attacks in the open ocean.

The Defence Update 2003 has moved some way to acknowledging this, but its
focus is more on global terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 21
Importantly statements that the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than
it was in 200022 must be viewed from a perspective of maritime strategy. In reality
the threat of a direct military attack on Australia was always extremely low. Attacks
were more likely to be aimed at disrupting Australia’s economic interests via
maritime trade interdiction or legal and military challenge to the use of strategic
straits away from Australia’s maritime approaches.

Dr John Reeve, in his 2001 working paper, Maritime Strategy and Defence of
the Archipelagic Inner Arc, noted that: ‘the concept of defending the inner arc is (as it
stands) strategically flawed, potentially dangerous, and in need of further
development. It is flawed because it does not relate concepts such as manoeuvre in the
littorals to relevant principles of maritime strategy, especially sea control. He then
stated that: ‘a concept for defending the inner arc must pay attention to controlling the
sea or risk failure.’ 23 His working paper also highlighted the dangers of the inner arc
concept as it tends to neglect the extent of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their
intrinsic relevance to Australia’s national security and the need to better understand
and respond to the fundamentally maritime nature of the region. 24 These statements
and indeed the whole thrust of his paper supports the need for the development of
21

The Defence Update 2003, p.9
The Defence Update 2003, p.9
23
Reeve, J. Maritime Strategy and Defence of the Archipelagic Inner Arc, Working Paper No 5, RAN
Sea Power Centre, Commonwealth of Australia, March 2001, pp, 1-3.
24
Ibid, pp 11-12.
22

Australia’s military strategy and ultimately its Defence White Papers to be based
rigorously on doctrine, especially that of maritime doctrine.

Having emphasised the need to respond to the maritime nature of Australia’s
environment and to see beyond the inner arc and the immediate region, it is obvious
that the region will remain strategically important to Australia. For the foreseeable
future, any sustained conventional land threat to Australia’s physical integrity must
move through this region. This is not to say that any attack will emanate from the
inner arc. However, there is a need to balance the likelihood of an attack being a
conventional land based invasion scenario, as against other effective forms of
threatening Australia.

As stated earlier, attacks on Australia may involve interdiction of trade leading
to economic pressure. Additionally attacks could occur to the coastal infrastructure in
the east, west and south of Australia, including the major centres of population. These
attacks are most likely to be from the sea. The inner arc region is also of importance
to Australia’s economic well being as much of Australia’s trade relies on freedom of
navigation through these archipelagic waters. Australia’s close links with the region
have been demonstrated over many decades and several wars. Australia is unlikely to
remain aloof from the range of operations that may arise in the region at varying
degrees of notice.

The maritime nature of the Australian environment has made it essential that
Australia be able to conduct effective and successful maritime operations in support
of its military strategy, especially within these regional areas. As Dr Eric Grove
wrote; ‘The use of the sea for movement is itself the core of maritime strategy in its
traditional sense.’ 25 Tradition in this sense is reality for an island nation in a region
which is dominated so completely by the sea. The use of the sea for movement is the
core issue facing Australia. Indeed, due to the overwhelmingly maritime nature of
Australia’s environment, any aggression against Australia, or any military action
taken by the ADF in the region, will have a substantial, if not overwhelming,
maritime component.
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Maritime Jurisdictions – Legal Issues
In addition to the geographic nature of the environment there is also the issue
of legal jurisdiction and international maritime law. Maritime strategy cannot be
viewed in isolation from this as military force is used in peacetime, transition to war
and wartime. In any ADF operation personnel involved and actions undertaken are
subject to international law. Historically with respect to international law, the law of
the sea evolved to represent the process of freedom of the seas. Freedom of the seas
was a concept enforced by great powers that have always found a way to ensure that
they could use the seas for their own purposes. As nation states developed and the
concept of freedom of the seas began to be challenged these great states, especially
the United States, Britain, Japan and the trading states of Europe, sought to protect
their access to the sea by law.

The complex nature of maritime jurisdictions in the region can be traced
directly to nations expanding their maritime zones to conform to the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Up until the UNCLOS
conventions the only limitation to the concept of freedom of the seas was that of the
three mile territorial sea which arose purely from the range of a typical British cannon
of the period. Some states had sought to claim a larger territorial sea, but these were
ignored generally by the great powers. However, what is pertinent is that in
accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS, in 1990, Australia proclaimed a 12 nautical mile
territorial sea and in 1994 proclaimed a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). The vast majority of nations in the world have done likewise.

To summarise, it is useful to utilise excerpts from the Introduction to the
publication, Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones. This states;

‘from a legal perspective Australia’s domestic legal regime grants State
and Territory jurisdiction to ‘coastal waters’ out to three miles from the
coast. The Commonwealth government has jurisdiction from the limit
of coastal waters to that of the EEZ or to the edge of the continental
shelf where it continues out beyond the EEZ. Australia may exercise

jurisdiction over high seas offences such as piracy and slave trading.
Australian maritime laws may also be enforced against Australian
flagged vessels and Australian citizens anywhere on the high seas (ie
waters outside the national jurisdiction of any country), including the
200 nautical mile EEZs of other countries. In the territorial sea the
Commonwealth applies much of the legislation of the adjacent State or
Territory’. 1

In a similar fashion the nations of the Asia-Pacific region have enacted 12
nautical mile territorial sea legislation and 200 nautical mile EEZs. Noting the close
proximity of many of the nations of the regions and the number of offshore islands
claimed sometimes by more than one nation, the complexity of maritime law and
jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific region is sometimes seen as compounding difficulties
in conducting maritime operations. In fact, maritime operations remain uncomplicated
in many important strategic ways. Within the foreign nation’s territorial sea maritime
forces have the right to innocent passage. This right to innocent passage can be
suspended temporarily by the coastal state for national security reasons, 2 but reasons
for any such suspension must be substantiated and adequate notice must be given.
Additionally any revocation of the rights of innocent passage must be nondiscriminatory. Under innocent passage regulations warships can transit through a
nations’ waters, but a significant number of operations of a military nature are not
permitted. Flying from a ship or live weapon training for instance is not permitted and
submarines must transit on the surface.

Importantly, however, outside the 12 nautical mile territorial sea, full military
operations may occur. Despite declarations by some countries 3 that seek to limit
military operations in EEZs, maritime forces may operate with few if any constraints.
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Flying operations may occur, exercises may take place, military training, coastal
surveillance and manoeuvres may occur. Submarines may remain submerged. These
activities are conducted having due regard to the coastal states’ rights with respect to
fiscal, sanitary, immigration and economic issues and in a non-discriminatory
fashion. 4 Some coastal states 5 are tending to utilise EEZs as de-facto Territorial Seas
(TS). Despite this, EEZs are a resource zone and not a zone to be utilised by states as
a means of extending territorial sovereignty by stealth. The very term EEZ is focused
on economic resource issues not security or territory.

The tendency by some coastal states to impose restrictions on the military use
of their EEZs perhaps reflects a degree of unease at the flexibility and utility that sea
power brings to bear against them. Despite this unease, when the UNCLOS is
scrutinised in its correct legal interpretation, the ability to conduct a full range of
naval or maritime operations is a vital factor in determining the freedom that
maritime-based forces enjoy under the law. This underpins the importance to
Australia of the maritime strategic concepts, such as sea control, and with it the
protection of sea lines of communications and power projection.

For Australia an important regional strategic issue is the impact of
archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) legislation, especially in the cases of Indonesia and the
Philippines. Conscious of its strategic and economic dependence on passage through
the archipelagoes to its north, Australia has played a vital role in negotiations on this
issue. Prior to the negotiation of UNCLOS, the interpretation by maritime states of
rights of passage between the islands of mid oceanic archipelagoes was based on the
position that each island generated its own territorial sea in which innocent passage
was available to foreign vessels. ‘Where the territorial seas of individual islands
overlapped, a straits regime of non-suspendable innocent passage applied to all
foreign vessels. High seas freedoms of navigation and overflight applied in waters
beyond the territorial seas of individual islands. This meant that in reality liberal
freedoms of navigation and overflight existed through most mid-oceanic
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archipelagos.’ 6 However, having noted this from a legal standpoint, an example of
differing interpretations of maritime legal issues in the region is the case of Indonesia
and their decision to designate three North/South ASLs through their archipelago.

Archipelagic Sea Lanes - Australian Position
including east-west ASL based on ‘normal routes.’

FIGURE 3:
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The Indonesian decision to designate only three north/south ASLs and no
east/west ASL, has led to a series of meetings by Government representatives from
Australia, the United States and Indonesia in the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO). 7 Australia has acknowledged the cultural importance of the wawasan
nusantara 8 and the Java Sea to the Indonesian psyche, but the Indonesian
Government Regulation No 37 of 2002 9 which was ratified in Jakarta via publication
on 28 June 2002, does cause Australia some significant difficulty. This is because it
goes beyond what is permissible at international law. 10 At the centre of this issue is
the decision by Indonesia to legislate in a manner which purports to limit the rights of
user states on the basis of internal security matters.

Building on this from a maritime strategic perspective, the important point to
be observed from the UNCLOS ASL legislation, in contrast to the Indonesian
interpretation of it, is that the archipelagic state has increased sovereign control over
the waters between its constituent islands while guaranteeing a non-suspendable form
of passage for maritime user states in waters which were formerly high seas. The
ASL regime devised in the UNCLOS is based on the concept of ‘routes normally used
for international navigation’ through or over archipelagic waters and the adjacent
territorial sea from entry to exit points. 11

The requirement in Article 53(4) of the UNCLOS, that the sea lanes and air
routes designated by the archipelagic state; ‘shall include all normal passage routes
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used for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters,’ 12
is of crucial significance for maritime user states since it preserves customary rights
of passage formerly enjoyed by foreign vessels and aircraft through archipelagic
waters. Within the sea lanes and the air routes directly above the sea lanes, foreign
vessels and aircraft enjoy non-suspendable rights of navigation and overflight; ‘in the
normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed
transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.’ 13

Therefore, from an international law perspective, despite the differing
interpretations on the access by maritime user states to EEZs by some regional
countries, maritime forces basically have freedom to operate, threat permitting, up to
12 nautical miles from the designated baseline of a coastal state. The only significant
restriction is in archipelagic waters, but importantly under the auspices of the ASL
they can transit through such designated archipelagos in ‘normal’ mode. This allows
passage through the region without seeking prior permission or the agreement of the
geographically adjacent state. Aircraft can also conduct flying operations through the
normal routes of the archipelago, but if sea-lanes have been designated overflight is
restricted to routes above the sea-lanes. 14 When passaging under ASL legislation
maritime forces should not excessively alter course, delay, loiter or conduct
operations that result in such forces not transiting in good time through the
archipelagic area. In summary, ships or aircraft exercising ASL passage must operate
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and
unobstructed passage and not deviate more than 25 nautical miles off the axis lines. 15

In the case of land based aircraft, if passage is not in accordance with ASL
legislation, the freedom of land based aircraft to over flight of the territorial airspace
of a third nation is subject to the sovereign agreement of that nation. There is no
equivalent legislation to that of innocent passage for aircraft and ASL passage is only
12
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available to aircraft if the flight can be completed without the need to utilise a land
base within the archipelagic country itself. This reality could directly impact on
Australia’s ability to project power into the region given that the current land based
air power would need to transit over the Indonesian archipelago, Papua New Guinea
and the Philippines to support nations such as Singapore and Malaysia under the Five
Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), or to conduct any pre-emptive operations that
the Government might desire.

Maritime Strategic Concepts - The Classical Perspective
Having established the maritime nature of Australia’s regional environment
and briefly investigated some legal issues involved in the use of the environment it is
necessary to relate these to maritime strategic concepts as they affect Australia. An
understanding of maritime strategic concepts is axiomatic to an understanding of the
universality of maritime power and the role of the sea in the defence of Australia and
its interests.
It was not until the late 19th century that any intellectual rigour was brought to
the deliberation of the strategic role of the sea in history. Since then, much has been
written on the subject, initially as an attempt to counter an ignorance of the role of the
sea in the survival of nation states.

It was Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, who produced some of the
most renowned writings on sea power. They were significant in strategic debates
amongst nations in the period leading up to the First World War. Mahan’s books were
the catalyst for debates between proponents and opponents of naval expansion,
colonialism and aggressive mercantilist capitalism. Mahan used history to show that
concentration of force, mobility, surprise and the defeat of the enemy fleet was the
key to sea power. Sea power meant control of the sea. Despite a tendency at times to
over state the issue and to draw what could perhaps be termed a ‘long-bow,’ his
writings were and are impressive for their breadth of vision and scope. As John
Hattendorf has stated; ‘a century after the first publication of The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History, one can say of Mahan’s work that it formed the most powerful
single influence on the formulation of naval thought.’ 1

Mahan emphasised the need for the decisive battle as much as classical
strategists such as Clausewitz. However, he recognised that sea power meant the
stoppage of the enemy’s commerce, which would compel peace. ‘Wars are won by
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the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea.’ 2 It was not necessarily the
invasion or destruction of the enemy’s country that would achieve victory. Mahan
knew that it was not always necessary to shatter and destroy. This is a key point when
considering sea power in the context of the defence of Australia. Diplomatic,
economic and political pressure is as fundamental to the successful application of sea
power as the decisive military victory, and Mahan recognised this. A prime example
of this was the sea control strategy of close blockade that characterised British
maritime operations of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Writing at the same time as Mahan was the British strategist, Vice-Admiral
Philip Colomb, RN. His work, Naval Warfare, was first published in 1891. Colomb
traced the rise of naval warfare and linked it to the establishment of commerce. He
noted that having vessels that could remain at sea for prolonged periods of time,
permitted a nation the ability to impact on an enemy that also depended on sea access
for wealth and security. 3 Colomb also wrote about the impact that attacks on the land
could have on a coastal state. His writing was about the use of naval power. He noted
and wrote upon the rise of interest in commanding the sea from the 16th century and
the advent of sea borne commerce.

Another significant maritime strategist was Sir Julian Corbett who published
his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911.

It was built on the

conceptual basis established by Mahan and Colomb and remains highly relevant.
Corbett’s historical and maritime strategic writing dealt with British sea power from
the 16th to 19th centuries. His major theme was how a small country had risen to
great imperial power despite its disadvantages of size. 4

Corbett utilised much of the theoretical aspects of Carl von Clausewitz’s
writings. He noted, as did Clausewitz, ‘that the nature of a war is critical, the
distinction between limited and unlimited war, and the concept of force as a weapon
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of state but only one of the possible tools of policy.’ 5 John Reeve states; ‘his focus
was on the land-sea interface and this is reflected in his use of the word ‘maritime’
rather than ‘naval’. His subject was the role of the sea in strategy, not how navies can
win wars on their own’. 6 He also emphasised the fact that territory cannot be held at
sea, and this is a major difference between land and maritime strategy. As noted
earlier his general conclusion was that; ‘The object of naval warfare is to control
maritime communications.’ 7 Corbett stated this repeatedly in Some Principles of
Maritime Strategy. By this he meant that operations at sea are transient and focused
basically on control of sea lines of communications.

Mahan, Colomb and Corbett valued the role of history in teaching enduring
principles about maritime strategy. The purpose was to draw a direct analogy between
technological revolution, strategic thought and the value of history. They wrote during
the beginning of a profound revolution in military affairs of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. In a period of 30 years, sail was replaced completely in maritime warfare by
steam turbine, oil replaced coal as fuel, big gun dreadnoughts were developed, the
submarine emerged as a significant weapon, the aircraft impacted on sea and land, the
tank and the machine-gun revolutionised land warfare and importantly wireless
communications began to be utilised both strategically and tactically.

If innovation and technology can be termed as resulting in ‘a revolution’ then
this was certainly a revolution in military affairs. Perhaps it was a far more significant
revolution than that which is invoked in many circles today. In the current rush to
embrace new technology a significant proportion of strategic thinkers, military,
academic and journalistic, have neglected to notice that the revolution in military
affairs that occurred in this period did not tear down the historical fabric of military
strategy nor did it create a ‘new way’ of fighting wars. Rather it reinforced the
uncertainty and horror of conflict.

In taking this into account what did the classical maritime strategy of Mahan,
Colomb and Corbett teach?
5
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summarises it very well by stating that their writings are valuable in teaching four
major lessons. These he lists as; the value of history; the link between sea power and
liberal societies; the economy of human life involved in the use of naval power and;
the enormous strategic potential of the sea. He notes that Corbett further stresses the
interdependent nature of land and sea power. ‘The strategic challenge of Mahan’s and
Corbett’s ideas is therefore to maintain the balance and the interconnectedness of land
and sea power and the air power which enhances them both: The challenge is also to
remember that sea power will not do it all, but that in a global society sea power is
indispensable.’ 8 Barry Gough writing about Colomb would agree. He notes that
Colomb stressed the role of history upon sea power and that ‘history dictated that
countries that would be strong must learn from the past and control the ocean trades
and ocean routes of the world.’ 9
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Maritime Strategic Concepts – Contemporary Developments
When concluding his discussion of the principal elements which affect the
growth of sea power, Mahan was entirely correct when he stated famously the often
quoted line that, ‘from time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or
wholly torn down; but the foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a
rock.’ 1 In recent times in support of this premise, strategists of the maritime
persuasion 2 have attempted to add balance to the unbridled fascination in some
quarters with technology and to counter ignorance when it comes to the multi-faceted
role of maritime forces. The maritime strategy that characterised British maritime
operations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially the blockade and
interdiction of enemy forces is as relevant today as then. Maritime Interception Force
Operations (MIFOPS) would be a contemporary example of this form of maritime
strategy. The imposing visible presence of ships standing close off-shore has been
supplemented by advanced long range surveillance including that from space, the real
possibility of submarine attack, the threat of offensive mining, long range surface
strike capability and air attack, both sea borne and land based. Mobility, surprise,
surveillance and exploitation of information warfare permit a hitherto undreamed of
ability to exploit traditional strategic operations in a blue water context. Real time
tactical data links now permit data fusion between geographically disparate units,
facilitating force projection and weapon engagement far beyond single unit sensor
acquisition range. However, the basics of maritime doctrine remain unyielding.

In some quarters there is a belief that networked information systems are a
panacea for the realities of the environment, the primacy of nature and the very
essence of human conflict over the centuries. Technology, however, will not do it all.
Conflict as always will involve the human element. It will be the sailor, soldier and
airman together with civilians, national government, infrastructure and corporate
businesses that will determine the outcome. This is not to say that technological
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change has not impacted on methods of conflict. It has, but in a relative not absolute
way.

Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Network Enabled Operations (NEO)
amongst other titles are terms by which the perceived transformation of the way
forces will fight and be organised in the information age has been grouped. NCW has
been defined by different organisations.

One definition is; ‘an information

superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness,
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased
survivability, and a degree of synchronization. In essence, NCW translates
information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable
entities in the battlespace.’ 3 By this definition the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of
Jutland, as examples, were NCW operations. In these maritime battles individual units
were controlled as a whole, networked together. NCW is nothing revolutionary in the
maritime domain. It remains a relative use of available technology.

When accepting the definition of NCW, the question for Australia is what
does NCW really imply and how does it impact on maritime geo-strategic realities?
From the Australian operational perspective it should be seen as a logical use of new
technology, much the same way that military force has utilised technology over the
centuries. However, there is a tendency within some sections to see it as changing the
very character of conflict. In support of the former view, Professor Owens, Professor
of Strategy and Force Planning at the US Naval War College, has pointed out that if
Clausewitz’s timeless elements of war, those of its non-linear nature, uncertainty and
friction are actually valid, then those who stress a new ‘orthodoxy’ in thought are
wrong. He has stated that; ‘Such an imposition of orthodoxy is based on the
assumption that it is possible to predict and control the actions of potential
adversaries…it discounts that the world is dynamic and characterised by uncertainty.
If the vision is correct, things will be fine. If not, defeat may well be the ultimate
result.’ 4 There is great danger in NCW being seen as an absolute revolution in
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military affairs, which imposes its own orthodoxy, rather than a relatively logical use
of technology in support of strategic concepts.

When reflecting on a tendency towards orthodoxy in strategic thought in
Australia, especially in relation to the strategic concept of Defence of Australia, it is
refreshing to prophesize that during the 20th century technology has in fact vindicated
maritime strategic concepts by providing additional roles for maritime forces.
However, across the spectrum of maritime operations these roles have a ‘relative’ not
‘absolute’ effect. These additional roles include coercive constabulary operations such
as border protection against immigration and resource piracy, nuclear deterrence, sea
basing and theatre ballistic missile protection. The realities of conflict have many
times surprised and baffled those whose protestations indicated the premature demise
of maritime power in conflict.

Examples of this includes the Falklands Island

campaign of 1982 and the maritime interdiction operations against Iraq in 1990 the
Gulf War itself of 1991 and even the War against Terror in Afghanistan. 5

The multi-faceted nature of maritime power was well appreciated by Admiral
Sergei Gorshkov who was a significant figure in maritime strategic thought in the 20th
century. Admiral Gorshkov was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from the
1956 to 1985. He was expansive in his support for balanced maritime forces. In his
book, The Sea Power of the State, he concluded by noting that one of the main
qualities of modern naval forces was their universality, their ability to perform
multiple tasks including attacks on sea lines of communications and operations
directly against the shore. 6 He commented that the predominantly defensive, coastal
nature of the Soviet navy was no longer adequate to meet the multi-faceted activity of
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the navy in wars and peacetime. That the art of using its forces depended on it being a
‘balanced’ force. 7

In further reinforcement of a maritime strategy, it is useful to refer to Professor
Ken Booth and his description of the functions of navies. He stated that the theme of
navies and foreign policy is the use of the sea for the passage of goods and people, for
the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes, for use against targets on sea or
land and for the exploitation of resources. 8

He noted a trinity of functions, of the

military role, the diplomatic role and the policing role. 9 However, the military role
formed the essence of the three, providing the power projection and threat of the use
of force, which underpinned the latent diplomatic, and policing functions.

This

projection of force was the essence of maritime power. Without this capability, be it
organic air power, land based air in some cases, cruise missiles or long range
precision guided munitions, a force is powerless to perform its sea control and
policy/power projection or military role. This theme is enunciated clearly in
Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN Doctrine 1). 10 It can be seen, therefore, that
maritime strategic concepts have developed over time, building on historical lessons
and strategic realities while absorbing the impact of technology, increasing
knowledge and changing societal values.

In the maritime strategic school terms used to describe maritime concepts
include command of the sea, sea control and sea denial. Command of the sea was
historically an absolute concept, which basically espoused free use of the sea by a
nation. Although this was tacitly understood for centuries, it was Mahan and Colomb
who made great use of the term. 11 Colomb in particular placed great emphasis on
command of the sea. He stressed that command of the sea was ‘henceforth to be
understood as the aim of naval war. A power striving for anything else, such as
evasions, or surprises of ports or territories, or merely defensive guardings of
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commerce, accepted the position of the inferior and beaten naval power, and could
never hope, so long as she maintained that attitude, of seriously damaging her
opponent,’ 12

The Royal Navy, imbued with the need to achieve such dominance of the
world’s oceans, held the belief until the end of the First World War that command of
the sea was determined by a decisive battle. From 1805 onwards for over 100 years
the lesson of the Battle of Trafalgar, was concerned was that command of the sea
maintained the empire and ensured the safety of Britain.

The Battle of Jutland was the catalyst, which hastened for many the end of the
concept of the decisive battle and command of the sea. The tactics of the Germans
that led to the battle revolved around attempts to surprise a small portion of the Grand
Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe was well aware of the German strategic plan to weaken the
RN portion by portion and his caution resulted in the German High Seas Fleet
escaping almost certain destruction at the hands of the Grand Fleet. The escape was
made easier by British tactical problems, communications inefficiency, fractured
command and control, and poor ammunition flash control. However, the fact is that
British survival during the First World War was seen as depending on maintaining
command of the sea, which only the continued existence of the Grand Fleet could
ensure. 13

After the Battle of Jutland, the concept of command of the sea began to be
challenged. Indeed as already alluded to, a close reading of classical strategists,
would have revealed the fact that maritime strategy was certainly not just about the
decisive battle, but that it included ongoing diplomatic, presence, coercive and
economic issues. However, for many naval practitioners, the First World War did
represent a practical watershed in maritime strategy because the lessons learned
brought this home to even the most traditional in naval circles. The absolute sense of a
term such as command of the sea could not be maintained. This was due in many
12

Naval Warfare, Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated, 1891, 3rd edition 1899,
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, 1990, p. 47
13
Gordon, A. The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, John Murray Publishers,
London, 1996, pp. 20-21. Andrew Gordon noted in this section Churchill’s statement that Jellicoe was
‘the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’

respects to the revolution in military affairs that had occurred from 1880 onwards and
the emergence of more navies. At the dawn of the 20th Century, nations such as the
United States, Germany and Japan, began to trade more internationally and to begin to
understand the importance of the sea to their status, and continued emergence, as
nation states. The lesson of history, as written so succinctly by Colomb, Corbett and
Mahan, was appreciated by these nations. The need for a navy then became the norm
for nations other than the traditional trading and empire building nations of Europe
such as Britain, The Netherlands and France.

In addition to strategic and political realities, the economic burden imposed by
the continuing revolution in military technology on post 1918 national economies,
meant that command of the sea could not be preserved. 14 In response to these issues
the term sea control was coined to encompass the more modern realities, whilst
upholding the vital role of history and strategy. 15 Sea control is very much a multidimensional concept as it encompasses the control of the air, control of the surface of
the sea, control of the undersea water column and control of the littoral sea and
landmass and control of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Australian Maritime Doctrine
defines the concept of sea control as: ‘that condition which exists when one has
freedom of action to use an area of sea for one’s own purposes and, if required, deny
its use to an adversary.’ 16 It is a relative rather than absolute concept with the aim
being to establish sufficient control, in a particular area, for a period of time, to enable
one to use the sea for one’s own purposes. Control of the sea may be established
through key battles. Examples of such battles from the Second World War are those
of Coral Sea, Cape Matapan and Midway. However, again as these battles
demonstrated, control of the sea is unlikely to be finally settled. It is likely to be a
14
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continuing contest. This was certainly the case with the Battle of the Atlantic, which
ebbed and flowed from 1939 to 1944 as the British and Allied forces contested sea
control in the vicinity of the merchant convoys which supplied and sustained Britain
against Germany.

These four battles are just as relevant now to Australia understanding maritime
strategy as they were in the 1940s. They remain good examples of sea control. The
result was the ability of the British and American forces to establish sufficient control
to use the sea for their purposes and to prevent the enemy from being able to interfere
decisively. Cape Matapan was crucial in undermining the confidence of the Italian
Navy in the Mediterranean and permitted the British to more confidently carry out
traditional maritime roles such as sea lines of communications protection with convoy
resupply of Malta and logistics support to army units in North Africa. The support by
maritime forces, naval and merchant ships, of the Australian troops in the siege of the
North African port town of Tobruk, made famous in Australia by the ‘Rats of
Tobruk,’ was a good example of the sea control. More broadly the Battle of the
Atlantic not only sustained Britain in the early stages of World War II but sea control
around the convoys was axiomatic to the build-up of Allied forces for land operations
in North Africa and later Europe. In the Pacific theatre, the Battle of the Coral Sea
prevented a landing of Japanese land forces by sea in the vicinity of Port Moresby,
while the Battle of Midway enabled the Pacific island advance of United States’s
forces.

The important point in sea control is the multi-dimensional reality. Axiomatic
to sea control is control of the air, which requires maritime power projection and an
air warfare capability. In a regionally representative threat environment, involving
operations in close proximity to an adversary that has a viable counter-air capability,
the absence of air power and air warfare will almost inevitably prevent a force
achieving sea control. Without sea control sea lines of communications will be
interdicted, there will be no power projection and forces cannot be operated ashore.
The need for the air power to be within the area of operations will be discussed later.
Suffice to state at this point that the geography of the Australian maritime
environment will almost inevitably thwart effective counter air or air dominance
operations by land based aircraft at a distance from the Australian mainland.

Trade in the Australian sense is about controlling the sea lines of
communications. As mentioned earlier, for Australia the need for protection of trade
could be within the region, including strategic straits, coastal waters and open ocean
areas, as well as at distance from Australia itself. Dr Eric Grove has pointed out that,
‘the overwhelming weight of historical evidence seems to demonstrate that unless
some direct protection is given to shipping then the exercise of command of the sea
may be impossible. In other words, the battle around the ships themselves may be as
vital to gaining command of the sea as operations elsewhere, perhaps more so.’ 17 His
use of the term command of the seas in this context is in effect sea control as he is
referring to superiority of force at the necessary place in which to destroy the fighting
capacity of the enemy. Maritime assets, both in the air and on or under the sea, are
required in area, at immediate notice, to achieve this. Thus the protection of sea lines
of communications is about protecting the ships themselves, not the sea. 18To achieve
this, the forces required need a high degree of prominence in force structure planning.

In addition to protecting sea lines of communications the ability to provide
power projection is in many ways the most fundamental thing that sea control enables.
As Professor Colin Gray wrote as the first sentence in Chapter One of his work, The
Leverage of Sea Power, ‘navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can
secure ashore, where people live.’ 19 In this respect the core aerospace capabilities of
precision strike and rapid force projection are related to maritime ideas of power
projection. In the maritime context, however, a fundamental difference is that in
providing this power projection, maritime forces enjoy the benefits of maritime force
characteristics such as accessibility, flexibility and ambiguity with which to influence
events ashore as necessary.

Supplementing sea control is the concept of sea denial. Sea denial as a
maritime strategic concept is in effect a subset of sea control. Sea denial can be
explained as the ability to deny an adversary the ability to use the sea for their own
purposes without necessarily being able to utilise the sea for your purposes at the
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same time. 20 The U-boat campaigns by the Germans in both World Wars are
examples of a sea denial strategy as is the concept of offensive mining.

Having defined sea denial it is necessary to state that many sea denial
strategies, despite an initial success, ultimately fail. They fail in most cases because
they are one-dimensional. In the German case, the Battle of the Atlantic was onedimensional. It could be characterised as an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach. Once the Uboat had been countered, the Germans had no other effective weapon with which to
continue the sea denial strategy.

This can be compared to the very successful

submarine and air campaign of the United States in the Pacific against Japanese
shipping. This sea denial operation was successful due to the fact that the United
States used it as a subset of a sea control strategy. This is relevant for Australia as the
current over reliance on sea denial, in the absence of a sea control capability, could
have a significant adverse effect. This is certainly so when strategic tasks such as
protection of trade (sea lines of communications) and maritime power projection,
utilising the Australian Army’s manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment
concept, are considered.

The maritime strategic concepts of sea control and sea denial are used by the
RAN to describe the role of maritime forces for Australia. However, a close look at
Australia’s prime military task, as defined in Defence 2000, of defending Australia
and its direct approaches (DA) would indicate that this task is not viewed within
Defence 2000 as a sea control task. Rather, within strategic guidance it is treated as a
sea denial one, a sub-set of sea control. In noting this, and having defined very briefly
three maritime strategic concepts, it is necessary to stress that the maritime
environment is intrinsically a joint one, combining sea, land and air assets. The
integration of sea, land and air assets is required to achieve success in the application
of the correct strategy at the right place at the right time. Individual military units
need to cooperate and complement each other to achieve the common aim.
Commanders of joint forces have to be able to recognise the distinctive characteristics
of the various components of the force and be fully ready to employ each according to
19

Gray, C. The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, The Free Press,
New York, USA 1992, p.1.
20
Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 39, Grove, E. The Future of Sea Power, p.15

its strengths and limitations. It is only by capitalising on the synergy of the whole that
maximum effectiveness can be achieved.

One example of this is maritime air warfare. A proficient air warfare
capability is vital to operations at sea and in the littoral area. Air warfare can be best
summarised as active and passive measures taken to facilitate command of the air
environment to ensure the success of the mission.

This can include defensive

measures aimed at the defeat of an enemy attack or a plan of attack and offensive
measures taken to prevent the enemy use of the environment in pursuit of their
mission. Command of the air environment is defined as denial, superiority or
supremacy of the air environment as dictated by the mission requirements.

The conduct of maritime air warfare demands the employment and integration
of a wide range of assets; from wide area surveillance and fixed wing air dominance
aircraft to long-range surface to air missiles and complementary radar and sensor
systems, to close-range point defence weapons and electronic warfare systems. It may
also include strike operations to destroy enemy air power on the ground before it can
take offensive action. It is fundamental to the success of air warfare that these assets
are wielded as a coordinated whole, with each capability complementing every other,
and interference between systems minimised.

One type of force, however, cannot simply be substituted for another. Each
attribute makes a unique and vital contribution and when combined, they must ensure
maritime air warfare supremacy in order to be successful. Layered and complimentary
systems are the key to the resilience of a force, to achieving the sea control that
underpins maritime strategy. This is an unmovable necessity if mission success is to
be achieved. The trend to excessive orthodoxy in strategic thought needs to be
resisted, as does a one-dimensional, technological approach to operations, borne as it
is from a rigidly of tactical thought. It ignores the flexibility, poise and persistence
that layered, complimentary capability offers to maritime operations. The lack of air
warfare in a scenario, that enabling layer of capability against a regionally
representative threat to the forces involved, results in Australia being prevented from
achieving sea control and therefore a successful maritime strategic outcome. This is

the key to successful maritime operations in, through and over Australia’s maritime
geographic environment

Australian Maritime Doctrine and Its Characteristics
In addition to the strategic concepts of sea control and sea denial, Australian
Maritime Doctrine lists some characteristics of maritime forces, which have been
enunciated in different ways by maritime strategists over many years. It must be
remembered that these characteristics are relative to other forces, and the relativities
are not constant. Australian Maritime Doctrine is the prime source used in this paper
when describing these characteristics. The characteristics are re-stated in this paper as
an understanding of them is essential if a proper appreciation of how maritime forces
underpin Australian strategic realities is to be gained.

First, maritime forces provide mobility in mass as they can be continuously
mobile, with their own logistics, and so can cover very large distances. This is
obviously situation dependent, but in the Australian maritime environment and given
the diplomatic realities of over-flight of foreign landmass, in almost all cases mobility
by mass will be via the sea. Thousands of tonnes of equipment, cargo and logistics
supplies can be moved in a number of days within the region or in three weeks as far a
field as the Persian Gulf without the need for diplomatic permission. The Australian
involvement in Vietnam was heavily supported and enabled by sealift. The ex-aircraft
carrier, HMAS Sydney proved to be the linchpin of Australia’s forward defence
policy. 1 From 1965 to 1972, Sydney made 23 runs from Australia to the Vietnamese
port of Vung Tau, escorted by at least two surface combatants, and carrying the bulk
of Australia’s ground forces. 2

Maritime forces also provide readiness via rapid deployment. There is no
immediate need for forward operating bases, or prolonged diplomatic negotiations
and so maritime forces can typically be quickly operational in theatre. Examples
include the rapid reaction by the RAN to the Government’s decision to provide assets
to Operation Desert Shield in 1990 in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Two
guided missile frigates, HMA ships Adelaide and Darwin and the replenishment ship,
1
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HMAS Success were notified on the Thursday and sailed on the following Monday for
the operational area. In more recent times in response to the MV Tampa incident in
August 2001, two frigates, HMA ships Newcastle and Warramunga and the
amphibious transport HMAS Manoora, were diverted from exercises in South East
Asia for border protection operations. These ships were on station off Christmas
Island and Ashmore Reef within four days. Operations were then carried out
involving four suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs) without any ship having first
visited Australia for either re-supply or further training. A third frigate, HMAS
Arunta, was sailed from its base in Western Australia with only 12 hours notice
having only just returned to port from other operations.

Related to response and readiness for an operation is the factor of access. As
described earlier, in operations other than war the UNCLOS permits maritime forces
free operations everywhere except territorial seas, archipelagic waters and internal
waters. The only limitation is the degree of threat present and that is a similar issue
for land-based forces. In the border protection issue, the vessels involved transited
through the Indonesian archipelago to the area of operations without the need to gain
any permission from the Indonesian government or to provide any notification in
advance. This led not only to access but also rapid reaction in accordance with the
conventions of international law. Another factor for government consideration is that
maritime forces leave no political footprint in transiting from one area to another.

Maritime forces also provide flexibility via the ability to deploy or withdraw at
will, providing a rapid response to government direction and a welcome degree of
ambiguity which is very useful in many operations other than war. A withdrawal can
also be accompanied without the diplomatic embarrassment that can come from the
images of a land headquarters, buildings or bases being abandoned. Maritime forces
can simply sail away, and embarrassment or ‘loss of face,’ often vital in diplomatic
and politically sensitive situations can be limited. Maritime forces are also adaptable.
This relates to their flexibility and refers to the transition from peace to wartime
footing quickly, often without any external signs. Maritime forces can be in a foreign
port, conducting activities as diverse as training, diplomatic initiatives, charity work,
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supporting trade expositions for examples and then they can sail and loiter 12 nautical
miles off shore as necessary.

Their demeanour can be aggressive, passive or

ambiguous without any external sign, if that is the desire of the Government. This
flexibility is unique to maritime forces, specifically ships.

Reach and poise and persistence are also characteristics of maritime forces.
They permit operations at long range from home port through self-contained logistics.
Maritime forces can remain useful in the area of operations for a considerable length
of time, which may be difficult for an adversary to gauge. A recent example involves
the border protection operations against illegal immigration. From August 2001 until
the end of January 2002, HMAS Warramunga was assigned to border protection
duties for 125 days. Of these days, 119 were spent at sea, on task. During that time
four suspected illegal entry vessels were intercepted successfully with one returned to
the vicinity of Indonesia’s territorial sea.

The final attribute is resilience. Although seen often by some strategists and
theorists as vulnerable, maritime forces are in fact resilient with good resistance of a
force or ships to damage. Mobility remains a major factor ensuring the safety of
maritime forces. Maritime forces can also be viewed as less mission sensitive to
defects, especially when compared to aircraft operating in areas of operations at great
distances from their bases. Practical operational experience of distance and aircraft
operations indicates that there is either 100 percent coverage in the area of operations
or a zero percent coverage. An aircraft defect when operating at distance from the
area of operations often results in mission cancellation and no coverage for that sortie
period.
Australian Maritime Doctrine 3 also lists some limitations for maritime forces.
When compared to land forces transience is one such limitation. Maritime forces
cannot hold the sea in the same way as troops can hold the ground. However,
maritime forces are less transient than aircraft and therefore the scenario again
determines the role. Indirectness can also be a limitation with the effects of maritime
campaign often not easy to discern for sometime afterwards. Blockade as a maritime
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function is an example of an operation whose effects are indirect and often not evident
for some time afterwards. By then of course, the focus of interest has often shifted and
the true value of such operations is not analysed fully. When looking at indirectness
as a limitation, the primary danger is that it tends to disguise the critical nature of the
maritime environment in most conflicts. However, it is equally true that indirectness
can be viewed as a positive characteristic of maritime forces especially in relation to
roles such as blockade.

Another potential limitation is speed. As mentioned before, maritime forces
may be slow in comparison with aircraft but they are in fact fast when compared to
many other forms of prolonged response, especially as the ship is at sea basically fully
armed, logistically capable and ready to go. Importantly maritime forces do not
require diplomatic approval to appear in theatre and this does aid in their speedy
deployment in theatre.

These characteristics are relative ideas and they are situation dependent.
Australia’s current and planned maritime forces have many of these characteristics,
but their ability to operate in other than relatively benign theatres, or coalition
operations is limited by the inability to project force via combat operations at sea.
Combat operations from the sea have a much more direct and obvious joint or
combined purpose. However, the ADF will be unable to project land forces ashore
unless it has the capability to conduct sea control operations and not merely limited
defensive sea denial tasks.

For a nation in a maritime region, these issues are quite fundamental to
Australia’s military strategy. If Australia does not understand and apply them, despite
anything that may be written Australia will in reality be constrained to a ‘Fortress
Australia’ methodology, a continentalist approach to its security. As such a wide
range of potentially very effective military options will be inevitably denied. Noting
that sea control is multi-dimensional, the RAN’s and ADF’s achilles heel is the lack
of credible maritime air warfare, incorporating air warfare destroyers and long range
surface to air superiority weapons, command and control capability and maritime
organic air power. These are all required if a response in the military or diplomatic
sense is to be truly multi-dimensional.

In recent times, the desire of the Australian Government to have a pre-emptive
capability has been much in the news. The Prime Minister, John Howard stated on
radio that given the knowledge of a forthcoming threat to Australia he would certainly
authorise a pre-emptive strike. 4 The Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill was
quoted as stating that; ‘The need to act swiftly and firmly before threats become
attacks is perhaps the clearest lesson of September 11, and is one that is clearly
driving US policy and strategy. It is a position which we share in principle.’ 5 This
position was re-stated again on 1 December 2002 by Mr Howard in an interview on
the Sunday Programme. 6 Noting the negative reaction from the region 7 to this
statement of intent, the access of forces from the sea and the flexibility this brings a
government would be of even more importance should this action ever be needed.
Whether or not this scenario is ever realised, Australia’s ability to do this without
implementing a maritime strategy must be questioned. Certainly the problems of overflight, diplomatic clearance and sovereignty would limit the ability of Australian
mainland based air power to operate effectively in any such operation.

When speaking on the implications for Australia of the globalisation of
security which has arisen since the terrorist attack on the United States on 11
September 2001, Senator Hill in June 2002 stated:

‘For Australia, it demonstrates again that defence of Australia and its
interests does not stop at the edge of the air-sea gap. It probably never
made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of
diminishing concentric circles around our own coastline, but it
certainly does not do so now. We are seeing a fundamental change to
the notion that our security responsibilities are confined largely to our
own region.
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increasingly likely to be deployed well beyond Australia. This will
require a greater emphasis on strategic lift in our planning.’ 8

In short, this approach is maritime strategy with the means of implementing
strategic concepts required to be from the three armed forces, the RAN, Australian
Army and RAAF. Maritime strategy, and power projection via strategic lift are
specifically concerned with the exercise of maritime power. It emanates from forces
drawn from all three services, both land and sea-based, supported by national and
commercial resources, exercising influence over sea, land and air environments.
However, to achieve this there is a need for layered and complimentary forces. A
strategic lift capability, such as that envisaged by Senator Hill and as enunciated in
Joint Projects 2048 and 2027, aimed at replacing amphibious systems and giving a
meaningful transport capability to the army’s manoeuvre operations in the littoral
environment (MOLE), is limited significantly in value without the enabling element
of sea control for which air power and sea power is required. In Australia’s region this
requires maritime power projection and protection of sea lines of communications to
ensure that the forces involved actually can get to their objective and be landed safely
in anything but a benign environment. Control of the maritime environment is a
critical requirement for the conduct of any operation within the region.
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The Continentalist Approach – Aerospace Theory & Land
Warfare Strategy
Having made reference to a continentalist approach to military strategy it is
fitting to define briefly what is meant by this term. For the purpose of this paper
continental thought is espoused basically as the art of bringing a powerful land force
to bear via land manoeuvre at the decisive point to achieve victory. In this
perspective, the use of the term “land force” includes air power. By including air
power this is in some way a deviation from the traditional continental approach, but it
reflects and compliments the three dimensional characteristic of maritime strategy and
indeed it reflects land battles since 1939, especially after the conception and use of
‘blitzkrieg.’ 1 By using this approach aerospace power could be viewed more
accurately as a pre-requisite to success in the two strategic requirements, the
continental and the maritime, and not as a separate school of strategic thought in its
own right.

The RAAF notes that; ‘aerospace power developed into an integral, yet
discrete, part of warfare. Aerospace power can still provide direct support to the
surface battle but, through exploitation of unique characteristics, it will be equally
able to carry out discrete functions that do not necessarily involve surface forces.’ 2 As
a strategic statement this is open to contest. It is perhaps true in a limited tactical
scenario, but not strategically. Aerospace power should be seen in the same way as
maritime power. As already quoted, ‘navies fight at sea for the strategic effect they
have ashore where people live.’ 3 Logically therefore, aerospace power fights in the air
for the strategic effect it has on the ground, where people live. For a strategic effect to
be achieved, surface forces, whether directly or indirectly, must be effected by the
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‘fight.’ The change of government or change of government policy that occurs due to
a use of aerospace power in isolation, therefore, does involve surface forces in a
strategic manner. This is important in understanding how aerospace power effects
maritime strategy.

From the perspective of land forces, the Australian Army defines land power
as; ‘the ability to exert immediate and sustained influence on or from the land in
conditions of peace, crisis and war. It involves the capability to use land forces to
uphold and protect Australia’s sovereignty and interests. Land forces will have the
capability to undertake a wide range of warfighting and non-combat tasks on
Australian territory and in the regional maritime environment. If necessary, land
power may be projected further afield.’ 4 The Australian Army publication, The
Fundamentals of Land Warfare, also notes that land power does not operate in
isolation and that the employment of land, sea and air forces in joint operations will
often be necessary in order to achieve decisive outcomes. It then states; ‘Australia’s
geo-strategic circumstances require joint forces that can be employed in a littoral
environment where the respective domains of land, sea and air forces converge.’ 5
The key statement that, ‘land forces in this environment are fundamentally dependent
on sea and air forces for deployment, protection, sustainment and re-deployment,’ 6
reinforces the vital role in the Australian context of maritime strategy as the enabler of
operations at sea, in the air and on the land for any Australian operation in the region
or beyond.

Countries that rely on the use of a continental strategy are typified by having
contested land borders with numerous access points. Historically the survival of the
nation state in such a geo-strategic situation has required a large land army and, in
more recent times, an effective land based air force. As Antoine Henry Jomini stated;
‘Strategy, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the
important point of the theatre of war or the zone of operations.’ 7 In the context of
Australia with the absence of any land border, the only way to achieve this is via the

4

The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, LWD 1, Australian Army, Commonwealth of Australia, 2002,
p.26.
5
Ibid, p. 28
6
Ibid, p. 28

sea. This is where maritime strategy should subsume continental strategy for
Australia. This requires credible maritime forces, maritime air power, sea control and
the ability within the national infrastructure to support the forces once deployed.

Dr Norman Friedman, in the Synnot lecture series of 2002, noted that the end
of the Soviet system meant the end of cheap sophisticated ground weaponry.
Additionally the rising cost per soldier, or per unit, has led and will lead to a cut in the
size of armies. High technology can compensate for the loss of mass to a degree but
this is also expensive. 8 This is relevant to the continental debate as it reinvigorates the
importance of strategic mobility and the use of the sea sanctuary. 9 Australia in the
past was part of an imperial maritime empire and was used primarily as a source of
manpower for it. 10 The maritime empire has now disappeared and thus the emphasis
must also be reviewed.
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This was evident especially in World War I and to a lesser extent in World War II.

An International Historical Perspective
Having reviewed the characteristics of the continental and maritime
environment that determine maritime strategic concepts, it is timely to restate that
history provides vindication of the maritime strategic approach. Nations that have
concentrated on a continentalist approach have been successful only until they have
attempted to project force over the sea or to defend against attack from the sea. For at
least the last 500 years in the final determination of victory maritime power has never
lost. This is a vitally important fact if Australia is to truly respond in an adept manner
to the realities of its strategic and geographic situation.

History reveals a long and impressive record of the strategic value of flexible
sea power. Without sea control a maritime power is defeated. In the First World War
the North Sea blockade, in which Australia participated, demonstrated the major
military and commercial advantages of sea control. Notably, during the Second
World War, the Atlantic victory required surface capabilities as well as sea and land
based air cover. In the Mediterranean the RAN excelled in a variety of sea control
roles, which aided the defence of the Middle East and the conduct of the war in
Africa.

The Allied naval operations, which won the war in the Pacific, required sea
control. Sea control was gained via surface and air engagements and amphibious
power projection. Submarine operations were used primarily for sea denial. Landbased air cover also depended on sea control for base acquisition and supply. Both
eastern and western Australia were important bases for allied maritime operations,
and the RAN was a major alliance builder with the USN. In Cold War Asia, sea
power was a major factor in coalition building, deterrence and containment. In
Korea, United Nations sea control, again in which Australia participated, enabled the
war to be fought in all its aspects.

Similar circumstances obtained in Vietnam, where the interoperability of the
RAN’s new guided missile destroyers (DDGs) facilitated alliance politics and

gunfire support. 1 In the Gulf in 1990-91 sea power classically gained time, structured
the conflict and enabled the eventual counter offensive, utilising blockade, lift, strike,
and amphibious decoy capabilities. The RAN's Gulf presence then and since has had
reach and interoperability in contributing to the USN’s sea control in that area of
operations. The flexibility of sea power has so often established the context of a war
and been the springboard for victory.

When examining history in more detail, perhaps better understood is the
experience of Britain and more recently the United States. The great proponents of
maritime strategy, Britain in the 16th – 20th centuries and the United States from 1901
onwards, have ultimately been victorious over Continentalist powers due to the
efficacy of the sea. Evidence of this includes the North Africa Campaign and defeat
of General Rommel in 1943, the Pacific campaign of 1942-1945, the 1951
amphibious landing at Inchon in the Korean War, the recovery by Britain of the
Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Gulf War of 1991, where the seaward flank was
secured and maintained throughout.

The nation, which best utilised sea power in its guise of command of the sea
and more recently sea control, was Britain. Blockade, the threat of the fleet in being,
the bringing of the enemy fleet to battle and its destruction or defeat, the maintenance
of sea lines of communications and the projection of diplomatic power via the sea
were all exercised by Britain via its maritime forces. Britain utilised a series of
alliances with land powers to counter the great power status of any single power in
Europe. This was so in relation to Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russia in the nineteenth century
and Germany in the twentieth century. The British utilised land power when and
where necessary to support its allies in Europe. In the case of the Napoleonic Wars,
the Peninsular campaign in Spain from 1812 to 1815 was enabled by sea power which
projected the military power. Its initial aim was limited but in the end it proved to be

1
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a decisive campaign in preventing France from countering an effective continentalist
attack from Russia and Prussia.

The history of the United States has shown an increasing awareness of the
importance of the sea and maritime power in that nation’s security. The inability of
the British to maintain control of the sea in the American War of Independence led
directly to the defeat of the British army under General Cornwallis at Yorktown in
1781. This defeat effectively meant the end of the American Revolution 2 and the
independence of the United States. Even though the United States then concentrated
for a century on internal issues, being isolationist in outlook, the nature of their geostrategic environment meant that they almost inevitably became involved in maritime
issues. Involvement in the Philippines and the Caribbean against Spain, and fear of
unwelcomed European interest in the North American landmass led to the United
States developing a substantial navy and a maritime capability and strategy from the
beginning of the twentieth century. This strategy has served it well for over 100
years.
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Australian Historical Perspective
In considering the Australian historical perspective there are numerous
examples that should emphasise the holistic nature of the sea. The very pattern of
settlement of Australia by Britain reflected this. Australia was settled on the coast
with the major cities being established firstly as deep-water ports. However, despite
this overriding historical link, in the context of Australia, maritime forces have
suffered from a lack of profile. The statement ‘out of sight, out of mind’ has long
been true of the Australian knowledge of the pivotal role of maritime affairs in the
shaping and survival of the nation. It is the sea that framed and determined the
ancient history of the island continent. It is the sea, which kept the indigenous
inhabitants, the unique Australian fauna and flora isolated for some 40,000 years, and
ultimately it was by sea that the Europeans colonised the land. Although it was the
harshness of the western coastline and interior deserts which deterred earlier invasion
of the continent from the Dutch East Indies or from Europe, it was only via sea that
any such invasion or exploitation could occur. The historian Geoffrey Blainey notes
that Tasmania was completely isolated by sea and its segregation was perhaps the
longest in human history. He also states that although mainland Australia was not
completely isolated, the narrow strait between New Guinea and Australia, ‘served as a
deep ditch or barrier for thousands of years.’ 1

With the scientific and technological developments of the late eighteenth
century it was only a matter of time before Europeans would seriously consider
further exploration in the region of Australia. In the early years after 1788, the first
colony in Sydney was sustained from the sea. It faced starvation in the first year as the
initial crops failed and the colonists laboured to understand the intricacies of
successful agriculture in Australia. As Australia developed, although threats to its
sovereignty were seen to be via the sea, the solution was often seen to lie in
continentally based forces. In the period of the Crimean War in the mid nineteenth
century, Russia emerged as the main threat. Coastal fortifications were built in
Sydney and Melbourne specifically to counter the ‘Russian’ threat. Despite a focus on
1
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land defences there was some understanding of maritime issues. Many of the colonies
developed navies or coastal maritime defence forces. There was also enough of a
focus to ensure that great political emphasis was placed on Britain maintaining
significant maritime forces in the Australian region.

Later, almost immediately after Federation in 1901, it was Japan that was
viewed with alarm by the embryonic nation. In some significant quarters it was
acknowledged that Australia was absolutely dependent on the sea. ‘Nowhere’, said
Prime Minister Alfred Deakin in 1906, ‘are maritime communications more important
than to Australia, seeing that our dependence upon sea carriage is certain to increase
rather than diminish as population and production advance.’ 2 It was Australian
consternation at the apparent lack of priority by Britain in Australian affairs, Britain’s
1902 treaty with Japan and the growing strength of Japanese naval power that led to
Deakin independently approaching the United States, the resultant visit of the USN
Great White Fleet in 1907 3 and the expansion of the Australian Navy.

An emphasis on maritime affairs in Australia was, however, only appreciated
by few in this period. As is the case today there was much greater public awareness
of the utility of land based forces. The then Minister for Defence, J.W. McCay is
reported as being of the view that naval developments should await the completion of
land protection. 4 To Captain (later Vice-Admiral Sir William) Creswell, the Director
of Naval Forces, the most certain deterrent to any enemy landing was the existence of
an adequate navy. Captain Creswell objected to the priority on land forces noting that
defeat at sea would be required before any conflict in Australia 5 and that in any case
the only form of attack declared to be reasonably possible was by raiding forces on
coastal targets. He also found it strange that interstate and overseas trade, greater than
that of Spain, Portugal or Japan and valued at more than 170 million pounds, had been
left out of consideration in Australian defence plans. 6 In 1901 as part of the
commemorative edition of the Brisbane Courier Creswell had a page-length column
adjacent to that of the Prime Minister’s. In this column which emphasised the need for
2

Letter Deakin to Governor General 28 Aug 1906, cited in Stevens, D. The Royal Australian Navy, p.6
Stevens, D. The Royal Australian Navy, p. 14
4
Ibid, p. 15
5
Stevens, D. ‘The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, Stevens. D (ed), The Royal Australian Navy,
p. 15
3

real naval capability Creswell noted, ‘I would conclude by impressing on every
Australian, and every Federal voter, senator, and statesman that, although a big one,
Australia is still an island, and must be defended like an island.’ 7

In this period Field Marshal Lord Kitchener embarked on a study tour of
Australia at the invitation of the Australian government. 8 In his 1992 book, An Army
for a Nation Dr John Mordike raised the point that despite the belief of most that
Kitchener’s scheme was concerned primarily with local defence it was in fact aimed
at providing manpower for imperial operations. 9 Dr Mordike stated that ‘as a defence
scheme it was sadly lacking…with no concept of operations…or suggestion how an
invading force might be constituted or where it might land.’ 10 Dr Mordike noted
further that despite Kitchener overturning imperial policy and stating that Australia
had to prepare for invasion his purpose in this was; ‘to provide a powerful stimulus
for Australians to establish a strong military capability, (land force) a capability which
Kitchener undoubtedly intended for use on imperial operations.’ 11

Despite the imperialistic nature of much Australian defence policy and the
interests of the British, in the space of four years, from 1909 to 1913, Australia did
create a credible fleet. That this could not have been achieved without the support of
the RN is very obvious. 12 However, the all-pervasive influence of Britain in maritime
issues perhaps had the unintended effect of alienating these forces to some extent
from Australian ethos and society. At its formation in 1901 the Australian Navy, then
known as the Commonwealth Naval Forces, was seen as a squadron of the RN and in
times of hostilities it would come under the command of the British Admiralty. This
did not secure the navy a place in the hearts and minds of Australians. Literally these
naval forces inherited the traditions of the RN, which was secure in British hearts and
minds as the “senior service”, the bulwark of the Empire. When the British public
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thought of security and the military and of their military tradition they thought of
battles such as Trafalgar first. The nation was truly one with the tradition of ‘Rule
Britannia’ and ‘Hearts of Oak’.

The RAN did not have this standing within Australia, and in many ways it has
always struggled to gain recognition. This situation was not helped in any way by the
almost immediate outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and the following four years of
continentalist warfare in Europe and the Middle East. Not surprisingly the First World
War had a significant impact on the outlook of society and of Australians’
understanding of themselves. This was due largely to the substantial casualties
incurred 13 and the controversy and division caused to society by the conscription
debates of the period. As stated previously, the RAN was placed under the control of
the RN as part of an imperial maritime strategy. After the initial success of
expeditionary operations in the Asia-Pacific, and the destruction by the cruiser HMAS
Sydney of the German light cruiser SMS Emden at the Cocos Islands, coincidentally
while HMAS Sydney was participating in the escort of Australian soldiers to the
Middle East, the RAN’s war effort was for the most part in the North Sea. This was
irrelevant to Australians and was ignored. The overwhelming psychological impact
of events at Gallipoli and on the clash of mass armies on the Western Front in France
naturally took centre stage.

To better understand this it is necessary to appreciate that C.E.W. (Charles)
Bean has the major role in Australian historiography of the First World War. Bean
wrote the first six volumes of the 12 volume Official History of Australia in World
War I. This History had an indelible effect on Australia and was arguably the most
important work produced in the first 40 years after Federation. 14 More remarkably it
did not so much depend on those that read it to achieve this because its message had
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transcendence across the whole society.

As the Official History, generations of

school children, parents and the soldiers of the Second World War were brought up
with the legend of ANZAC.

Bean spent the entire war with the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF), from
the landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 to the surrender of the German forces on 11
November 1918. Importantly this time was spent with the soldiers at the front, not
rewriting second hand reports of the fighting, but witnessing first hand as many
conflicts and actual battles as he physically could. His descriptive prose, backed up
with sketch maps of the battlefield, meant that he set the tone for the beginning of the
ANZAC legend. Importantly his work from 1921 to 1942 in producing the Official
History of Australia in the War ensured that his impact on Australian historiography
of the period was immense. By becoming the only authoritative account of the age it
shaped the very structure of Australia’s development as a nation. Bean felt a moral
need to ensure that the truth of events and history was available to the nation. He saw
that; ‘the final product would be more than a simple work of record. Through its
“truth”, it would alter the conduct of Australians and help shape their view of
Australia’s role in world affairs.’ 15

The narrative style with which his six volumes of the Official History was
written meant that it achieved its aim to be a tribute to the heroism of the Australian
soldier and to be welcomed into many homes, schools and libraries.

The

completeness of the battle coverage and the important fact that a bibliographical note
exists for every soldier named in the History, ensured its place as an accurate record
of battle and as the most influential Australian account of the war. Bean’s work had
its greatest influence in the creation, and importantly the continuation, of the ANZAC
legend. ANZAC Day was first celebrated in 1916 and between 1921 and 1927
became a public holiday in all States. 16 Bean’s influence on the development of an
Australian perception of Australian cultural identity was profound. As noted by Inglis;
‘The Story of ANZAC ended with an affirmation that “it was on the 25th of April
1915, that the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born.” Bean did as much
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as anybody to propagate that view of the nation.’ 17 Importantly it was not just by
word that Bean had a profound influence in Australian historiography of the First
World War.

As an example he was active in lobbying for the creation of the

Australian War Memorial in Canberra and in fact was Chairman of its Board in
1952. 18

The jubilation that followed the arrival of the fleet unit in 1913 and the sinking
of the Emden by HMAS Sydney in 1914 had been overshadowed by four years of
bloody trench warfare. The feeling that the creation of a powerful navy presaged the
birth of the nation as an independent entity had been displaced by the growing
ANZAC mythology that the nation’s independence had been bought with blood on the
shores of Gallipoli. The national psyche and sense of nationhood was irrevocably
shifted to an army focus.

This would have serious repercussions for the RAN,

especially from 1919-1939 in terms of trying to maintain a credible force, as the will
to invest in an effective and independent navy declined.

This influence also extends beyond that conflict, through the Second World
War and into all areas of Australian cultural identity today, be it military, civilian or
sports based.

The egalitarian, ‘fair go’ society could well be described as the

‘Australian Dream’. Much of its basis can be found in the writings of Bean. Prime
Minister Keating’s moving speech at the entombment of the Unknown Australian
Soldier at the Australian War Memorial on the 75th anniversary of the armistice on 11
November 1993 summarised the essence of the legend 19 as; “it is legend not of
sweeping military victories so much as triumphs against the odds, of courage and
ingenuity in adversity. It is a legend of free and independent spirits whose discipline
derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship
and the demands for necessity. It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which
Australians have gone to war ever since.” 20
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An understanding of this period almost immediately after Federation is vital if
an appreciation is to be gained of why Australians are unaware of the efficacy of the
sea and maritime issues on the nation and the future development of it. Society in the
First World War was riven by debates on soldering, on men going off to fight a
continentalist campaign at great distance from Australia. Built upon the legend of
ANZAC and of the heroism of the Australian soldier, was the social schism that
occurred in Australia due to the two divisive conscription referendums during the war
and the impact of the extensive casualties on families and the society. This was
especially so in small towns where in some cases whole families or a large proportion
of the community were decimated by the bloody trench warfare, especially on the
Western Front in France.

The blooding of Australia was therefore seen

understandably as a continental battle, revolving predominantly around images of
land warfare and the ‘digger’. It remains so today.

Despite

the

overwhelming

continentalist

nature

of

the

Australian

understanding of conflict in the First World War, the Australian geo-strategic
environment offers further cases in support of the maritime strategic viewpoint.
Australian military history itself is filled with examples of the utility and necessity of
sea power. During the first days of the First World War it was the hunt for the
German Admiral Graf von Spee and the very successful expeditionary attack on the
German colony of New Britain, its capital Rabaul and the Solomons that initiated
Australian forces in combat. The very existence of the battlecruiser, HMAS Australia,
is acknowledged by von Spee himself as preventing the German squadron attacking
Australian coastal cities. 21 Indeed in 1933 the Prime Minister W.M ‘Billy’ Hughes
declared; ‘But for HMAS Australia the great cities of Australia would have been
reduced to ruins, coastwise shipping sunk, and communications with the outside
world cut off.’ 22
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HMAS AUSTRALIA, SYDNEY 1913
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German New Guinea became Australian because of maritime strategy. The
Gallipoli campaign was also maritime strategy in operation. Its failure was perhaps
due more to the planning, command and execution of the operation at the tactical
level rather than the strategic design, which underpinned it. The RAN was there at the
start with the penetration of the Dardenelles on 25 April 1915 by the RAN submarine
AE2. This was the first successful penetration of the strait, and it was significant, as
was the submarine’s successful interdiction of Turkish shipping for the next five days
prior to her destruction.

Perhaps the best example of maritime strategy in the Australian context is the
Pacific campaign of both the Japanese and the Allies in World War Two. The
Japanese were successful in the early period of the war because of their control of the
sea and the air over it. Their aggressive campaign to capture the peninsula of Malaya
and ultimately Singapore was made possible by this control. On many instances when
they met stiff land opposition on the Malayan peninsula, the Japanese by-passed it and
inserted troops further down the coast. This was only possible via their control of the

sea. That they had achieved this with air power that was land based, through the
destruction of the British capital ships, HM Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse, did
not diminish the utility of sea power in these operations. Rather it enhanced the
linkage between sea control and air control in the maritime environment. It was
maritime strategy.

The same is true of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Dr Norman
Friedman makes the point that to the United States Army the critical issue in the
Pacific, when faced with the prospect of Japanese aggression, was the defence of the
Philippines. United States planners in the mid 1930s admitted that the Philippines
probably could not be held, yet General MacArthur acted on the theory that the
islands should be held at all costs. 23 MacArthur’s war aim was then to regain the
Philippines, whereas the United States Navy’s (USN) aim was to defeat Japan first.
Once this was achieved then the territories that had been seized by Japan would then
be regained. 24 Due to Japan’s almost total reliance on imports the USN concentrated
on the need to gain bases to permit blockade and bombardment of Japan, leading to
her surrender. Once again it was maritime power that facilitated this. This was
underpinned by United States sea control, which was the enabler for the blockade and
power projection operations.

As has been established, the American led offensive in the Pacific between
1942 and 1945 was a maritime strategy. Immediately prior to this the threat to
Australia in 1941 from the Japanese was maritime in nature. The Japanese never
intended to invade Australia. Rather, they planned to isolate Australia by severing its
strategic linkages with the United States. Once rendered strategically irrelevant and
operationally impotent there would be no need to invade, and Australia could be
forced to accept Japanese terms and conditions at an appropriate time in the future.25
These plans foundered as Japan lost control of the seas.

The Battle of the Coral Sea, which prevented the Japanese from invading Port
Moresby by sea, was the first sea battle in history where opposing ships never saw
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each other. It was fought by carrier air power intrinsically as sea power in operation.
That the USN achieved sea control, or at least prevented the Imperial Japanese Navy
from achieving sea control, effectively saved Port Moresby on that occasion. This
lack of sea control required the Japanese to attempt a land attack with inadequate
logistics support over the New Guinea highlands and led to the famous battles and
heroic Australian defence of Milne Bay and the Kokoda trail. This also led to the
actions by the RAAF in defence of Port Moresby and the more offensive combat air
patrols over Papua New Guinea. The indirect characteristic of maritime power, as has
been mentioned earlier, disguised this fact. As a result, the successful defence of Port
Moresby is not seen as a result of maritime strategy. This is rarely mentioned in the
annals of Australian military history, and where mentioned, its true impact is
understated.

It is relevant at this stage to review briefly some of the major issues
surrounding the operations of Allied and Japanese naval forces during the war in New
Guinea from 1942 to 1944. This period gives a pertinent example of maritime
strategic issues in an Australian context. It deserves this study, as it was the one
period since Federation when Australia was threatened directly. Dr David Stevens in a
journal article for the Australian War Memorial has provided very good evidence in
support of the vital role of maritime strategy in the New Guinea campaign. As part of
this article he noted;

‘The Japanese, however, had already rejected the invasion of Australia
as being beyond their ability. Instead, before the United States could
muster a significant response, they aimed to occupy Port Moresby and
the southern Solomons, followed by Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia.
Having secured their resource base, the Japanese expected these
additional operations to shore up their defensive perimeter while
simultaneously cutting Australia’s vital

communications with

America. Isolated from its allies, Australia would thereafter be
prevented from acting as a staging area for manpower and materiel.
Subsequently, Australia would either be forced out of the war, or
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rendered harmless until a Japanese invasion could proceed at a more
favourable time in the future. Assisted by an efficient intelligence
system, MacArthur had an accurate understanding of Japanese
intentions, and soon made it clear that he considered Australia’s
security lay in Port Moresby rather than on the mainland.’ 26

Building on this theme, Dr David Stevens noted that with the land campaign
underway in New Guinea, the Japanese, not unexpectedly, commenced submarine
attacks against merchant shipping. This resulted in a convoy system being introduced
by early 1943, which stretched from Melbourne to Darwin and the New Guinea bases.
As Dr Stevens states; ‘Once the land campaign in New Guinea was underway,
Australia’s role as a rearward support base came to the fore, and Allied shipping
movements along the East Australian Coast and up to forward areas increased rapidly.
After Coral Sea, the Japanese no longer risked surface ships south of New Guinea,
and so their attempts to disrupt Allied communications were generally limited to what
could be achieved by their aircraft and submarines.’ 27
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MARITIME CONVOY/ RE-SUPPLY NEW GUINEA/ EAST COAST AUSTRALIA 19421944
Graphic: Sea Power Centre, Australia

As the battle for New Guinea unfolded, the Japanese continued to attempt to
disrupt the flow of supplies. ‘Enemy aircraft maintained frequent attacks against the
supply lines around New Guinea and across northern Australia, while submarines
tended to operate further south. With fighting ashore concentrated along the north
coast of New Guinea, the Allied northern supply line, and in particular, the run from
Milne Bay to Oro Bay, assumed the greatest importance. Insufficient friendly aircraft
were available to cover all ships on this passage.’ 28 By the end of 1943, naval
authorities had allocated over sixty warships for convoy escort duties, while other
formations remained available to provide cover. These vessels included Australian
and Allied destroyers, corvettes and a wide assortment of smaller anti-submarine
vessels. The period May-June 1943 saw the Japanese campaign peak with nine ships
torpedoed over four weeks. The scale of the attack forced the Australian naval
command to reduce the number of convoy sailings by half so that the number of
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escort vessels allocated to each convoy could be doubled. 29 Meanwhile, the RAAF
pressed all possible reconnaissance aircraft into service, employed three reserve
squadrons on the escort task, and ordered training aircraft to carry weapons and keep
a sharp lookout for submarines. 30

Without wishing to get into too much detail on the New Guinea campaign it is
vital in any investigation of Australian strategic realities to note again that history can
give a good indication of the future direction of conflict. After Kokoda there were no
other northern advances across New Guinea. The movement of Allied forces was in a
westerly direction in a series of amphibious assaults. While the Allies were able to
protect their supplies and gain the initiative via amphibious landings thereby avoiding
the main Japanese land forces, the Japanese themselves were systematically starved of
reinforcements and logistical supplies.

Indeed food became very scarce for the

Japanese troops. Again in terms which should remind Australians today of the
importance of a balanced maritime capability, David Stevens has written that ‘the
Imperial Japanese Navy paid only minimal attention to the problem of maintaining
and protecting supply services. This was a critical weakness, for although Japan’s
industrial development had rendered the nation increasingly dependent on shipping,
her merchant marine was inadequate even for peacetime needs.’ 31
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FIGURE 6:

ALLIED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS NEW GUINEA 1943-45
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There are numerous examples of successful interdiction of Japanese supply
lines. One of the best known of these is ‘The Battle of the Bismarck Sea.’ This very
successful attack by RAAF land based air power was the result of a clear
understanding of the vital importance that the destruction of logistics and
reinforcements would have on the ability of the Japanese to wage a successful land
battle. ‘Good intelligence allowed the Allies to mount a massive air attack, and in
what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese lost all eight
transports, four out of eight destroyers, and at least a third of their troops.’ 33 This
battle was clearly a victory for air power as an element of a maritime strategy.
However, it would be a mistake to regard it as an isolated battle. It was significant
mainly as part of a mature maritime strategy in which surface, sub-surface and air
forces all combined to maintain continuous pressure on the Japanese. In January
1943, two months before the Battle of the Bismarck Sea the submarine, USS Wahoo
reported that after a ten hour battle she had sunk an entire convoy of two Japanese
32
33
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freighters, one transport and one tanker. 34 This was but one example of the coordinated nature of the Allied maritime strategy. Over many months allied aircraft
and submarines conducted attacks throughout the day and torpedo boats attacked
shipping at night.

In summary, it has been written that although allied maritime power could not
ultimately remove the Japanese from New Guinea, it did directly affect the course of
events ashore. Throughout the operations, the protection and maintenance of the sea
lines of communication were vital to the successful progress of MacArthur’s
campaign. The simultaneous denial to the Japanese of their own supply lines meant
that the enemy had no hope of competing with Allied ‘troopers, beans and bullets in
greater and greater numbers.’ 35 Later, when the Allies had clearly established the
capability to establish local superiority on the sea and in the air, it was possible to
exploit this control for combined operations. Compared to overland assault, power
could thereafter be projected at times and places chosen by the Allies and with
remarkable speed and economy. The Japanese, on the other hand, consistently failed
to allocate sufficient priority to either a concentrated offensive against Allied
shipping, or protection of their own lines of communication. Once they had lost
control of the sea and air off the New Guinea coastline, any Japanese local superiority
ashore could never be effectively applied. Starved of reinforcements and supplies,
Japanese strong points were consistently neutralised, and either disposed of piecemeal
or left to waste away. Though too often ignored by historians, the operations of naval
forces around New Guinea were vital to the war’s outcome, providing the ‘enabling
factor’ that allowed the campaign to be fought to its successful conclusion. 36 Simply
put, Allied maritime power rendered the Japanese useless in a strategic sense.

Building on the lessons of the New Guinea campaign, the concurrent island
hopping operations of the Allies through the Pacific was classical maritime strategy.
Islands were attacked because the Allies achieved sea control. Air power, both sea
and land based, and maritime strike via bombardment were used to gain superiority
over the area of operations until air bases could be captured and close air support
34

Ibid, p.9
Morrison, S.E. Breaking the Bismarck’s Barrier, History of USN Operations in World War II, vol.VI
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950, p. 448
35

mounted from these by land based air power. Each element contributed to success,
which may not have been achieved in the absence of any one layer. Sea control was
the enabling factor that permitted the success of the Pacific campaign. The ability of
the United States to control the sea was contested frequently by the Japanese but from
the Battle of Midway on, the United States managed to defeat all major attempts.
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However, this maritime lesson is not well understood in Australia. From the
context of 2003 and Defence 2000 it can be ascertained that in many ways the
strategic policy of today continues the trend in the historiography of Australia to deny
or diminish the maritime component in any threat to Australia’s security. In the period
of the New Guinea campaign the Australian Chief of Naval Staff was Vice Admiral
Sir Guy Royle, RN and it was he who was responsible for the convoy system off the
coast of Australia and the maritime operations in New Guinea. Pertinently for this
paper, Admiral Royle wrote a personal letter to the Commander Allied Forces in the
36
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South-West Pacific Area (CANFSWPA), Vice-Admiral A.S. Carpenter USN, in
February 1943 in which he expressed his ‘considerable concern’ over MacArthur’s
policy regarding release of information to the public;

‘No mention has been made of the importance that control of the
sea has had, and is having in the New Guinea campaign or in the
South West Pacific Area generally, and the work of our ships
and men is passing entirely unnoticed. ...the public mind is
becoming less and less conscious of the important role of Sea
Power, and is acquiring an entirely erroneous standard of values.
This is to my mind harmful to the Navy at present, and fraught
with danger for the future.’ 37

Based on Australia’s approach to maritime strategy, certainly in the last 20
years, these were prophetic words indeed.
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Contemporary International Maritime Strategy
This paper has thus far established the maritime nature of Australia’s
environment, investigated some classical and contemporary maritime strategic
concepts and explored the lessons of history. However, before exploring further the
proposal that Australia needs to implement a credible maritime strategy, it is useful to
reflect on how some other countries, whose operations may impact Australia’s
strategic area into the future, are responding to contemporary strategic challenges.

In the post 1945 era, great power relationships and strategy were dominated by
the Cold War, the era of nuclear deterrence involving the United States and the Soviet
Union, brought on by mutually assured destruction. With the end of the Cold War and
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was left as the only great power. 1
Given the structure and size of its maritime forces vis-à-vis any challenges, for the
present the United States assumes that it will have supremacy, or in maritime
doctrinal terms, sea control, when and where it needs it. 2

The United States

presupposes that it has control of sea lines of communications, that it can project
power ashore where and when it requires and that it can deny the use of the sea to any
adversary, for the period of time and in the area of operations necessary to ensure
success. This is one of the most important points to comprehend with respect to the
use of maritime power by the United States. Because this is backed up by economic
and nuclear power no other nation can deny the USN the use of the sea. Because of
this assumed sea control, the United States can implement a maritime doctrine that is
now focused on the projection of maritime power from the sea.

1

In this sense the USA is seen as a power whose great status and influence transcends being
hegemonic. Hegemonic (as defined in the Macquarie Dictionary) can be seen as; ‘leadership or
predominant influence exercised by one state over others, as in a confederation.’ This presupposes a
degree of acceptance or acquiescence by other states. A great power on the other hand does not require
the acceptance or acquiescence of other states or even the existence of a confederation.
2
US Defence budget for Fiscal year 2004 is US$380billion. This exceeds the cumulative defence
budgets of the next 20 largest defence spending countries in the world. Australia does not feature in the
top 20. The budget for the USN and USMC for FY 04 is US$114.7billion, the USAF US$93.5billion,
US Army US$94billion. Janes Defence Weekly, 5 February 2003 p. 8 reports that the Defence budget
for FY 05 is likely to grow to nearly US$400billion while FY09 could see US$483.6billion spent on
defence.

The foundation of United States maritime operational concept is provided by
the concept of operations forward from the sea. Forward from the sea concentrates on
crisis management and warfare in the littoral regions of the world – those regions
adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the
striking power of sea-based forces. The expanding role for the USN in overseas
presence suggests the increasing importance and likelihood of multinational naval
cooperation. It also means that regional navies are likely to be caught up more in the
process of facilitating or interfering with United States operations and being a link to
the other national military services that may be less adapted to United States’
requirements.

The latest operational concept for the USN is termed Sea Power 21. The USN
and the US Marine Corps (USMC) under the terms of a ‘Naval Transformation
Roadmap’ have launched this operational concept. The heading and key theme of this
concept is ‘Power and Access…From the Sea.’ The foreword to the transformation
document states from the United States perspective that;

‘Naval forces are unique in their contribution to the nation’s
defence. Versatile naval expeditionary forces are the nation’s
first responders, relied upon to influence the course of a crisis,
control the early phases of hostilities, and set the conditions for
decisive resolution. America’s ability to protect its homeland,
assure our friends and allies, and deter potential adversaries
depends on maritime supremacy and credible projection of
combat power.’ 3

Under this concept there will be three core capabilities – Sea Strike, which is
projecting offensive power; Sea Shield, which is projecting defensive power and Sea
Basing, which is allowing US access to foreign theatres. 4 When announcing this
concept the USN Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, stated that Sea
Strike is about projecting dominant and decisive offensive power against key enemy
3
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targets. In the transformation document this is expanded further to project decisive
and persistent offensive power anywhere in the world and launch immediate, agile,
and sustainable operations from the sea. Sea Strike is a broadened naval concept for
projecting dominant and decisive offensive power from the sea in support of joint
objectives. 5

Sea Shield will provide protection to the United States homeland by projecting
defensive firepower deep overland emphasising a joint focus and a nuclear deterrence.
The Roadmap states that Sea Shield will exploit control of the seas and forwarddeployed defensive capabilities to defeat area-denial strategies, enabling joint forces
to project and sustain power. 6 Sea Basing is about projecting sovereignty around the
world. 7 In more detail the Roadmap notes that Sea Basing will project responsive
forces worldwide with the capability to fight and win, operate continuously from an
expanded and secure manoeuvre area and minimise vulnerabilities tied to overseas
land support. Sea Basing will enhance manoeuvre ashore by reducing the need to
move in major command and control elements, heavy fire support systems, or
logistical stockpiles. By locating these critical functions at sea to the greatest extent
possible, Sea Basing will provide the nation with unmatched operational freedom of
action. 8

The essence of this document, and the point that is dismissed within
Australian thinking, is the strategic independence that maritime operations provide.
The elements of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing all build on the intellectual
work of the classical and contemporary maritime strategists as outlined earlier in this
paper. The whole emphasis of power and access from the sea again indicates that the
USN considers that it has already established sea control and this allows it to conduct
this maritime strategy. Importantly for Australia this capability involves maritime air
power, precision strike from the sea, interdiction and sea control assets.

4
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In the case of Britain, the basis for its maritime operational concept is short
notice contributions to joint expeditionary campaigns in the littoral, similar to the
Balkan conflicts and the Gulf War. The Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations, is
the RN’s overarching document arising from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.
This has spawned the British Future Navy Operational Concept (FNOC).

It is

basically an expeditionary posture similar to that of the USN. Having stated this, with
the exceptions of the period 1914 – 1918 when Britain conducted a very bloody
continental strategy to defend France, rather than defeat Germany by utilising a
maritime approach, and the period of the Cold War, with its emphasis within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of anti-submarine patrol requirements off
Britain, the central core of British strategy has been expeditionary.

Therefore the operational concepts that the British are espousing today should
come as no surprise. Also, British maritime doctrine implicitly assumes that British
forces will likely operate in concert with allies, most probably as part of a United
States led coalition. As host nation support may not be available, the RN is seeking to
develop its aircraft carrier capability. This reflects an understanding in Britain that sea
control involves control of the air, which cannot be assumed if the air combat arm is
land-based only. The need to have a harmonious linkage between strategic lift, both
by sea and air, and sea control has been recognised by the British with their decision
to procure two aircraft carriers equipped with the F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) for air
dominance and power projection ashore.

The FNOC has firmly linked the RN with a manoeuvrist approach to
operations. In support of the FNOC, however, capabilities will be expressed less in
platform terms and more in effect based terms. The concept is based on four core
maritime capabilities. The first British maritime core capability, Power Projection,
has two components, littoral manoeuvre and maritime strike. 9 Littoral manoeuvre
places the maritime and amphibious forces into the littoral, and maritime strike
interdicts the land, using direct and indirect fire. The next core capability is Global
Reach – using the advantages associated with freedom of the seas to forward deploy.
Optimised Access is the third core capability which means manoeuvre in the open seas

and littoral and the last core capability is Command, Control, Computer,
Communications, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) which is about
knowledge superiority. 10

In reviewing the Russian situation, despite the break up of the Soviet Union
and the demise of much of the operational capability of its Navy, Russia remains an
important element of the Asia-Pacific region. When looking at Russian maritime
operational concepts it is difficult to get much information on contemporary Russian
maritime doctrine. However, during the era of the Soviet Union after 1945, Admiral
Sergei Gorshkov controlled the build-up of the Soviet Navy. Dr Chipman noted in a
1982 article on Admiral Gorshkov that he successfully challenged the conventional
dogma that classified Russia as only a land power and supplemented this with sea
power doctrine. Under Gorshkov’s influence, the Soviet military developed
aspirations to dominate the maritime frontier. 11

Russia has the world’s longest continental maritime frontier, but doctrine
development was constrained by three issues: ice, chokepoints and distance. Admiral
Gorshkov designed his fleet to overcome these by using icebreakers to help open
winter ports and long-range replenishment ships to circumvent the effects of
chokepoints and distance. 12 Soviet foreign policy also utilised foreign ports to further
overcome all three. Soviet naval strategy moved from defensive to assertive as the
fleet developed. In support of their evolving maritime strategy the Soviets had four
basic naval missions. The first was sea presence, which they defined as the peaceful
use of naval ships in foreign areas. Next came sea control, which in the Soviet context
involved anti-submarine warfare and interdiction. Third was power projection with an
emphasis on amphibious warfare, and fourth was deterrence, which involved the use
of ballistic missile submarines. The sea presence mission showed that nations can
gain great benefit from maritime operations and that such operations can be extremely
influential in peacetime. Through the use of port visits the Soviets utilised diplomatic
leverage and this was extremely valuable, especially when combined with a Soviet
9
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merchant fleet of over 1700 ships and fishing fleets of over 4000 ocean going
vessels. 13

Since the break up of the Soviet Union, there appears to have been little
change in Russian maritime doctrine. Russia’s Naval Strategy is ‘to ensure Russia’s
military security and international authority, further its national interests in the
world’s oceans, as well as politico-economic and defence interests and maintaining
military- political stability at sea.’ 14 This is basically the sea presence, sea control and
deterrence missions of the old Soviet Navy. Only power projection ashore
(amphibious operations) has been reduced in emphasis.

As with Britain, the French operational concept states that while France faces
no immediate and identifiable threat, the established order further afield is volatile
and represents a threat to the preservation of a peaceful global community and the
safety of French and European interests. French naval strategy is focused towards the
land. The importance of the interaction between land and sea-based environments in a
global strategic reality involving combined operations lies at the heart of French
maritime doctrine. 15

The French Navy states that French maritime forces operate to achieve three
major objectives. The first is deterrence and nuclear weapons remain the backbone of
the French defence strategy. Nuclear weapons provide the threat of inflicting
unacceptable damage on any aggressor, which threatens French vital interests. The
Navy and its strategic submarine force provide the main element of the French
nuclear deterrent. The second objective is operational action. France participates in
the preservation of world stability based on sea control at the appropriate level. To
protect France’s sovereign responsibilities and contribute to global security, naval
forces are permanently pre-positioned. A patrol is maintained in the North Atlantic,
the focal point of French supply routes, in the Mediterranean, the link between
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, the hub of maritime and
12
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strategic communications, in the Pacific around the French territories and generally
everywhere that France has interests that must be protected. The third objective is
public service, which covers the major non-warfighting roles ranging from search and
rescue, safeguarding the environment, preservation of resources, and policing
activities within the EEZ. 16

The French Navy has also acknowledged the fact that while Western nations
control the sea, maritime strategy is oriented towards the land. French maritime
strategy emphasises the imperative of maritime air power. The eminent strategist,
Admiral Raoul Castex who lived from 1878-1968, is quoted in the foreword to the
French Navy homepage that; ‘The influence of sea power in world crises today
depends on the air-ground power force that it can deploy, and this influence at the
same time depends directly on the strength of the naval-air force that it can throw into
the balance.’ 17 Admiral Castex is an important strategist as his writings and
experiences are based on those of the twentieth century. Due to the somewhat
traumatic experience of the French in maritime operations 18 he is aware of the limits
of naval power. His emphasis is on the importance of high technology, especially
aircraft carriers and submarines as force multipliers, and he notes throughout his
writings that this is required even more so for smaller sea powers. This for France
underpins that nation’s expeditionary warfare or power projection capability.

There is much contained within the operational concepts of the United States,
Britain, Russia and France which should be of direct relevance to Australia. In
analysing parallels with Australia, the United States’ emphasis is on versatile naval
forces as the nation’s first response. These can be relied upon to influence the course
of a crisis, control the early phases of hostilities, and set the conditions for decisive
resolution. The renewed British emphasis on expeditionary warfare reflects a nation
with no land borders, which desires to deflect and diffuse conflicts far from home.
Russia, despite current financial problems still places emphasis on the requirement for
maritime power to promote international authority and further its national interests in

16
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the world’s oceans. Finally France places great emphasis on the importance of high
technology such as aircraft carriers and submarines as force multipliers, which is
stressed as even more influential for smaller sea powers.

destruction of much of the remaining French Fleet by the RN in 1940 to prevent it falling into German
hands at the surrender of France was also a low point.

Contemporary Regional Maritime Strategy
Having reviewed the maritime operational concepts of the one remaining
super power and three other significant powers, it is useful to reflect on regional
maritime doctrine. Asian navies appear less influenced by the power projection
considerations that are driving doctrine in the major Western navies. Although
obviously a factor of size and capability, these nations concentrate more closely on
the basics of economic and national survival. The concerns of coastal states such as
Malaysia and Singapore, as examples, are more with coastal patrol and local trade
protection operations. The Republic of Singapore Navy stresses the defence of
Singapore against sea-borne threats and the protection of shipping that encompass the
Singapore Straits and its access routes. 1 The Royal Malaysian Navy focuses on
territorial integrity, national sovereignty and resource protection. 2

Japan, China and India as cases in point are more focused on achieving sea
control, perhaps at some distance. This reflects the blue water nature of their sea lines
of communications and means that the security of these routes is also given great
emphasis. This consideration is a reflection of the importance of seaborne trade in the
region and the dependence of Northeast Asian countries, in particular, on energy
imports by sea. Other factors influencing maritime doctrine in East Asia include the
situation in the South China Sea and other disputes over offshore islands; possible
conflict between China and Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula; Chinese naval
expansion; and finally, lingering concern over the long-term commitment of the
United States to the security of the region.

With respect to China it is relevant that to date China historically has viewed
the sea as an invasion route by foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for
achieving national goals. This attitude has appeared to change over the past decade or
so and China’s post-Cold War focus is on offshore sovereignty, economic matters and
resource issues. The fall of the Soviet Union removed or significantly reduced a
significant continental land threat from China’s northern and western borders. This
1
2
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has permitted the Chinese to explore the potential of a more maritime approach to
regional strategic issues. This in turn, has meant an evolutionary shift from its static
coastal defence role (brown-water navy) to an offensive offshore active defence,
whereby it will be used for both tactical and strategic purposes in asserting Chinese
influence and in protecting territorial and economic interests, using force if necessary.

Strategic analysts have forecast that this offshore active defence strategy is
planned in two phases. 3 They state that Chinese naval strategic planners are aiming to
achieve a so-called 'green water' capability between 2002-2010. This means being
able to operate out to the 'first-island chain' of Japan, the Senkaku islands, Taiwan and
the west coast of Borneo. China’s doctrine emphasises defence in depth and in line
with this the objective is to defend all China’s claimed offshore territories, including
the Spratly (Nansha) Islands out to an effective operational range of approximately
430 nautical miles. 4

By 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) hopes to have extended
its operational capability further out to the 'second-island chain' (Kuriles in the north,
the Bonin and Marina islands, and Papua New Guinea to the south). With such plans,
the assumption is that a true-blue water capability will be achieved by 2050. 5 By
then, doctrine may shift from an 'active forward defence' to an 'active forward
deployment' scenario, with the possibility of one or more naval bases on foreign
shores. China is also increasingly concerned about its dependence on energy imports
and the security of its sea lines of communications. These considerations partly
explain its longer-term interest in a two ocean navy – the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Japan presents as an undeveloped or incomplete maritime power due in a large
part to the complications posed by the renunciation of war in the Constitution. Article
Nine of the Japanese Constitution states:

3
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‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognised.’ 6

As the right to self-defence is not prohibited, Japan maintains self-defence
forces, and to date the roles of these are purely oriented to self-defence. Some
weapons such as inter-continental ballistic missiles, bombers and aircraft carriers are
prohibited and military deployments to the sea, land and air spaces of other nations
for the purpose of ‘using force’ 7 are also not permitted. The basic precepts of
Japanese policy is to be purely defensive, not to become a military power and to not
possess, produce or permit nuclear weapons in Japan.

The definition of ‘self-defence,’ as understood by the Japanese, has been
interpreted to mean in essence that Japan can only respond militarily to a direct attack
on Japan. The basic defence policy was proclaimed in 1957. It states that the objective
of national defence is; ‘To prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to
repel such aggression, thereby preserving the sovereignty and peace of Japan based
upon democracy.’ 8 It is a continentalist approach to the defence of a maritime nation.
The Japanese have since 1945 relied on the United States alliance for the maritime
aspects of their security at distance from Japan. Despite this, and also the severe
limitations that the Constitution imposes, Japan has a significant maritime capability.
Recently Japanese destroyers and supply ship have conducted logistics and support
missions as far afield as the Indian Ocean. 9
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In the case of India, as with China, it may be considered as a latent
predominant Asian power. From the 1970’s India’s naval operational concepts
developed as the:

‘Protection of the Indian coast, offshore facilities, and merchant
shipping; The neutralisation or destruction of the Pakistan fleet in the
event of renewed hostilities, in order to establish a blockade of Pakistan
and allow action against that country’s coastline and economic zone
assets; Protection of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands against
incursions; Denial to any foreign force the ability to operate effectively
against Indian interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone; and to a lesser
extent demonstration and enforcement of Indian interests within the
country’s area of strategic influence.’ 10

The Indian Navy (IN) has developed from these responsibilities. It is now the
largest navy of the states bordering the Indian Ocean. India is a leading advocate of
the position that the resources of the Indian Ocean should only be exploited by states
that border the Indian Ocean. The IN is building a ‘powerful force-projection
capability, which will be used to increase Indian influence against China in Southeast
Asia.’ 11 This indicates that India now is able to concentrate a little more on maritime
strategic issues because the reality of nuclear deterrence, with Pakistan, India and
China all possessing nuclear weapons, has reduced the threat of a traditional
continental war. 12 For Australia this final point is pertinent. With no land border
Australia is extremely unlikely to fight a continental war on mainland Australia unless
its sea, air and expeditionary land forces are destroyed first. From the perspective of
Defence 2000 and the Defence Update 2003, however, not enough is made of the
geographic advantages that Australia enjoys over countries such as India who contend
daily with disputes, infractions and complications that an extended land border bring.
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In reviewing the development of India’s navy, its continued insistence on
maintaining a maritime air power component, 13 its desire to gain nuclear attack
submarines, and its very capable surface combatant force, including air warfare
destroyers, would indicate that India is intent on gaining a capability to achieve sea
control, rather than merely a sea denial capability. As has been stated earlier in this
paper, sea control is an essential pre-requisite before power projection activities and
sea lines of communications protection can be assured.

India, it would appear,

understands the role of maritime strategy precisely.

13

Reporting in Defense News Sep 2002 indicates that India is intending to acquire two Air Defense
Ships (aircraft carriers) of around 37000 tonnes by 2020 to replace its one current aircraft carrier.
These vessels will be built indigenously and will carry a range of air dominance, air/surface
surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft.

Recent Maritime Operations and Realities
Having reviewed some contemporary maritime strategies and already
examined Australian doctrine, maritime operations in recent times can be better
understood. Although largely ignored by the world’s press, the multi-national naval
operations against Iraq in the Persian Gulf area in 1990 - 1991, were significant and
contributed greatly to the coalition victory. Naval forces facilitated an immediate
diplomatic and political response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by economic
blockade, as well as providing the initial air defence of Saudi Arabia from USN
carriers. They then utilised strategic sealift to transport the vast majority of land
forces and their equipment to the area of operations. They then provided significant
naval gunfire support and offensive strike via carrier borne aircraft and cruise missile
attack against Iraqi military installations and positions. At the height of the conflict
six aircraft carriers (including two in the Red Sea), two battleships, 15 cruisers, 67
destroyers and frigates and over 100 logistics, amphibious and smaller craft were
involved. These forces were drawn from 15 nations and deployed more than 800
rotary and fixed wing aircraft. 1

The Iraqi navy consisted of brown water units, supplemented by captured
Kuwaiti patrol boats.

In the early days of the war they made only tentative forays

and were subjected to air and surface attacks. They played no meaningful part in the
conflict and were attacked, harassed and destroyed by allied forces with relative
impunity. Some 138 vessels of all types were assessed as sunk or being rendered
non- - mission capable. 2 Despite the threat of floating mines, Allied control of the
sea was absolute, with the economic blockade being implemented against Iraqi
maritime trade. In addition to the success of the strategic strike from the sea, the
threat of amphibious attack caused consternation to the Iraqi command and resulted
in significant Iraqi forces being retained in Kuwait itself, rather than being moved to
face the Allied land offensive when it began.
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The Gulf War was an excellent example of the contribution that maritime
units and maritime power can make. The roles and tasks of maritime surveillance,
maritime patrol and response, protection of offshore territories and resources,
intelligence collection and evaluation, protection of shipping, strategic strike and
operations in support of land forces, 3 were all executed by the Allied navies in and
around the Persian Gulf. The ability of countries to project military and diplomatic
force via a maritime capability was abundantly demonstrated in the Gulf War.

It must also be remembered that during the period of Operation Desert Shield,
prior to hostilities, a small force of USN, RAN and RN destroyers and frigates was
forward deployed in close proximity to Kuwait and Iraq. The capabilities of these
units, supported by the integrated air power of USN carriers at that stage in close
support in the Gulf of Oman, rendered the Iraqi forces powerless to interdict or
respond.

The critical importance of this is emphasised even further when the

geographic features of the Persian Gulf are taken into account. The Persian Gulf is a
virtually landlocked body of water approximately 500 nautical miles long and 200
nautical miles wide throughout its entire length. In Operation Desert Shield, a period
of extremely high tension when an Iraqi pre-emptive strike was considered very
probable, technologically advanced maritime forces were able to offensively operate
close to Iraq whilst monitoring and tracking Iraqi F1 Mirage aircraft by radar. This
despite geographically imposed limitations in manoeuvrability, the proximity to
potentially hostile countries, the constant threat of mines and a real threat from a
capable Iraqi air force of some 1315 aircraft, including 83 Mirage F1 EQ5/EQ6
variants armed with air to surface Exocet missiles. 4

The failure of Iraq to intervene in an effective manner with the maritime
strategic operations of the Allies once Operation Desert Storm commenced stemmed
from their lack of an operational concept, joint doctrine, lack of third party over the
horizon targeting and loss of command, control and communications at the
2
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commencement of operations.

Iraq’s strategic posture was understandably

continentalist. Despite relatively modern missile boats being captured from the
Kuwaiti navy, the only real maritime interdiction capability was that of the Iraqi
airforce via its Mirage F1 aircraft and Super-Puma helicopters, both armed with the
Exocet missile. As with the naval elements, lack of targeting ability, identification
ability and the effectiveness of the Allied air and sea-based assault on airbases,
communications and command links severely limited the combat effectiveness of the
Iraqi air force very soon after the commencement of Desert Storm itself. Indeed early
on in the conflict the few remaining serviceable aircraft, those that had not been
destroyed on land or in the air, were tracked on sea-borne radars flying to Iran for
safety.

The Gulf War reinforced the lessons of other recent operations, such as the
Falklands War of 1982. The Falklands War illustrated the flexibility of a maritime
strategy. The RN ships utilised in the Falklands War were designed primarily for
anti-submarine warfare in the northern Atlantic and sea approaches to the United
Kingdom. 5 With few modifications they successfully executed a sea control, power
projection and sea denial strategy at a distance of some 8000 nautical miles from
Britain. The distances involved also had the advantages in some ways of allowing a
graduated use of force, time for diplomacy and psychological influences to play upon
the Argentinian forces and permitted time for the British to assemble a task force.
This was the ultimate form of expeditionary warfare and it culminated in a classic
British use of the indirect manoeuvrist approach to warfare with an assault where the
Argentinian forces did not expect one – at San Carlos waters and not the capital Port
Stanley itself. The land attack then commenced its advance towards Port Stanley
against an entrenched enemy that enjoyed relatively short supply lines and limited
land based air support.

The casualties suffered by ships and troops close to the Falkland Islands
could have led to an Argentinian victory had the British not understood the need to
gain sea control as the necessary pre-requisite to amphibious/power projection
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operations. The operation would have been impossible without organic sea based air
power, which was provided in this case by Sea Harrier aircraft from HM Ships
Invincible and Hermes. Land based bombers did attack the Port Stanley airfield in
failed attempts to render the runway unusable by the Argentinian air force, but the
tyranny of distance meant that close air support had to be provided from the sea. Due
to the distances involved Argentinian land-based air power was ineffective, despite
some heroic attempts by Argentinian pilots, in attempting to prevent the British
amphibious operation from proceeding. The British in the Falklands War gained sea
control and power was projected ashore only because control of the air was
established from the sea. Air warfare capable surface combatants and combat aircraft
achieved this.

Indeed the lesson that the Falklands War was a ‘close run thing’ was learnt by
the British and, as mentioned previously, an organic maritime air power capability
was retained. In fact in the 20 years since the Falklands War, this decision has been
vindicated time and time again, most recently in operations off the coast of the
Balkans. Due to the often proven flexibility and adaptability of sea based air power
in operations of the last 12 years, and despite some budgetary pressures, the British
are planning to build new aircraft carriers, with a much greater capability than that of
the Invincible class.
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FIGURE 8:
ROYAL NAVY FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Graphic: BBC Online News 30 Jan 03
So profound has been their experience that the British appreciate that maritime
force brings key enabling capabilities such as sustainment through a sea base. The
quote; ‘this last enabler allows reduced dependency on host nation support and
minimises the logistics footprint ashore in potentially hostile environments,’ 6 is borne
of lessons learnt over the last 200 plus years. In reality this ‘new’ approach is nothing
more than commonsense maritime strategy in operation. This is a major about turn
from the continentalist policy that was becoming prevalent in British defence circles
immediately prior to 1982. Again this ‘new’ commonsense should be observed
closely by Australia.

For Australia, the need to achieve sea control before conducting expeditionary
operations at any level was evidenced in the East Timor operation of 1999, Operation
Stabilise. The International Force East Timor, which began in September 1999, was
expeditionary by nature. It was maritime strategy in operation. First control of the sea
had to be assured and then the amphibious and logistical sealift nature of the operation
could commence. The Commander of the operation, then Major General Cosgrove,
stated in his Anzac lecture at Georgetown University in April 2000 that there was a
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tremendous range of direct military experiences and lessons to be learned from
Operation Stabilise. One well quoted passage in this address was that;

‘another military blinding glimpse of the obvious is the utility of
sea power in the East Timor operation. The persuasive,
intimidatory or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me
as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to
have ‘add-on’ but an important indicator to all of us who relied
on sea lifelines. It was a classic case of the ‘presence’ pillar of
sea power.’ 7

This powerful vindication of sea power for the East Timor operation could be
considered understated as sea power was in fact more than the ‘presence pillar’. It was
the enabler of the operation itself. At the commencement of the operation it was
Australian surface combatants demonstrating national resolve towards Indonesian
naval units which gained Australia the necessary sea control to enable the land
operation. After gaining sea control the vast majority of logistics support to forces
ashore was supplied via sea.

Dr Norman Friedman re-iterates this noting that;

‘The Royal Australian Navy made possible the Australian Army
operation in East Timor in 1999. Without shipping little could have been
done. If the Australians had encountered opposition at the outset, only
the Navy would have been in any position to fire back. Effective air
support could not have been provided from bases in Australia because
the transit time to the battle area would have precluded any sort of quick
reaction. Bases on the scene could not have been seized without naval
support. Such considerations presumably made in the absence of heavy
gun capability and any sort of floating air base (i.e. carrier) a matter of
considerable concern for the Australian Army going ashore.’ 8
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Even when examining the events arising from the terrorist attack on the United
States on 11 September 2001 it must be recognised that a significant portion of the
response from the United States has been by use of a maritime strategy. The United
States’ reaction to events of 11 September 2001, the implementation of the attack on
Afghanistan and operations in the Persian Gulf are all evidence of a robust maritime
strategy in operation. The events of 11 September should not entail less of an
emphasis on maritime strategy for Australia. Rather astute commentators should
observe that a significant element of Australia’s response has been to implement to
some degree maritime strategy by continuing the rolling deployments of surface ships
to Persian Gulf operations, which has occurred since 1990.

Indeed the RAN has been active in the Persian Gulf for 13 years, something
that is habitually overlooked by strategic analysts. As Australian Maritime Doctrine
notes, ‘some of the activities which take place in maritime conflict may only be
indirectly linked with effects on the shore but, sooner or later, that link is established
and a terrestrial result accomplished.’ 9 Indeed building on this is the fact that the
inherent flexibility of sea power is in many ways an effective antidote to the multilevel threat of terrorism and other forms of asymmetrical warfare. This is because the
proper use of power projection from the sea can be an effective form of asymmetric
warfare itself. An adversary does not have the certainty of knowing where forces from
the sea are based, where they may strike, how they may be employed and what their
operational range is. Intelligence information on issues such as force numbers, type,
operational cycles and launch times is also harder to obtain when the threat is from
the sea than when it is from a fixed land base.

In support of the delivery of force from the sea the great advantage of
maritime power projection is its pervasive presence and deterrence effects. Maritime
power projection can take the form of the landing of amphibious or Special Forces or
the delivery of seaborne land forces, or bombardment by guided or unguided weapons
from seaborne platforms or the provision of air power from seaborne platforms.
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The delivery of force from the sea is maritime power projection. When
examining the use of air power in a maritime environment and the role of surface
combatants in sea control and power projection, a good understanding of the
advantage of surface ship launched precision-guided munitions and the use of mobile
organic sea based air power is required. Power projection from surface platforms
possesses all the advantages of poise, persistence, adaptability, ambiguity and access.
Surface platforms do not have the concerns that submarines have of remaining
stealthy. Stealth is the submarine’s greatest protection. Once located a submarine,
particularly a diesel-electric submarine, is at great risk. In addition, given the reality
and vagaries of submarine operations, communications with submarines can not be
depended upon. In all probability there will be a fundamental requirement for
unimpeded two-way communications to and from the launch platform and the shore
headquarters, up to the moment before launch of a precision strike weapon. This
requirement may even extend to the duration of the flight of the weapon itself. This
requirement will be even more important should the diplomatic situation impose any
Government concern at unintended civilian casualties that could result from a
targeting error.

Contemporary maritime operations confirm maritime doctrine and reflect
Australia’s maritime environment in demonstrating the requirement for a viable and
layered maritime combatant force. This force must be able to execute the required sea
control functions, but additionally it must be capable in precision shore strike.
Precision strike from surface ships is a significant element of the United States’
strategy, yet this cost effective capability has had little exposure or debate in
Australia. Additionally organic sea based air power not only provides flexibility in
projecting air power ashore but also provides platforms capable of performing
forward basing functions, at least until shore facilities are captured, rendered safe and
repaired. As of 2003, there are significant limitations in Australia’s maritime
capability, which would limit Australia’s ability to execute this sea control and power
projection function, even with an enhanced strategic sealift and airlift capability.

8

Australian Strategic Issues
At present one of the major problems with a credible maritime strategy is one
of terminology and understanding. One aspect that needs an explanation for strategic
concepts in Australia to be understood is exactly what is meant by the term maritime.
‘Maritimeness’ in the Australian context needs be seen as truly national, involving the
military, government and commercial entities. Sea power, aerospace power and land
power, together with the larger national issues all create a maritime strategy. The
army fighting in New Guinea, conducting manoeuvre operations in the littoral
environment is a maritime strategy. The RAAF operating from fixed bases and
conducting operations in support of sea control and its enabling factors such as
protection of sea lines of communications and power projection is a maritime
strategy. The RAN conducting combat operations at sea, combat operations from the
sea and peacetime maritime tasking is also maritime strategy. This approach is not a
threat to the existence or structures any of the armed forces, rather it needs to be
viewed as an enabler for Australia. This is so because Australia is an island.
Despite being downplayed in the Defence Update 2003, 1 the current
significant white paper, Defence 2000, states that the priority task for the ADF is the
Defence of Australia. It further states that Australia’s approach is shaped by three
principles. First, Australia must be able to defend itself without relying on the combat
forces of other countries – self-reliance. Second, Australia needs to be able to control
the air and sea approaches to the continent – a maritime strategy. Third, although
Australia’s strategic posture is defensive, Australia would seek to attack hostile forces
as far from our shores as possible – pro-active operations. 2

Operations in East Timor from 1999 and operations off Afghanistan and in the
Persian Gulf subsequent to the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001
would indicate that in addition to the above tasks the role of the ADF in expeditionary
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warfare may well increase. Comments by the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert
Hill tend to support this view. 3

This emphasis on forward engagement was

formalised to some degree in Defence Update 2003. This document reflected the
Government’s response to global terrorism. It stated that, ‘These new circumstances
indicate a need for some rebalancing of capabilities and priorities to take account of
the new strategic environment, changes which will ensure a more flexible and mobile
force, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve outcomes in the
national interest.’ 4 This is in contrast to the strategic thought that existed in Australia
in the 1980s for example, when previous important capability decisions relating to
maritime air power were made. Nevertheless, even before the events of 2001, Defence
2000 indicated that expeditionary warfare was a likely scenario, with Australia’s
strategic objectives including the requirement to contribute to maintaining strategic
stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region. 5

In addition, Defence 2000 states that the capability priority for the ADF is
firstly to maintain maritime capabilities – mostly naval and air forces to defend the
sea-air approaches and also have the ability to support Australian forces deployed in
the region and coalition operations in higher intensity conflicts.

6

However, this

cannot be achieved without power projection ashore and close air support. The second
capability priority is maintaining land forces – including the air and naval assets
needed to deploy and protect them. 7 This would appear on first reading to support the
stated maritime strategic primacy for Australia, however, it is in the area of executing
these forms of operations, projecting power ashore and then supporting deployed
Australian forces that there is a gap. This gap involves the lack of in-theatre maritime
air power and air warfare and precision land attack capable surface combatants. This
gap does not appear to be recognised either in the Defence Update 2003. That report
concludes by emphasising interoperability with allies, specifically via programmes
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such as the JSF, AEW&C and submarines. 8 The need for surface combatants and sea
control is not mentioned at all.

Defence 2000 states:

‘The key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea
approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships
and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our
forces. That means we need a fundamentally maritime strategy.
Our strategic geography, our relatively small population and our
comparative advantage in a range of technologies all dictate that
our defence should focus on our air and sea approaches.’ 9

Defence 2000 then mentions the land forces necessary to defeat any incursions
into Australia. In the next section on proactive operations, Defence 2000 notes that
although Australia’s strategic posture is defensive, if attacked,

‘Australia would take a highly proactive approach…seek to
attack hostile forces as far from our shores as possible, including
their home bases, forward operating bases and in transit. We
would aim to seize the initiative and dictate the pace, location
and intensity of operations.’ 10

This is further emphasised in Defence Update 2003, which noted that, ‘ADF
involvement in coalition operations further afield is somewhat more likely than in the
recent past.’ 11

Despite the stated aim to be pro-active, when viewed from the perspective of
both classical and contemporary maritime strategists, the claims in Defence 2000 that
Australia’s strategy is ‘fundamentally maritime’ and the expeditionary emphasis in
Defence Update 2003 need to be critically examined. As already noted and explained
8
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Australia is a maritime nation, in a maritime environment. Observing the capability
gap in providing support to deployed forces, Australia’s military strategy is not in
reality maritime in nature. Sea control is not afforded the emphasis and prominence
that a purported maritime strategy should give it. Thus Australia’s maritime strategy
does not carry any great weight. Perhaps, realistically, given the current and planned
force structure Australia has a capability to conduct maritime tasks such as sea denial
close to the Australian mainland and not the sea control function that underpins a truly
maritime strategic posture. This is a vital issue.

The strategy of Defence of Australia in Defence 2000 can perhaps be
categorised more properly as a continental approach in philosophy and emphasis. It
refers almost solely to the exercise of land based military power, rather than more
indirect scenarios. It has similarities to those continentally based nations which have a
coastline, but which also need to structure forces, especially their air forces, for
conflict over a land border. These nations usually seek to project air power and
maintain some degree of air control out to about 200 to 300 nautical miles from their
major air bases, with an ability to conduct some strategic strike missions at longer
range. Limited by fixed land bases located within continental Australia, and the geostrategic realities of the Asia-Pacific environment, this is in reality all Australia can
do. This does not constitute a maritime strategy. This should not be of surprise as the
history of the development of the ADF since Federation, and the national and public
focus on defence issues, has tended to be inward looking and continental in context.

In contrast, Defence Update 2003 does focus on a more global role, however,
it does this to an extent that is almost to the detriment of the nearer region. In doing
this, the maritime environment and realities are ignored and the perspective of the
document is predominantly on the development of ‘niche capabilities,’ 12 perceived as
useful in response to the threat of terrorism.

When looking beyond Defence Update 2003 and concentrating on the pattern
of continuity in Australian strategy, certainly since the 1986 Dibb Review, the
continued focus on land based air forces, configured to conduct a continental strategy,
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needs to be reviewed. Australia gains certainty and stability from the fact that much of
its inherent security comes from having no land borders, a situation that only a few
select nations can claim. Australians should not view the challenge of a long coastline
and sparse population as a strategic problem. Rather it should be viewed as a strategic
bonus. If Australia develops forces that are truly maritime in nature, the problems for
any adversary looking to attack Australia or its interests would be compounded. This
in the Australian context is not well understood. Indeed in many ways it is ignored.

The former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Shackleton stated in April 2002 that;

‘Yet, although Australian history cannot be understood
effectively without constant reference to the sea and the tyranny
of distance, Australians strangely remain a continentally
oriented society, where the bush and its folklore dominate the
central theme of nationhood…..That Australian military
experiences in general, and our formative Naval history in
particular, has tended to result in the Navy’s involvement in
shaping Australia’s security being somewhat understated; Navy
is the ‘Silent Service’. 13

He further noted that; ‘The Navy must become less of a ‘Silent Service’ – and
be able to articulate its case amongst the many competing pressures that Australia
faces as a nation.’ 14 Although Vice Admiral Shackleton in this section was referring
mainly to Navy’s place and standing in the Australian community, there is an
underlying theme that in strategic terms and force capability planning a vigorous
debate is required.

When viewed in this perspective, even given resource constraints within the
Defence budget, the somewhat diffident nature of the emphasis on maritime affairs in
both Defence 2000 and Defence Update 2003, cannot be understood. A true maritime
strategic capability for Australia would build on a blue-water, open ocean sea control
12
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and power projection capability. Australia does not have this capability and is thus
constrained to a large extent in any open ocean scenario. Of the nations in the AsiaPacific region it should be of interest to Australia that India does have this capability
and China is seeking to develop it. Neither of these nations is as inherently maritime
as is Australia in a geo-strategic sense.

A maritime approach to war also has as its advantage the use of manoeuvre
warfare rather than attrition based warfare. This approach was used successfully in the
first instance by the Japanese in Malaya in 1941/42 and then by the Australians in
New Guinea operations. In support of this Corbett also emphasised the power of
manoeuvre, noting that the essence of defence is mobility. 15 Maritime forces are
ideally suited to this approach. This is the very basis of credible deterrence and
defence. By denying the enemy the initiative, by possessing the means for decisive
strike, by exercising the option of strategic surprise, true maritime capability is
justified. Later in his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett notes;

‘In criticising the maritime history of France we must be careful
to distinguish policy from strategy.

It was not always the

defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned
her Admirals to negative operations. Seeing that she was a
continental power with continental aspirations, it was often a
policy from which her military exigencies permitted no
escape.’ 16

This observation is also particularly relevant to Australia in 2003, given the
shaping of defence capability.

Looking more broadly at strategic issues, and leaving aside the minor
amendments in Defence Update 2003, Australia’s strategic interests as defined in
Defence 2000 17 are: Protection of Australia’s direct maritime approaches from
intrusion by hostile forces; Support for protection of the stability and cohesion of
15
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neighbouring countries from internal challenges and external aggression; Prevention
of the intrusion of potentially hostile powers and resolving peacefully any problems
that may arise between countries in the region; Avoidance of de-stabilising strategic
competition between the region’s major powers, and preserving a security
environment in which the region’s economic development can proceed unhindered by
threats to trade; Prevention of the rise of a dominant regional power with interests
inimical to Australia’s; Safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the nations in the
nearer region, especially maritime Southeast Asia; Prevention of the positioning in
neighbouring states of foreign forces that might be used to attack Australia; and
Prevention of regional WMD proliferation. The implementation of these strategic
interests requires Australian credible diplomatic and military involvement in the
region itself, not merely on mainland Australia or in the sea and air approaches.

To execute these strategic issues Defence 2000 describes a range of strategic
tasks ranked in priority order. Priority one is Defending Australia and its Direct
Approaches (DA). 18 This recognises the fundamental responsibility that exists to
ensure the defence of Australia as a sovereign state and to protect its people, territory
and interests from menace. The second priority in the strategic tasks is for military
forces to Contribute to the Security of the Immediate Neighbourhood (CSIN).19
Defence 2000 states that this task recognises the important priority of the immediate
region to Australia’s security and contemplates fostering its security or a significant
military response if threats develop within it. Next is Supporting Wider Interests
(SWI), 20 which is Australia’s third priority and is explained as demonstrating
Australia’s commitment to regional and global stability. It means that Australia wants
to promote stability and cooperation closer to home and support strategic stability and
security more widely. Accordingly, Australian military contributions and actions
would be strongly influenced by responsibilities and interests in the region. In
addition to these core tasks, Defence 2000 states that the ADF will also undertake
what is known as Peacetime National Tasks (PNT). 21 This acknowledges that the
ADF will, because of its expertise and specialised capability, be called on to
undertake tasks in the national interest under whole-of-government or inter-agency
18
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arrangements. These include tasks such as border protection, counter-terrorist
operations, maritime search and rescue and disaster relief.

Defence 2000 specifically acknowledges that a maritime strategy is involved
with the DA task. 22 Noting the characteristics of maritime forces and their efficacy in
operations other than war, notably in diplomatic and constabulary tasks 23 a credible
maritime capability would also be of invaluable use to Australia in ensuring that the
strategic tasks of CSIN, SWI and PNT are effective. For example the CSIN role is
derived from Government’s desire that Australia would want to be in a position, if
asked, to help its neighbours protect themselves against unprovoked armed
aggression, to help ameliorate the effects of a natural disaster, or to help and support
them against other internal challenges to their stability. SWI has a similar emphasis.
Operations would be conducted predominantly in coalition, most probably in a UNsanctioned regional or international coalition. As the region is maritime if Australia
wishes to be prepared to be the largest force contributor for the CSIN task, and if
appropriate take a leadership role, maritime issues especially sea control and power
projection will be fundamental, not only as the enabler but as an essential prerequisite.

When reviewing the strategic interests and tasks listed in Defence 2000, even
with a good appreciation of the realities of budget restrictions, the fundamental
precept of self-reliance 24 is not being met in a maritime strategic sense. The current
and future structure of the ADF means Australia will not achieve the capability to
influence the maritime areas off the continent other than in coalition. Therefore in
many circumstances, Australia may be restricted in DA, CSIN, SWI and PNT tasks to
the direct and immediate approaches to continental Australia. Defence Update 2003,
published as a response to the prominence of global terrorism in the last two years,
does amplify the importance of expeditionary warfare for Australia. Although terms
such as CSIN and SWI do not appear in the update, there is an implicit and increased
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emphasis on such tasks.

However, the maritime dimension continues to be

marginalised.

Having examined contemporary maritime thought from countries such as the
United States, Britain and China amongst others, it is important to acknowledge that
in an attempt to respond in a pro-active manner to Defence 2000 the RAN has
produced its own future operational concept. Called the Future Maritime Operational
Concept (FMOC) it is an effort to delineate the requirements for the maritime force of
the future and to define the manner in which these forces will be operated and
supported. 25 These are excellent documents, which provide a good basis for testing
force capability options in experimentation of the proposed maritime components.
This includes components such as equipment, personnel, training, tactics, doctrine,
logistics, organisation and facilities. 26 As official defence documents both FMOCs are
centred on guidance provided in documents such as Defence 2000, Australia’s
Military Strategy (AMS 2001) and Force 2020. 27

FMOC 2020, Maritime Shaping & Control, is the manuscript which seeks to
explore the future naval requirement that meets the underlying Defence 2000 strategic
tasks. Because it is responsive to Defence 2000 it contends that; ‘to be able to
effectively contribute to the ADF’s mission in 2020, the ADF maritime forces must be
able to project power (including strike) and exert control within the maritime
approaches.’ 28 In outlining the operational and capability enablers inherent in this
mission, the FMOC does well in canvassing issues such as the requirement for
knowledge, command and control, comprehensive manoeuvre, assured engagement
and sustained presence. 29

However, despite being a comprehensive document, the reality is that the
FMOCs are essentially limited by the necessity for them to focus on the areas in
Defence 2000 that are seen as of strategic importance to Australia. As a result the
focus is on: northern coastal waters and littoral; principal air approaches from the
25
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archipelago to northern Australia; principal maritime approach routes to vital assets
and resource infrastructure in northern Australia; choke points for coastal shipping in
northern Australia; the important archipelagic shipping straits; and the Sub-Antarctic
EEZ and possibly even the Antarctic EEZ. 30 Despite the welcome addition of outer
territories and choke points, the accent in the FMOCs is not on sea control and the
protection of sea lines of communications and maritime power projection at distance
from Australia. Nor do tasks conducted predominantly in operations other than war
figure prominently. This is due to the emphasis in Defence 2000 on DA.

The section on networked air warfare gives a good indication of the issues
involved. It states that; ‘Networked Maritime Air Warfare envisages the sensor
netting of all surface warships, AEW&C, ground based air defence, Air 6000 strike
fighters and possibly helicopters to develop a comprehensive multi-sensor air picture
in blue and littoral waters. The Air Warfare Destroyer (Sea 4000) and Air 6000 would
play a crucial role in maximising the opportunities to engage aircraft before they are
able to effect missile release against ADF forces afloat and ashore.’ 31 This is an
accurate portrayal of the issues involved, however the practical difficulties of relying
on land based air support at distance from Australia is not highlighted.

Despite the best endeavours of the FMOCs, a commentator or foreign nation
when comparing the current and planned ADF force structure to one which would
truly reflect a maritime strategy, would come to the conclusion that the maritime
strategy that is espoused by Defence 2000 is narrowly based. The fact that the force
structure is based predominantly on DA tasking exacerbates this situation with the
other vital areas of CSIN, SWI and PNT having only a minor influence. Defence
Update 2003 does indicate some rebalancing of capabilities but it will not
fundamentally alter the size and structure of the ADF. It recognises the need for a
more flexible and mobile force but an acknowledgment of the need for sea control to
project such a force at range from Australia is not cited.
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Despite this lack of recognition, the need for a maritime emphasis is probably
greater now than at any time in the last 100 years. That emphasis, that real strategic
commitment, if enunciated clearly, would justify a true maritime capability.
Unfortunately, in the last twenty years the combat capability of the RAN at sea has
declined in relative terms with that of the region. An air warfare capability has been
lost and there is a gap of more than a decade before the Air Warfare Destroyer
project, with its significant contribution to sea control, may deliver capability at sea.
There is also the danger that in a nation where maritime strategy is not well
understood this project could be subject to further delays, cuts in capability and even
possible cancellation.

More dangerously to a nation where meaningful debate should be encouraged,
since the vitriolic service based debates of the 1960s to early 1980s that surrounded
the aircraft carrier issue, little real emphasis has been placed on maritime air power.
Debate within the ADF has been stifled. The lack of debate has inevitably resulted in
Australian maritime strategy being developed to reflect the platforms planned or
already in service, rather than forces being procured in response to a mature maritime
strategy.

In 2000 the RAN produced Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1.
The aim of this doctrine publication was to not only educate those in the ADF, but
also to foster debate across all areas of Australian society. It was an attempt to raise
the level of awareness and debate on maritime issues. Although an excellent and
timely publication, as yet, its impact has been muted. All change is evolutionary,
however, and over time the impact of Australian Maritime Doctrine, in an openminded environment should be significant.

The problem is that many areas of

Australian strategic thinking and planning fail to truly acknowledge the primacy of a
maritime strategy for Australia. Major surface combatants are seen as vulnerable, and
the all-encompassing nature of maritime operations across the spectrum of conflict
operations is given scant attention. Discussions of a tactical nature are substituted for,
and even called, strategic discussions, perhaps because the strategic reality is too
challenging to grasp. Classical strategic theory incorporating deterrence and defence,
via mobility and power projection has been neglected.

In this way the Australian use of air power could be coined as ‘one
dimensional’ due to its dependence on static land bases, a situation that any intelligent
enemy would be sure to capitalise on. There are many elements to this debate. There
is an accepted position that continental air power, defence of the sea-air gap and of the
EEZ, constitutes credible defence of Australia. The emphasis is on a strategy that
revolves around advanced technologies and the tactical use of a land based aerospace
power. There is not an appreciation that maritime air power brings an added
dimension to aerospace theory. Use of the sea to base air power complements the land
based options and provides a credible maritime strategy for Australia and a viable
balanced defence force.

In summary from an Australian strategic perspective the sea surrounding
Australia is vast. This can be both a strategic bonus and a strategic liability. Currently,
given the lack of a credible maritime strategy the sea is in many ways a strategic
liability. This is because the sea eliminates geography. This means that access to
Australia can come from any direction, not just the north. The lessons of history, of
maritime strategy, of proper layered defence and of conditional and measured
response have been marginalised. To rely solely on land based air power is to have a
first response, which is absolute, but one that is also the last resort. More than any
other instrument of political, diplomatic and military intent, for a nation such as
Australia, maritime forces provide substance and intent to a nation’s foreign policy.
The graduated force that credible maritime units permit is even more valuable when
the political and diplomatic situation is likely to be complex. This is the situation in
which Australia finds itself.

The Aircraft Carrier Debate
Maritime fixed wing air capability at sea has been present before in the ADF
in a number of forms. This ranged from the sea plane carrier HMAS Albatross 1 in the
1920s and 1930s, fixed wing reconnaissance planes embarked in RAN cruisers before
and during World War Two to the three aircraft carriers of the post World War Two
period, HMA Ships Vengeance, Sydney and Melbourne. However, its history has
been marked by disagreement between the RAAF and the RAN as each vied for the
necessary funding.

In fact there was intense disagreement between the RAAF and RAN in 1947
as to whether the RAN or the RAAF should command the aircraft that would be
operated from the planned aircraft carrier(s). 2 On this occasion the naval argument
prevailed, but worryingly this inter-service rivalry set the scene for the next 35 years
of debate between maritime and land based air power. Despite the best efforts of some
this debate was characterised for its lack of in-depth appreciation with respect to
Australia’s maritime strategic environment. Additionally the benefits, limitations and
operational capabilities of maritime and land based aircraft was also relegated to a
very secondary consideration. The hard won lesson of the Second World War, when
maritime and land based air power contributed significantly and co-operatively to the
defeat of the Axis powers was ignored. Of note, however, is that this disagreement
over the role of air power in support of maritime operations was not a phenomenon
that was peculiar to Australia.

Indeed Britain had its own divisive debate, which had culminated in the 1966
Defence Review. 3 The RN was devastated by the decision to cancel the projected fleet
carrier project, CVA-01, as it had formed the central core of the RN’s plans and self
image. 4 The RAF won the day on that occasion due in large part to the fact that they
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better understood the bureaucratic environment, convincing the Government that
land-based air power, even with its limitations was the only cost effective solution in
a fiscally limited period which also coincided with the draw down of British military
power and influence across the world. The term ‘East of Suez’ began to be observed
more in diplomatic assurances rather than military reality. 5
As finance was the real point, 6 the problem for the British naval staff was that
the scenarios modelled indicated that land based air power was required whether or
not carrier power existed. The carrier was argued more as ‘an adjunct to, rather than
an alternative to, a land-based air force.’ 7 Additionally there was disagreement
amongst naval officers themselves, with manpower for new carriers and supporters of
an increased role for surface combatants in strike, used to undermine the aircraft
carrier position. The RAF was also content for inter-service relations to be sacrificed,
whereas the leadership of the RN was reticent to act in other than a statesmanlike
fashion. 8 The RAF, however, saw it as a challenge to the very efficacy of aerospace
theory and perhaps even the rationale for a separate service, and ensured that issues
such as the costs of land-bases and even the position of continents themselves were
suppressed or moved to meet the budgetary and strategic requirement. 9

The situation had also been replicated in many other nations around the world.
Small and medium sized carriers, most of which were ex-RN World War Two
carriers, were retired and the loss of capability acknowledged. The most obvious loss
was in the power projection role for which air cover was essential. 10 Writing in 1986,
Philip Pugh in The Cost of Seapower, noted that the in many ways the large fleet
carrier was doomed to extinction through excessive cost. 11 However, his book was
written based on 1980s technological thought and before STOVL developments had
progressed to the technology of the JSF. There is much in modern strategy and
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technology which would refute this position. Even though he stated this position,
Pugh also noted that small differences allow large arguments and that ‘had costs not
been so evenly balanced they would have enforced a choice long ago. As it is
proponents of land and sea basing have been able to propagandise their rival views
upon many occasions over many decades, often with more passion than reason.’ 12

The situation by the late 1960s in Australia was hauntingly similar to that in
Britain. Pugh’s ‘propagandist’ statement was true for Australia as well. Indeed the
same aircraft, the F-111 13 was integral to the disagreements on strategic strike and
bombing in Australia as it was in Britain. As far back as 1954 the power projection
role was removed from the RAN, and the carriers were focused on anti-submarine
warfare. 14 From 1954, air power had been the cornerstone of Australia’s defence, yet
the fundamental limitation of air support at distance from Australia remained
unresolved. Nevertheless, the RAN was benefiting from this emphasis on forward
defence with new submarines, fast support ships, minesweepers and new surface
combatants all under construction. However, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) existed
precariously for the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Fixed wing aviation was
threatened with extinction on more than one occasion. 15 Chief amongst the problems
was manpower shortages and cost. A hauntingly similar issue to that faced today.

That the RAN was successful in modernising the fleet was due in great part to
the political acumen of the Minister for the Navy, Senator John Gorton. 16 Fixed wing
aviation gained a reprieve with new anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters and
ASW aircraft 17 being provided. Significantly, however, the RAN achieved a limited
air strike and air defence capability when 20 McDonnell-Douglas A-4 Skyhawk
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fighter-bombers were acquired, the last 10 at the expense of a 7th and 8th Oberon Class
submarines. 18

FIGURE 9:
HMAS MELBOURNE
Picture: Royal Australian Navy

Despite this, the ignorance of the efficacy of the sea in Australia’s strategic
environment was never far removed. Linked to this unawareness was the sad fact that
defence procurement in the period proceeded in fits and starts, depending in large part
on the interest, commitment and political ability of the Minister of the day of each
service, the RAN, the Army and RAAF. The disagreement in Australian circles was to
be put bluntly, an example of a dysfunctional policy making system. In the early
1960s, the RAAF saw the Skyhawk, as a competitor to funds for its new F-111 and
vice-a-versa. The RAN saw a strike role as a logical adjunct to its other roles, yet
strategic considerations were reduced all to often to acrimonious arguments on the
tactical superiority or inferiority of the relevant aircraft itself. Such disagreement and
lack of joint comprehension boded ill for the RAN when the issue of a carrier
replacement required decisive action in 1977.
18

Cooper, A. ‘The Era of Forward Defence,’ in Stevens, D. (ed) The Royal Australian Navy, pp 193194.

The carrier suffered from what could be termed ‘illegitimate isolationism.’19
This can be defined as where a specific capability of a platform is targeted in isolation
from its other capabilities. If this is done within the wider strategic debate, a platform
or capability, which is actually very good and cost effective across a range of strategic
tasks, if measured against specific absolutist scenarios and viewed in isolation, can be
discredited. This is because in such debates, propagandists can state that a capability
is not necessarily the only possible way of achieving any single task. This is exactly
what happened to the carrier debate in Australia. A carrier is very effective, and
arguably the most flexible and cost effective platform across a range of activities in
war and operations other than war. In war carriers are potent platforms to effect air
warfare, surface warfare, undersea warfare, sea-lift, amphibious warfare, power
projection, protection of sea lines of communication, close air support to ground
forces, land strike and afloat support. In operations other than war carriers are potent
platforms to effect deterrence, coalition operations, exercises, peacekeeping, oceans
governance, national interests, search and rescue, defence assistance to the civil
community, disaster relief, diplomatic tasks, sea-lift and afloat support. Its flexibility
and adaptability is its prize asset, in sporting parlance it could be termed the ‘allrounder’ 20 of the team.

Compounding the issue was the fact that the era of the 1970s was marked in
defence in Australia by the reorganisation of the Department by Sir Arthur Tange. Sir
Arthur Tange was Secretary to the Department of Defence from 1970 to 1979. During
this tenure he conducted the most significant reorganisation of the Department. This
included the abolition of the Departments of Navy, Army and Air, the integration of
the Department of Supply, and the co-location of resources management and policy
advice, such as strategic policy and force development, in departmental organisations
under the Secretary of the Department. 21 His reorganisation brought civilian
bureaucrats more to the fore in defence planning and reduced the power of the RAN,
19
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the Army and the RAAF with respect to acquisition policy. Tange used the principle
of ‘creative tension’ 22 to ensure that the services vied with each other to prove the
joint worth of a single-service project. The Government saw the Tange reorganisation
as an advance that would ensure that the military services were focused on joint issues
and not on niche areas that would be of direct benefit to that service alone. This
reduced single service influence in decision making with the hope that the problems
of acquisition and defence planning would be rectified. However, the RAN soon
discovered to its chagrin that the carrier issue would be fought on single-service lines.
The RAN saw the carrier as a flexible offensive weapon, whereas the RAAF saw it as
a ‘needless duplication of capability.’ 23 In addition, two strike-projection task groups
were seen as surplus to Australia’s requirements. 24 However, as alluded to previously,
more telling was the fact that ‘illegitimate isolationism’ was used to discredit the
carrier options. Individual RAAF capabilities were pitched in isolation against the
carrier’s flexibility. The RAAF ensured that the debate avoided canvassing, at a
strategic level, the holistic advantages or disadvantages of land and sea basing. It
remained more centred on narrow technical and platform centric issues of aircraft
performance, range and single mission tactical employment.

However, despite ongoing disagreements with the RAAF and problems with
manpower and funding, in 1977 the RAN had achieved an important milestone with
the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) approving a design investigation
for a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) and helicopter carrier, while
eliminating a conventional carrier, due mainly to its higher cost and manpower
needs. 25 The costs of the carrier had risen considerably and despite the uncertain state
of security in 1980, the carrier project came under intense scrutiny. HMAS
Melbourne’s life was extended to 1985, but the RAAF continued to assert that land
based aircraft could serve the fleet air defence role and that the performance of
STOVL aircraft such as the Sea Harrier in the air defence role was limited. 26 This last
point was true, but the arguments were made using an absolutist approach, rather than
one that addressed the relative merits of the options. Despite this opposition the
22
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strategic situation for Australia remained uncertain 27 and on 20 August 1980 Cabinet
agreed to acquire a purpose-designed aircraft carrier. 28 However, significantly it was
aimed at ASW operations with any decision on STOVL aircraft being delayed.

Unexpectedly in late 1981, the British announced that the first of their new
STOVL aircraft carriers, HMS Invincible was available for sale at a very favourable
price. The members of the DFDC were split on traditional lines with the Chief of
Defence Force Staff (CDFS), Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, the Chief of Naval Staff
(CNS), Vice-Admiral Sir James Willis, and significantly the Chief of the General
Staff (CGS), Sir Donald Dunstan, supporting the acquisition, while the Secretary, W.
B. Pritchett and the acting Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Vice-Marshal F.W. Barnes
disagreed. Significantly the CGS was not necessarily supportive at the start of the
DFDC meeting, but he was persuaded during the meeting by the arguments for power
projection and protection of deployed ADF elements at sea. 29

On 25 February 1982, the Minister for Defence, Mr D.J. Killen, announced
that the Government had decided to acquire the carrier which was to be re-named
HMAS Australia. As a result the 1982-83 refit of the aircraft carrier Melbourne was
cancelled. The opposition ridiculed the purchase in Parliament, with its leader, Mr
Hayden calling the decision amongst other things a ‘serious blunder’, stating that the
Invincible did not project sea power. 30 This was not unexpected, as the Australian
Labor Party (ALP) did not support power projection as a strategic requirement for
Australia, having a continentalist, rather than maritime approach to strategy. On the
other hand in his ministerial statement Mr Killen noted that;

‘The acquisition of this ship will enhance our manifest capability to
deter aggression in our neighbouring regions in the decades ahead. Air
power is fundamental to maritime operations…. The value of shorebased aircraft to Australia’s maritime defence will remain of particular
26
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importance….The carrier will provide the Government of the day with
additional options, particularly in areas further from our shores and
remote from our military airfields. The importance of this cannot be
over emphasised for a country like Australia surrounded on three sides
by vast oceans, and dependent for its very livelihood upon trade carried
in ships.’ 31

Although the Liberal Government had not committed to buy the STOVL aircraft that
would be needed, the substance of this response from Mr Killen still holds true in
2003.

On 2 April 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands forcing the UK to
mount a maritime campaign to reclaim them. Subsequently on 1 June 1982, Prime
Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, wrote to the British Prime Minister stating that in light
of developments Australia would not hold the UK Government to the earlier
obligation. On 30 June 1982 the Melbourne was de-commissioned. On 13 July 1982
the Minister for Defence announced that the UK Government would retain the
Invincible in RN service.

Other options were explored, but there was considerable hostility, especially
from the then Labor opposition, which resolutely opposed any carrier purchase. In
March 1982 the Senate also referred the issue of an aircraft carrier purchase to the
Parliament via the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (JCFAD). The
JCFAD report, An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, was produced
the same year. The report investigated the relevance of an aircraft carrier to
Australia’s current and perceived environment, the role of an aircraft carrier in the
Defence Force structure and the effects of the purchase of a carrier on the future
defence procurement program.

The report was not favourable. This was due in a very large part to the
assumptions used at the time and the lack of commitment in the Department of
Defence to a maritime strategy. The world situation was characterised by the potential
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for conflict between the super-powers escalating to nuclear conflict and the focus on
the threat to Australia being an invasion. These scenarios were marked as extremely
unlikely. When other intermediate and low level threats were examined, the aircraft
carrier was best described as ‘useful’ but limited due to aircraft type and limited
size. 32 Again the approach was one of ‘illegitimate isolationism.’ In a damming
sentence the report read, ‘not all the functions outlined in the preceding sections
require an aircraft carrier capability for their effective performance. In all cases, use
of an aircraft carrier is substantially dependent on a favourable air and maritime
environment.’ 33 This last sentence certainly holds little basis in historical fact when
aircraft carrier operations and performances from World War II were assessed. 34

In the second section on the role of an aircraft carrier, the Committee report
focused on the capability of a ship of about 20,000 tons. 35 ASW was the primary task
assigned to such a vessel, with air defence, anti-shipping strikes, command and
control, force projection, surveillance and patrol operations and peacetime tasks
relegated to secondary importance. The ability to deny the enemy intelligence and
targeting and identification information by an ability to engage shadowing
surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft was ignored.
The lack of a credible maritime strategy 36 not surprisingly counted against the
utility of maritime air power, with land-based air power providing continental defence
in the vicinity of Australia. With this strategic view, a continental strategy as
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espoused by the Department of Defence, not surprisingly the carrier was perceived
more as a luxury item, and not an essential component of any of these operational
tasks.

In conclusion the Committee ‘acknowledged that an aircraft carrier can
provide functions which would be valuable in the Australian Defence Force.’37
Crucially however, it noted that at the price of Invincible a credible case could be
made, but that the full project cost, which would be involved in the acquisition of a
purpose-designed ship could not be justified, certainly at current defence expenditure
levels. 38 This was not unexpected as the new CDFS, the Secretary and the RAAF had
all opposed the carrier purchase. 39

Especially damning was evidence provided in the air defence role where the
STOVL Harrier aircraft was criticised severely, basically to the point of denigration,
and also land strike, where the report stated that land-based strike aircraft would
destroy the enemy’s air strike capability before naval forces entered the area. 40
Conveniently, despite the success of the Harrier in the Falklands War of 1982, the
features of that conflict were described as, ‘atypical, which should not influence
judgements, certainly not before full details are available.’ 41

Interestingly any

decision by the JCFAD was not going to wait for the full details of the effectiveness
of the Harriers to be ascertained.

Thus the Department of Defence evidence was not favourable for the RAN.
Vital in this was the fact that Admiral Synnot had retired as CDFS and been replaced
by Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara. Admiral Synnot did appear, arguing a
comprehensive case, but in the capacity as a retired senior officer.
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The Committee report, although seemingly thorough and comprehensive, was
seriously flawed because its basic premise was a continental defence of Australia. It
foreshadowed the move to the Defence of Australia and ‘inner-arc’ concept that was
formalised via The Dibb Report. Maritime strategy, sea control, the maritime
environment, the need for protection of sea lines of communications and the ability to
project power through the maritime environment was reduced in emphasis. Thus
maritime air power was not seen as critical for Australia in 1982.

Noting the JCFAD report and the Labor opposition, it was no surprise,
therefore, that without first informing the then Chief of Naval Staff, 42 the incoming
Labor government of Mr Bob Hawke announced on 14 March 1983 that the
Melbourne would not be replaced. Two months later the Government announced that
flying by fixed wing aircraft of the RAN would be phased out. 43 The provision of
Australian air power in support of maritime forces then became the sole responsibility
of the RAAF, operating from fixed land bases.

Perhaps it could be surmised from this that an unintended casualty of the 1982
Falklands War was the RAN, or more properly the ADF. There is no doubt that the
Invincible was not an ideal ship, 44 and that true air dominance would have been hard
to achieve from such a platform. Indeed the rationale for the Invincible class began as
an anti-submarine platform designed to enforce the RN’s role in containing Soviet
submarines in the Iceland-Faroe Island gap in the North Atlantic. In this role, air
defence was seen as being provided from land based aircraft, and as such the carriers
were fitted with sea-to-air missiles, much like any guided missile destroyer.
However, the Falkland Islands conflict provided undeniable evidence of the
flexibility, survivability and capability of these ships and the need for sea based air
power to achieve sea control at distances from land bases. 45 The carrier decision in
reality removed sea control from Australia’s capabilities and substituted at best a
42
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defensive sea denial capability and an ‘inner arc’ mindset to defence strategic
planning.

HMS INVINCIBLE
FIGURE 10:
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Another, perhaps also unintended casualty of this era, appears to have been
that of further debate on the subject within the Department of Defence. Despite the
rigour of maritime doctrine and the changing nature of technology this is still true
even after a period of 20 years. Such was the acrimony and politicisation of the whole
issue that even with a budget of AUD$16B for Project Air 6000, the first phase of this
three phase project is looking only at land-based options. It would appear that any
novel or lateral ideas for studying other means of better providing air power in a
maritime environment have been marginalised. The costs and strategic advantages or
disadvantages of extensive air-to-air refuelling planes and land bases that are needed
effect a land-based option must also be included to fairly balance it against the seabased option. These land-based capabilities continue to be viewed and costed in
isolation, and not as a collective whole, when the issue of projecting air power is
studied.
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In proposing a study into maritime air power and aircraft carriers it is vital to
understand the opportunities now available. Today, as the ADF examines new air
power projects there is a chance, with aircraft such as the JSF, to again provide
organic air power in support of expeditionary warfare. What likelihood is there of a
mobile bare base operated by the RAN with the combat air power for the vessel being
provided by the RAAF? Is this a better option in the light of Australia’s Military
Strategy than the present arrangement with static bare bases spread through the north?
To re-iterate, Australia is an island continent in a maritime environment, with the
strategic bonus of no land borders but also the strategic problem of an extensive
coastline. The critical strategic issue for Australia is to control the sea where
Australia’s interests are threatened. This could be at distance in protection of sea lines
of communications, closer to Australia in the sea approaches to Australia itself, not
just the northern approaches. It could also be in the littoral contiguous region of the
Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia when attempting to safely escort Australian Army
units to the area of operations and then in providing support for them during the
conflict. Other nations that exist in a strategic environment less inherently maritime
than that of Australia seem to have understood this much better. Many continue to
emphasise the sea-based air power option. The following table illustrates that other
nations continue to see worth in maritime power projection and air power, even if
Australia does not.

Aircraft Carriers 1990-2003
Countries

1990/91

2003

In Contract/building

Australia

0

0

0

Argentina

1

0

0

Brazil

1

1

0

Britain

4

5

2

China

0

0

1

France

3

1

2

India

2

1

2

Italy

2

1

1

USSR/Russia

7

1

0

Spain

1

1

0

Thailand

0

1

0

USA

29

25

4

List includes CV (multi-purpose aircraft carrier), CVA (attack aircraft carrier), CVH
(helicopter carrier), CVL (light aircraft carrier), CVN (multi purpose aircraft carrier (nuclear
powered)), CVS (ASW aircraft carrier), AVT (auxiliary aircraft landing training ship), CGH
9helicopter cruiser – USSR/Russia only), LHD (amphibious assault ship – WASP Class US
only), LHA (amphibious assault ships – Tarawa Class US only), LPH (amphibious assault
ships – Iwo Jima Class – US only) 47/48
FIGURE 11:

TABLE OF COUNTRIES OPERATING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1990-2003

Complicating this is the reality that Australia can only ever be a medium
power with a limited ability to project force. A fundamental strength that underpins
the range of options available under a maritime strategy is the possession of the full
inventory of maritime capabilities, especially maritime air power. In this regard the
presence of such maritime capabilities not only significantly increases the range of
response options available to meet changing requirements but the possession of such
capabilities in itself acts as a major deterrent. It also adds uncertainty of response to
any action for an adversary and appreciably complicates their strategic options. The
ability to project combat air power throughout the maritime region in defence of
Australia’s national interests is not only a significant force multiplier but is a major
and highly versatile capability that can be employed when and as required. It is this
hidden or latent capability that is one of its greatest strengths in contributing to
Australia’s maritime strategy.
In noting Australia’s geo-strategic realities, and in maximising the flexibility
of maritime power there is little doubt that the requirement for a credible maritime air
power capability is entirely justifiable. It is time to relegate the aircraft carrier debate
that culminated in 1983 to that era and to move on and engage in a new study on
maritime air power that rigorously reviews the technology, operational concepts and
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strategic realities of 2003 to 2040 with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic
circumstances.

Surface Combatant Capability
Sea power is rightly recognised for its flexibility, in particular the ability of
surface combatants to change their readiness swiftly between different levels of
operations and apply graduated force commensurate with the situation and across the
spectrum of conflict. In the diplomatic role, surface combatants make a psychological
impression through their perceptible presence and powerful appearance. They have
similar visibility in the policing role and possess inherent capabilities for interdiction
and boarding. In higher intensity operations surface combatants combine readiness
and global reach with sustainability and controllability, which can be non-invasive
and easily withdrawn if required. Deployed in the protection of sea lines of
communications they have multi-dimensional capabilities and are essentially weapons
of sea control rather than denial. In support of land operations, surface combatants are
likewise capable in a wide range of tasks including escort, bombardment, supply and
on occasion lift, including where necessary evacuation. In amphibious operations,
especially in conjunction with maritime air power, surface combatants can facilitate
approach with manoeuvre and surprise. All these functions relate directly to
Australia’s national and regional circumstances and make surface combatants
essential to the central concept of sea control.

The modern surface combatant therefore retains a vital, indeed fundamental,
role to play in the future maritime force structure. Their mobility and endurance
allows the flexibility to maintain a continuous presence in moving scenes of action
which other ADF units cannot achieve. Their sensors and weapons work throughout
the maritime battlespace and span operations against aircraft, ships and submarines,
and against forces and assets ashore. Properly armed they can be highly effective
offensive platforms, especially against other ships and against land targets. Moreover,
mobile naval platforms have the ability to poise and persist in theatre, often for
months at a time. The surface combatant thus remains a potent and flexible capability
to execute the sea control requirement, particularly when they lever off other assets
and advanced intelligence, surveillance fusion and dissemination systems. Indeed, the
flexible response options and sustained presence of surface combatants in periods
short of open hostilities may help to control or prevent escalation, particularly in

complex or ambiguous circumstances where submarines and aircraft are not free to
make full use of their primarily offensive potential. Surface combatants are inherently
capable of responding at short notice to peacetime contingencies and support for allies
in operations other than war.

Australian surface combatants must be capable of operating throughout the
maritime approaches and beyond. Project Sea 4000 is the project which will ensure
that Australia will acquire and maintain some sea control capability into the future.
Able to act across all environments simultaneously, the ships will provide a variety of
capabilities appropriate to securing sea lines of communications, the projection of
power ashore, the provision of fire support, the protection of friendly sea, land and air
forces in the open ocean and the littoral. This includes the very real potential to offer a
degree of defence against attack by ballistic missiles. The mission requirement is to
provide a sea control capability for the ADF. In this way the role and mission of the
Project Sea 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) could perhaps better be understood
in terms of a sea control combatant.

The current surface combatant force comprises 10 frigates with supporting
infrastructure that includes modern simulators and warfare systems centres. With its
existing level of capability the force is effective in achieving sea control in low threat
environments only. It could be an effective contributor in some medium threat
environments as part of a highly capable coalition force. When viewed in relation to
sea control capabilities of previous force structures, the current RAN surface
combatant force has a reduced capability relative to forces of other world navies and
also those in the Asia-Pacific region. The following table is illustrative of the relative
decline of Australia’s surface combatant capability vis-à-vis other nations since 1990.

Sea Control Combatants – Air Warfare Capable Destroyers 1990 – 2003
Countries

1990/91

2003

In contract/building

Australia

3

0

0

Britain

13

11

6

Canada

0

4

0

China

0

2

4

France

5

3

2

Germany

3

3

2

India

5

8

0

Italy

6

4

2

Japan

5

9

2

South Korea

0

0

3

Spain

0

1

3

Taiwan

0

0

4

The Netherlands

2

1

3

USA

70

63

15

USSR/Russia

55

11

0

Table based on ships with an area air defence weapon (SM-2 equivalent) and/or 3D radar and
C2 capability above 4500 tons. List includes CG (guided missile cruiser), CGN (guided
missile cruiser (nuclear powered)), DDG (guided missile destroyer),12
FIGURE 12:

TABLE OF COUNTRIES OPERATING SEA CONTROL COMBATANTS
WARFARE DESTROYERS 1990-2003

AIR

The issues surrounding HMAS Australia and the German Pacific Fleet of 1914
has been covered previously. However, it is worth re-emphasising that Australia then
had the ability to achieve sea control in a high threat environment. By the Second
World War this had been reduced. Indeed the period 1919-1939 could be summarised
for the RAN and for Australia as the era of the loss of strategic deterrence. The
lessons of keeping the cities, infrastructure and trade of Australia secure, which had
been achieved in the First World War, were ignored.
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Despite the clear deterrent value that the RAN had provided against an enemy
raiding threat, the ensuing fate of the RAN for the decades of the 1920s and 30s was
unhappy.

The jubilation that followed the arrival of the fleet unit in 1913, the

successful maritime operations that led to the capture of Rabaul and German New
Guinea, and the sinking of the SMS Emden by HMAS Sydney in 1914 had been
overshadowed by four years of bloody trench warfare. The Great Depression would
strike further blows at the RAN. At its lowest point in 1932 the RAN would comprise
just three ships in full commission. Henceforth Australian naval capability would be
restricted to a few cruisers for trade protection. Australia abrogated its maritime
defence to the RN and it was seen as a minute element of the Imperial Navy.
Australian naval deterrence between the wars was a victim of an unfortunate series of
circumstances, which saw the RAN reduced from a formidable fleet water unit in
1919 to a limited trade protection force in 1939.

The core of the RAN surface combatant fleet post 1945 was aircraft carriers
and then the DDGs. These platforms permitted meaningful sea control and power
projection operations in the Korean War (HMAS Sydney) and then the Vietnam War
(DDGs). In 2003 the absence of maritime air power, command and control capability,
air warfare and power projection capability means the current surface combatant force
is lacking in its ability to execute sea control in anything other than relatively benign
operations. From the mid 1990s the RAN effectively lost an air warfare capability as
the three guided missile destroyers and their surface-to-air missile (SM-1)
progressively became more obsolescent. The last DDG was withdrawn from service
in 2001.

Having noted the state of the surface combatant force, there are a number of
approved and planned projects designed to rectify elements of the problem. Project
Sea 1390 is the upgrade project for the six Adelaide Class guided missile frigates.
The main aim of this project is to re-dress a shortfall in ship self-protection especially
against anti-ship missiles (ASMs). A contract for the upgrade was signed with ADI
Limited in 1999. Project Sea 1348 is delivering eight Anzac Class frigates into
service with the RAN between 1996 and 2006. Two additional frigates have been
delivered to New Zealand. The national aspects of being a maritime nation are crucial
to a viable surface combatant capability. As an example of national benefits from a

maritime strategic approach the ANZAC project over 15 years will inject around $4
billion dollars in gross domestic product and create almost 10000 full time jobs. 3

Despite the current operational limitations, Australia has a proud record of
credible surface combatants fulfilling essential tasks at sea, across the continuum of
operations both off Australia and deployed to other regions and oceans. However,
Project Sea 4000 is the project to provide air warfare and command and control
capability at sea, or more properly a sea control capability. Without this capability as
an absolute minimum, Australia will not achieve sea control in any operation that is
not benign. The Chief of Army’s 2002 statement that; ‘The army’s land forces must
be highly mobile, well prepared and able to manoeuvre effectively in a littoral
environment, 4 offers further support of Project Sea 4000 and sea control. The RAN
requires credible surface combatants able to project power ashore to support such
forces and indeed defend them during the passage to the area of operations and then
ensure that the logistical support is able to get to them. In summary strategic sealift,
manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment and power projection are
unachievable without SEA 4000.

FIGURE 13:
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Project Air 6000 – The Need for an Organic Maritime Element
In considering Australian military strategy and policy it is worth noting that
Defence 2000 states specifically that air combat is the most important single
capability for the defence of Australia. 1 Importantly the same air combat section of
Defence 2000 notes not only that the ADF must be able to protect Australia from air
attack and control our air approaches, but also that it must be; ‘capable enough to
provide options to deploy an air-combat capability to support a regional coalition’ and
‘also have the capacity to provide air-defence and support for deployed ground and
maritime forces in our immediate region.’ 2 Defence 2000 then lists the major
challenges facing the ADF in meeting the air combat capability as, addressing the
deficiencies of the F/A-18 vis-à-vis regional air combat aircraft, retaining the air-toair refuelling (AAR) capability and thirdly addressing the future of our air combat
capability as the F/A-18 reach the end of their service life between 2012 and 2015. 3

The Government’s plan to address these challenges is to upgrade the F/A-18,
acquire at least four Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW & C) aircraft,
acquire up to five new-generation AAR aircraft and then to acquire up to 100 new
combat aircraft to replace both the F/A-18 and F-111 (AIR 6000). 4 Project Air 6000 is
the biggest force structure program in the history of the ADF with some AUD$16
Billion over three phases being set aside to achieve the requirement. 5

Defence 2000 notes that one of the reasons that an AAR capability is
important to our air combat is because; ‘it extends the range and endurance of our
fighters. This is critical for covering our extended air approaches, including offshore
territories such as Christmas and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and for providing air
support to surface ship deployments including amphibious task forces and land forces
deployed in our immediate neighbourhood.’ 6
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In commenting on this last requirement it is germane to remark that
complicated forms of warfighting are often doomed to failure. Christmas Island is
some 870 nautical miles from Australia and the Cocos (Keeling) islands are even
further afield. The difficulty of achieving air parity or supremacy over these
Australian territories should the need ever arise, via land based aircraft operating from
the Australian mainland, should not be under estimated. These include factors such as
response, resilience, reliability, persistence, weather, communications, coverage and
flexibility. These limitations are explored in more detail later. The JSF and an aircraft
carrier as a package would be a better option, building on the current vision and
providing a greater range and reality of responses for Australia.

The ADF publication Force 2020 notes in its defining influence;

‘that it is driven by the concept of a ‘seamlessly integrated force’. This
concept goes beyond the contemporary understanding of ‘jointness’, but
it does not signify a merger of the three Services, nor does it seek to
undermine their identities and cultures. Given the ADF’s relatively
small size, the main reason why it must aspire to be a Seamless Force is
to maximise its collective warfighting capabilities and specialisations...
As such, the concept of a Seamless Force looks towards a future where
the ADF’s traditional forces are not only seamlessly integrated with
each other, but also externally integrated with a wider range of
supporting organisations, agencies, and to an extent, the community.
Becoming a Seamless Force might mean that: units are ‘born joint’ (triService units based along functional lines). Some force elements would
be joint and inter-agency on a permanent basis. There would be a
different and/or greater degree of joint asset management and
employment. For example, Naval amphibious assets might have jointly
operated helicopter support attached.’ 7

Force 2020 is a powerful concept but this concept could be expanded to
include RAN vessels such as aircraft carriers, operating RAAF via air force assets.
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Given the actuality of the 1999 East Timor operation, the seamless force
concept from Force 2020, Australia’s Military Strategy as espoused in Defence 2000,
the comments in Defence Update 2003 that pertain to a more flexible and mobile
force and the elements of maritime history and strategy itself, now must be the time to
rekindle the debate on the need for organic maritime air power for the ADF. The
Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Houston has noted that current Project Air 6000
plans call for replacement of the air dominance and strike capabilities of the F/A-18
and F-111 to be introduced into service commencing in 2012. 8 The opportunity
presented by the need to replace the current air-to-air refuelling capability and by
Project Air 6000 should not be missed.

At the 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference there was a broad range of air
power issues, which were discussed. Although maritime specific issues such as the
strategic Australian environment were rarely mentioned, self-reliance, the need for
homeland defence to include going out and destroying the enemy wherever he may be
was. 9 Specifically Dr Alan Stephens noted that air campaigns needed to concentrate
more on how to destroy armies, that platform range and basing flexibility must be
looked at for Project Air 6000, that fixed bases have been the air forces achilles heel
and that diplomatic issues complicate access to third country airbases. 10

In mentioning land bases it is illuminating to look at issues involving fixed
operating bases. The RAAF’s air power doctrine publication, states that;

‘Fixed-wing aircraft depend fundamentally on air bases. These bases
are generally large in area; providing a substantial infrastructure
including fuel, power, water and airfield approach aids. Permanent
bases are also supported by command and control systems, well stocked
and continually re-supplied. In Australia, the use of bare-bases is
fundamental to the application of aerospace power. Such bare bases do
7
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not have the same level of support even when fully activated. The
physical security of an air base will usually require a substantial number
of personnel. Furthermore the high value of an air base makes them a
focus of enemy intelligence and a focal point for attack.’ 11

The same publication notes correctly that base dependency and vulnerability
can be reduced by: creating redundancy, establishing forward operating bases, use of
air-to-air refuelling, hardening base infrastructure and employing air defence
measures. 12 Whether or not these will prove effective in a future high intensity
conflict remains to be seen. An additional characteristic, that of maritime mobility
which aircraft carriers provide, does reduce vulnerability to precision weapons.
Maritime mobility also reduces the requirement for a forward operating base by being
one. It also reduces the need for air-to-air refuelling and eases forward re-supply
issues. This can only be of benefit in the Australian geo-strategic environment.

Other speakers at the Aerospace Conference emphasised the need for air
supremacy to conduct amphibious operations. 13 Air power gets its decisive edge from
being able to operate rapidly and effectively and over long distances. Air parity was
required to contest control of the air and achieve air parity for operations such as the
evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940 to be achieved and that loss of air parity blunts the
intent of the military Commander. 14 Although the maritime environment as a reality
to any operation in the Australian region, was surprisingly not the focus of any of the
speakers, the issues mentioned are all related directly to it.

The success of Dunkirk, of saving the core of the British army, was due in part
to the RAF airbases in southern England being reasonably adjacent to Dunkirk. The
tyranny and complications of distance were minimised in this case. Australia will
rarely, if ever, experience the same degree of re-assurance. The Pacific campaign of

11

The Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, p. 129
Ibid, p. 129
13
Goulter, C. Battlefield Management and the Aerospace Tool, 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference,
Canberra, 28-29 May 2002.
14
Gray, P. Are Air Forces Relevant to National Security for the Future? 2002 RAAF Aerospace
Conference, Canberra, 28-29 May 2002.
12

World War II has provided much overriding evidence of the all encompassing nature
of the sea and sea based power in operations in Australia’s region.

Given the convergence of opportunity provided by Project Air 6000 and
Project Sea 4000, now is the time for Australia to embrace the ‘seamless force’
concept and look critically at how best to achieve local air superiority, air dominance
or air control when and where it is needed in support of government policy. In this
way the JSF could be configured in one or two variants, depending on the outcome of
any study.

FIGURE 14:
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One possibility is that a portion of the JSF purchase could be in a maritime
configuration while the rest would be a land base version. If around 100 aircraft are
purchased, 30 to 40 of them could be a variant capable of operating from aircraft
carriers. This also overcomes some of the issues involved in retaining the strategic
strike capability of the F-111 while also meeting the air dominance capability of the
F/A-18 all from a single platform. The remaining precision shore strike requirement
could be transferred to surface combatants via long range surface launched precision
guided munitions and helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). From a RAAF
perspective importantly all the aircraft could be RAAF aircraft with the benefits of
commonality and critical mass in logistics and training support that flow from that
approach. The JSF concept would permit considerable synergy in training, operational
support, through life logistics and maintenance if such a position was taken.

As has been detailed, combat air support for ADF operations has been limited
to that provided by land based aircraft since 1982. Practical experience in operations
and exercises in this period has indicated that this reliance is fragile in the maritime
environment. Land based aircraft operating in support of maritime operations,
including expeditionary warfare, suffer from a number of issues that can delay or
prevent them achieving control of the air or even air parity in the area of operations.
These limitations include, but are not limited to the following:
Diplomatic Issues
The operation of aircraft from a foreign nation’s territory can involve
extensive and prolonged diplomatic negotiations, which even if successful can
prevent those aircraft being used as Australia may well wish. Some nations are
increasingly reluctant to allow foreign air bases or foreign forces on their soil. If they
do allow such access the negotiation of transit rights and landing rights even for
temporary operations can be a protracted issue. This may mean that a nation limited
only to land-based air power options will find it difficult to react in a timely manner to
a crisis. This is especially so in peacetime or in periods of increased tension short of
war itself. Air to air refuelling is not an answer in every case. Effective operations at
range may well require a secure air base and transit over-flight rights which could
require extensive, long and delicate diplomatic negotiations.

The diplomatic effort expended by the United States in the Middle East in
2002/2003 in operations against Afghanistan and Iraq, with respect to conditions on
aircraft operating from third party territory, is a case in point. The experience of
NATO in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans is also well documented. In this
operation strict compliance rules imposed on operations by the countries in which the
aircraft were based prevented tactical and operational freedom of operations. Within
the region the exception was carrier borne aircraft.

In peacetime before the

ramifications of a failure to take action are acknowledged by other nations, aircraft
carriers can deploy to the region without many of the problems that bedevil a
deployment involving a land element and third party sovereign issues.

Security Issues - Vulnerability

At times of heightened tensions the security of ADF assets, including
equipment, logistics and personnel operating in a third country would involve
considerable local and ADF security operations. This could also be intrusive and
fragile. Aircraft, equipment and personnel would be more vulnerable to asymmetric
attack such as terrorism. Although there have been successful terrorist attacks on
ships, the USS Cole being a prime example, generally speaking if there is a terrorist
threat ships are less vulnerable than fixed land based forces. This is simply because
they are mobile and if necessary they can remain at sea and be supplied at sea. Their
movements at sea are also less certain, which disrupts and complicates any attack
planning.
Resilience and Reliability
Unless the land base is adjacent to the area of operations, the ever-present
issues of aircraft defects on mission start, mission critical repair facilities and access
to the logistics to repair them in situ limit the provision of aircraft to the operation.
Although aircraft carriers require maintenance on machinery, hull etc prudent margins
of safety in peacetime can ensure prolonged availability in theatre when required.

Air Control
The reality of time and distance in the Australian strategic environment has
meant the ability to control the air is difficult from land bases. Even if aircraft are
operating on combat air patrol, with alert aircraft ready to surge from land bases, an
aircraft such as an F/A-18 or JSF would in all probability be mission critical for
weapons and fuel on completion of a single air-to-air engagement in the area of
operations. The term mission critical refers to the fact that the fuel reserves of the
aircraft may well be substantially expended by high speed manoeuvring in combat
while the small number of air-to-air, air-to-surface weapons may well be expended
requiring the aircraft to return to base prematurely. With distances to East Timor from
Darwin in the region of 360nm, Norman Friedman’s earlier comments are pertinent
indeed. Aircraft would need to return to base with an inevitable gap in air control until
the alert aircraft arrived on station. Extensive long range air-to-air refuelling would be
required to minimise this to any effect.

Reaction time to air attack by enemy forces operating within or adjacent to the
area of operations needs to be within minutes and needs to be reliable. Time and
distance has been demonstrated in exercises and via experimentation as a critical
factor which inhibits Australia’s ability to gain the sea control necessary to conduct
maritime operations.

Weather
The weather at the land base, especially one at some distance, may well be
different to that at sea or in the littoral area of operations. In the monsoonal conditions
of Northern Australia and the Asia-Pacific region this factor must be considered. At
worst weather at the distant air base could prevent any air support in the area of
operations. In many operations weather effects can and do reduce aircraft time on
station due to the need to allow fuel reserves in case of diversion requirements.
Communications, Command and Control
Despite the best efforts of technology, the friction and uncertainty of warfare
will overly complicate communications, command and control. This will be
compounded further when coupled with the distances that may well exist between
land based support and the maritime strategic operations. Additionally reliance on
land based support reduces the ability of a deployed force to be reactive immediately
to the changing tactical scenario. The emission control posture of the force is also
compromised by an excessive reliance on land based support and the need to
communicate with that support for each and every detail of the mission to be passed.

Tactical Flexibility
An adversary has less certainty as to the range of aircraft operating from a
base whose location and movements are unknown. This provides inherent tactical
problems for an adversary above and beyond that which air power brings to the battle.
An adversary will also find it more difficult to gain intelligence cuing on aircraft
operations if they are conducted from the sea. Fixed land bases will in all probability
be under satellite surveillance and human observation.

The mobility of aircraft

carriers makes continuous observation by an adversary of rates of effort, maintenance

and launch and recovery more problematical. Aircraft carriers are also operational on
arrival in theatre. It is not reliant on the arrival of support units or equipment to obtain
operational capability as it is inherent within the platform.

Land Base Protection
A proportion of assets are required to guard a land base from attack. This is
obviously also true of the sea base, but it has the inherent advantage of mobility.
Whether referring to the bare bases in the north of Australia or a forward land base,
the fact that these bases are static is a vulnerability, which needs to be acknowledged.
This factor should not be under-stated. Forces operating from these bases may well
spend a substantial proportion of their rate of effort defending the base, which may be
many miles from the critical area of operations, reducing the air control for the
deployed ADF forces. Reference to actual combat losses in the Second World War
indicate that the majority of aircraft carriers were destroyed or seriously damaged by
other carrier fleets while seeking battle with other carrier fleets. Those lost to land
based air attack or submarine attack were in most cases sunk due to consistent
deployment in a particular area which allowed the enemy to respond. 15

In this era of precision guided munitions it can be argued that fixed
installations and land bases are relatively more vulnerable as they cannot be moved,
even if intelligence provides advanced warning of any impending strike. Traditionally
to overcome this limitation, land forces and air forces have utilised bomb proof
bunkers and spread their equipment over as large an area as possible to complicate the
enemy attack and reduce casualties to personnel and damage to equipment. However,
new precision-guided munitions are capable of inflicting significant damage on even
the best-protected fixed bases and their accompanying forces. Infrared satellite images
and computer mapping has also rendered much of the traditional camouflaging
techniques ineffective.
Logistical Resupply
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An issue that cannot be ignored for fixed bare bases or for any land forward
operating base is that the local infrastructure could be inadequate, placing further
strain on transport of supplies via the sea or via transport aircraft. This is a major issue
for Australia with respect to the bare bases in the north and west of the country. The
supply of fuel alone will stretch the RAAF and the national support infrastructure in
any high level contingency, especially in the wet season when the interior of the
country is largely impassable. Resupply by sea may not be an option if sea control
cannot be assured. Additionally fixed fuel storage installations, ammunition bunkers,
water supplies, accommodation and support issues are also vulnerable to interdiction.
General
These points are by no means exhaustive and may or may not be relevant in all
operations. They are relative not absolute factors. All professional naval personnel are
advocates of air power. This is because the maritime environment is multidimensional and control of the air cannot be ignored. Given the opportunity presented
by new ADF projects and noting the investment of AUD$16 Billion in Project Air
6000 alone, it is certainly time to leave the vitriolic debates of the 1960s to early
1980s behind. The three services, navy, army, and air force on behalf of Australia
should review critically the role of organic maritime air power in the execution of
Australia’s military strategy. Britain has done it, France has done it, India is doing it
as is Italy, plus many others. None of these nation states, especially Britain with its
current trade emphasis on Europe, exists in an environment that is as inherently
maritime as is Australia’s. The RAF and RN had spent much of the previous 70 years
at odds of the issue of land based air power and sea based air power. However, the
RAF has recently voiced its support for the British CVF project. A RAF service
source is quoted as saying; ‘We have long since stopped talking about air forces. We
are interested in air power, and carriers seem like a pretty good platform from which
to project it.’ 16
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Professor Paul Dibb 17 stated in the Australian newspaper in August 2002,
when commenting on the need for a high technology force structure and when
referring to comments by the Chief of Air Force on the decision to nominate to be part
of the JSF development that; ‘This confirms what the white paper said about air
power being the most important single capability for Australia’s defence.’ 18 This
comment in this context appears continue Australia’s single dimensional use of air
power. The air power he is referring to is purely land based, which is very limiting
given Australia’s maritime environment. This emphasis is reinforced as Professor
Dibb is making a direct reference to a statement by the Chief of Air Force that the JSF
will ensure Australia will control the air in the land areas, predominantly over
northern Australia and over the maritime approaches to Australia. This is not a
strategy that meets Australia’s strategic requirements.

Air power, as has been

established, is a vital element of a balanced force structure that would permit a
successful outcome for Australia strategic contest, but this is in the context of
maritime strategy. An element of the JSF purchase could be configured as an aircraft
that is seamlessly integrated with the maritime force elements. This would provide
the flexibility of maritime air power, protect maritime logistics and over the shore
assault forces and provide close air support for the land forces that ultimately execute
the land battle.

A revealing exercise could be to review the roles that Invincible would have
played in the execution of Government policy had it been purchased in 1982. Given
the development in short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft over the
period since 1982, and given their success in the Falklands War of 1982, the ship
could have been utilised to provide a measure of air defence, land strike, close air
support and air dominance in medium level scenarios. Those in which the ADF has
been involved and in which such a capability would have been useful are the 1991
Gulf War, the 1999 East Timor operation the 2001-2 Afghanistan operation and the
Iraq War of 2003. Certainly given the forces used in the Gulf War, Afghanistan and
Iraq War, such a capability would have been functional and useful. In the context of
the issue of sea control in the East Timor scenario, the vessel would have been very
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useful. There is also the additional provision of logistical support to land forces that
such a capability provides.

Significantly, however, the attributes of sea borne mobile air bases versus the
issue of current fixed land bases are not being studied in Australia. Noting that any
new carrier could have a life span of some 50 years and new aircraft around 30 years
this decision will impact on the structure and capabilities of the ADF out towards
2060. At present Project Air 6000 phase 1 is stated as a replacement program for F/A18s and F-111. With Prime Minister John Howard’s comments on 27 June 2002 that
the ADF will be part of the multi-national development of the JSF, 19 the opportunity
exists for it to be a project, which delivers air dominance and strike by whatever
means necessary in support of Australia’s military strategy. The issue of effects based
operations could be debated more vigorously in relation to our maritime environment.

No proposal to study the requirement for an aircraft carrier can ignore the
people issue in defence. When the RAN operated the aircraft carrier HMAS
Melbourne its operational strength was around 17000 personnel. Major units in the
1970s consisted of one aircraft carrier, three guided missile destroyers, three
destroyers, six destroyer escorts, one tanker, a destroyer tender, six submarines, a
squadron of mine hunting vessels and fifteen patrol boats. As of 30 May 2003 the
RAN operates ten frigates, two replenishment ships, three amphibious ships, six
submarines, six mine hunters and 15 patrol boats plus other craft. The operational
strength of the RAN has fallen to 12400, with 323 reserve personnel on full time
service and 90 personnel on unpaid leave. This gives a total strength of around
12800. Importantly the Navy is funded for around 14000 personnel. The Directorate
of Workforce Planning and Establishments (DWPE) states that when determining the
sea/shore personnel ratio the planning is based on two personnel at sea and one ashore
at the Able Seaman level, three at sea and two ashore at Leading Seaman, one to one
at Petty Officer and Chief Petty Officer. Officers do not have a set sea/shore ratio.
Basically if a ship needs ten extra officers, a further ten officers will be added to the
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RAN officer manning level. Generally speaking the accepted ratio from historical data
for the RAN is that one person at sea equates roughly to two people ashore.

Therefore, when considering manning for a single carrier, an RAN scheme of
complement of around 300 to 400 and RAAF manning of 200 to 300 would appear
reasonable. From the RAN’s perspective this may result in a need to increase RAN
manning in total by 900 to 1200 for a single carrier. When looking across the
spectrum of the ADF, the fact that much of the actual flying, maintenance and flight
deck operations would be the responsibility of the RAAF would mean that any study
would need to review the total impact on ADF numbers. This should take into account
any savings in RAAF personnel from potential closure or reduction in size and
operational functions of some fixed bases.

Initially therefore, as part of Project Air 6000, the ADF should study the
common links of air and sea control. Any carrier, or carriers, should be studied more
as ‘mobile bare bases’. Cost and unit vulnerability has often been used as a reason
why Australia cannot re-open debate on the issue. However, when compared against
the costs of running, maintaining, manning and defending fixed bare bases, a study
into these issues should be conducted. The issue of cost should be investigated and
compared with the expenditure of building, maintaining, supplying and defending the
bare bases that have been built on Australia’s west and north coasts. As noted earlier
logistical re-supply of these bases, especially in the monsoonal wet season is no easy
feat. Their defence will be costly and complex. Their threat to Australia should they
fall into enemy hands should also not be underestimated.

The construction of surface combatants indicates that the cost of the actual
hull and machinery is around 15 to 20 percent of the total cost. Around 80 percent of
the cost is the weapons, sensors and combat and communications systems. An issue,
which should be investigated, is whether any new aircraft carrier requires an extensive
command and control suite. If it is operated as more of a ‘mobile bare base’ the cost
of such a platform may not be prohibitive for Australia.

When assessing vulnerability, Dr Alan Stephens’ comment about the fixed
land bases is again relevant. Precision-guided weapons may render these bases

indefensible, and place the aircraft and personnel operating from them at extreme
threat, especially when on the ground. A significant force and proportion of any air
dominance aircraft available to support the defence of the maritime approaches may
well be dedicated to defending the very bases themselves. Carriers may also be
vulnerable in some circumstances, but as previously noted their very mobility, the
synergy of Task Group operations and the layered offensive and defensive systems
that typify maritime deployments makes it a hard target. Any study may well reach
the conclusion not to remove the bare bases, as each layer has its role to play.
However, the ‘all-in-one-basket’ effects of current policy should be understood.

As stated aircraft carriers for Australia could be viewed more properly in the
context of mobile bare bases. They would build on the positive attributes of
Australia’s current fixed bare bases, but overcome the limitations of these bases, by
being able to bring air power to the area of operations, should the strategic and tactical
situation require it. Evolving aircraft technology permits the possibility of Australia
being able to operate an air dominance aircraft from a maritime platform. Noting the
seamless force statement of Force 2020, the RAAF could operate an air dominance
and air strike combat air group from the mobile bare base exactly as it does today
from land bases. The RAN does not need to re-create a fixed wing fleet air arm. The
operation of air dominance aircraft is what the RAAF does already. Australia should
just move the base to sea as necessary. The RAN would operate the ship, steam it to
where it is required and maintain it. The RAAF could be responsible for the fixedwing air group, including maintenance and training.

This approach builds on the UK use of RAF GR7 Harrier aircraft from the
Invincible class aircraft carriers off Yugoslavia. In fact between 2002 and 2006 the
RN’s Sea Harriers will be removed from service. This will result in the three
Invincible class aircraft carriers deploying solely with RAF fixed wing aircraft. 20 As
already stated the British are moving to provide a two carrier fixed wing air
dominance and strike capability to permit expeditionary warfare from 2012. Australia
seems not to have studied this aspect of operations. It is time to investigate this option
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with a view to operating either a common aircraft variant from land and mobile sea
bases or even a different variant should that be the preferred and logical outcome.

There would of course be significant challenges. It is some 20 years since the
RAN operated fixed wing aviation at sea. It would be a period of 30 to 35 years (1982
to 2012/17) by the time the Project Air 6000 platforms could be commissioned into
service. To be effective at sea aircrew would need to be educated in maritime
operations. This includes a basic understanding of how ships work, both at sea and in
harbour. This includes issues such as standing watches, conducting damage control
training, ship safety training and survival at sea. Issues such as obtaining experienced
Carrier Air Group Commanders to command the air element would be taxing. The
development of the ‘shipside’ such as the ship’s Commander Air, its head of the Air
Department, and the team responsible for the shipboard side of training and
operations would also be demanding. The RAN and RAAF would need to build this
up over the next few years, by exchange postings to overseas forces operating aircraft
at sea. Given the Force 2020 proposals and vision this should be possible. Noting
Project Air 6000’s impact on Australian strategy and its very significant budget, this
proposal should be investigated in a meaningful and open fashion.

The benefits that could flow from such an approach are more diverse than just
the direct strategic options such a capability provides. Less obvious effects perhaps
could be an increase in the retention of aircrew, with them being given better
opportunities to serve in operational environments away from Australian bases than
occurs at present. Other effects may include a reduction in the identified Defence
2000 need for five long range air-to-air refuelling aircraft; provision of enhanced air
dominance and strike in the area of operations; enhanced protection for and
interoperability with the AEW & C aircraft; operations free from considerations of
diplomatic issues of third nation land based air operations. There are many other
benefits, which may well follow. Such an approach should at least be considered as
part of Australia’s requirement for air dominance and strike as the current force
approaches obsolescence.

Project Sea 4000 – The Sea Control Combatant
Project Sea 4000, is the project which is slated to resolve one pillar of the
problem with air warfare at sea. However, the project still faces many hurdles and
possible delays as the debate continues within defence as to the affordability of the
future defence capability projects. That such a vital maritime project continues to be
subject to controversy is even further confirmation that Australia’s strategic posture is
not truly maritime in nature. Of all future projects the requirement to have a platform
capable of achieving a degree of sea control by securing sea lines of communications
and projecting power ashore by escorting the army, providing fire support and
securing the protection of supplies to that land force and any land based air should be
self-evident.

The mission requirement of the AWD should be primarily to provide an air
warfare capability. Specifically, it is required to provide an area air control capability
which includes all of the measures needed to achieve air superiority through the use of
installed or embarked weapons systems. The AWD should also have a significant
command and control capability to permit the embarkation of a task group
commander with all necessary communications capabilities. It should also be able to
perform effectively in long-range undersea warfare and long-range surface warfare as
these are vital to achieving sea control.
DSTO survivability studies 1 indicate that a 6000-7000 tonne warship, or
larger, shows significant improvements in survivability against damage when
compared with the Anzac Class, because vital systems are less vulnerable due to the
increased separation of vital equipment. Ship size is not a major cost driver.
Colloquially speaking, ‘steel is cheap, air is free.’ As stated earlier the hull of a
warship represents a small proportion of the total cost of the vessel with the systems
within the hull accounting for the largest part of the cost of a ship. The increased
survivability afforded by size is relatively cheap. Over the centuries ships have been
designed to be hit and to survive and hit back. The idea of being hit should not come
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as any surprise to those who understand maritime strategy properly. The challenge is
to build a ship to survive and to function effectively even when hit, and increased size
aids in this.

The AWD should be equipped with at least a single three dimensional phased
array radar, long range surface-to-air missiles, close range missiles, a surface effect
gun with a capability to provide precision fire support to land forces, anti-ship missile
decoys and a degree of radar, infra-red and noise reduction technology. The ship
should contain complex tactical data links, at least a single helicopter and be capable
of operating advanced unmanned aerial vehicles.

A maritime air warfare capable surface combatant force offers significant
support to Australian military strategy and tasking via the contribution they would
make to air control around Australia itself or to deployed forces. A long-range threedimensional tracking and targeting capability, linked to the SM-2 missile, 2
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)) 3 and Link-16 4 would be a considerable
force multiplier. It could impact on any adversary attack plans and assist RAAF in
concentrating fighter aircraft to localised threat sectors and reduce aircraft patrol
times by offering alternate means of defending an airspace. A combination of surface
combatants, aircraft carriers, AEW & C and fighter aircraft would offer a significant
improvement in the strategic control and denial capability of the ADF via enhanced
surveillance, classification and targeting capability. This combination would also be
effective in defending deployed ADF forces and coalition assets as well.

A capable surface combatant also has the potential to be extremely useful in
provision of theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD). Defence Update 2003
highlighted, as did Defence 2000 to a lesser extent, the threat posed to Australia by
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which include ballistic missiles. Surface
combatants equipped with a three dimensional long-range phased array radar, air
2
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warfare missile and weapon control system could have a growth path to integrate any
future options to intercept ballistic missiles. 5 Certainly surface combatants by virtue
of their mobility and access can offer a degree of defence to Australia and also to
deployed ADF and coalition forces.

In general terms the operational role of the AWD in executing the
requirements of maritime air warfare is to control the air environment. This would
deny an adversary the information and freedom to target surface combatants, ADF air
assets and escorted shipping. Escorted shipping could be maritime trade vessels or
strategic sealift vessels. The AWD would nullify or reduce the threat to an acceptable
level for effective joint task group operations by permitting ADF forces to engage
surveillance and strike aircraft at extended ranges, thereby denying them freedom to
use the air environment. The AWD would also deny an adversary the tactical
information on which they could base attack plans; deny targeting information on
which efficient use of adversary anti-ship missiles (ASMs) would be reliant; engage
ASMs attacking other ships in company; engage aircraft attacking other ships in
company; protect other ADF assets such as AEW&C, P3C and land units from enemy
aircraft; and control fighter aircraft effectively at long range. This would impact on
adversary freedom of use of the air environment in general, and project power in the
airspace over land. The ability to engage surveillance, targeting and strike aircraft
before weapon release is an integral part of providing an air warfare capability.

From the perspective of surface combatants, Project Sea 4000 can be a
significant force multiplier for Australia if it is equipped properly. A great proportion
of precision guided munitions used by the United States for power projection ashore
are launched from USN destroyers, it would seem odd if this was not also investigated
for the ADF. Indeed, there is space and weight already in the Anzac frigate for a
second strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system, which could be utilised in a
similar role. This is already a possible addition to the strategic strike capability of the
F-111 aircraft as it would provide another dimension to Australia’s maritime strategy.
It is after all the effect that matters and precision guided munitions from air, surface or
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sub-surface platforms could all be utilised accordingly to provide a balanced range of
responses.

Conclusion
Australia is a maritime nation. The fact that Australia has no land border is a
strategic bonus that makes Australia the envy of many less fortunate nations. To date
Australia has not maximised this bonus, has essentially marginalised maritime forces
and shown little real understanding of maritime strategy. There is much in Australian
military history that has led to the development of a continental outlook and a bush
mythology. Doctrine, especially maritime doctrine has not been well understood and
utilised fully as the basis for defence white papers.

Australia’s need for a credible maritime strategy is greater than the
requirement to obtain maritime air power and capable surface combatants. Maritime
strategy requires logistic capability, both sea and air, amphibious platforms, an
effective mobile army, long range maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, industrial
maritime repair, maintenance and construction infrastructure and a credible merchant
marine. Given the reality of Australia’s economic capability, with the exception of a
credible merchant capability, Australia possesses a reasonable capacity to be a
maritime nation in these areas.

The exception is in the ability to conduct sea control operations that enable
power projection and defence of the sea lines of communications that are so vital to
the Australian economy.

Sea control is a multi-dimensional concept as it

encompasses control of the air; control of the surface of the sea; control of the
undersea water column; control of the littoral (if operating in that environment); and
control of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Each of these multi-dimensional aspects is
important in each warfare discipline. Without sea control there is no maritime power
projection and forces cannot be operated ashore. Maritime organic air power and air
warfare capable surface combatants are two vital elements that are required in order
for Australia to be credible, not only in sea control but more broadly in a maritime
strategic sense.

Despite statements in Defence 2000 that Australia has a predominantly
maritime strategy, this is not so from a historical, strategic or doctrinal basis.

Maritime doctrine does not feature within Defence 2000. As a result the force
structure development that is built from that paper does not reflect the realities of
maritime strategy. Defence Update 2003 goes some way towards a conclusion that
expeditionary warfare will play a pivotal role in defending Australia and its interests.
However, it concentrates predominantly on niche capabilities, weapons of mass
destruction and land global terrorism. The maritime reality for Australia continues to
be marginalised.

To rectify this strategic force structure development and the drafting of
national documents such as Defence White papers should be built on a rigorous
doctrinal base. A good understanding of doctrine, of military history and strategy
should form the basis of strategic planning. Current strategic circumstances require
that Australia’s maritime environment and likely future requirements should drive
force structure decisions, rather than the current ‘top down’ strategic thinking, which
appears to shape those decisions. Any tendency towards ‘orthodoxy’, of imposing a
single vision on defence debate needs to be vigorously avoided if Australia is to have
a defence strategy, posture and capability which is best able to counter to a world
which is vigorous and characterised by uncertainty. The study of international
maritime doctrine and of history indicates that sea control is vital. Defeating Australia
does not predominantly involve countering the elements of DA and the ‘inner arc.’

Inter-service rivalry between the RAN and RAAF from the 1960s to the 1980s
meant that the debate on the true value of maritime air power to Australia was argued
in a ‘propagandist’ not strategically sound manner. Since the early 1980s there has
been no new debate on this subject in Australia and certainly not at a serious level in
the ADF. With the JSF, the looming block obsolescence of the F/A-18 and F-111 and
the convergence of technology there is a chance to make the claims of Australia
having a maritime centric strategy, as stated in Defence 2000, a reality.

To achieve this phase 1 of Project Air 6000 should be re-scoped in the first
instance to study the viability of including air power delivered via the sea as part of
Australia’s aerospace future. Any such study should take full account of Australia’s
maritime environment and strategic requirements over the next 50 years. A
cost/capability comparison, highlighting issues such as the net personnel operating

costs of land bases, including the bare bases should be considered when comparing
the costs of at least a single aircraft carrier and associated RAAF air wing based either
out of RAAF Williamtown or RAAF Pearce. All of the Bare Bases or one or two may
well be retained. The cost, capability issues and strategic requirement for providing
long range AAR as currently envisaged should also be compared noting the reduced
requirement should sea based air power be available in the area of operations.

Building on this the ADF should then consider a maritime air wing component
for AIR 6000 via the JSF. If around 100 aircraft are purchased for the RAAF, between
30 and 40 of them could be a variant capable of operations from maritime platforms –
that is aircraft carriers. Subsequent phases of Project Air 6000 could then maintain
their focus on unmanned aerial vehicles and space based systems while noting the
utility of UAVs from sea platforms. Regardless of any decision on maritime air power
the pressing strategic requirement for Project Sea 4000 must be maintained if any
level of maritime strategic capability is to be regained for Australia.

The challenge is to prove that the modern ADF is a seamless force. The
military strategic priority of defence of Australia and its approaches and force
projection requires air power as its very basis. This is axiomatic to operations in the
region. The RAAF are the professionals who should and do execute fixed wing air
power for Australia. The proposal in this paper is an attempt to rekindle meaningful
debate in a field that has been off limits for too long. The ADF prides itself on being
an innovative force. Therefore it should be encouraged to think ‘outside the box,’ use
innovative approaches and leverage technological developments and take the air
power with its forces to where it is needed. The ideals of Force 2020 support this
concept.

Fixed-wing aircraft depend fundamentally on air bases. In Australia, the use of
bare-bases is fundamental to the application of aerospace power. The physical
security of an air base will usually require a substantial number of personnel.
Furthermore the high value of air bases makes them a focus of enemy intelligence and
a focal point for attack. Base dependency and vulnerability can be reduced by;
creating redundancy, establishing forward operating bases, use of air-to-air refuelling,
hardening bases infrastructure and employing air defence measures. Whether or not

these will prove effective in a future high intensity conflict remains to be seen.
However, an additional characteristic, that of mobility which an aircraft carrier
provides, reduces vulnerability to precision weapons, reduces the requirement for a
forward operating base by being one, reduces the need for air-to-air refuelling and
eases forward re-supply issues which can only be of benefit in the Australian geostrategic environment.

There is the opportunity under Project Air 6000 to shape the future of air
power in support of Australia’s maritime strategy. Not to investigate seriously the
viability of maritime air power would be a mistake. It is time to relegate the vitriolic
single-service oriented debate, the ‘creative tension’ and ‘illegitimate isolationism’
that led to the 1983 carrier decision to that era and to move on and engage in a new
study that rigorously reviews the technology, operational concepts and strategic
realities of 2003 to 2040 with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic circumstances.

Aircraft carriers, operating much as mobile bare bases, with the aircraft flown
and operated by the RAAF and the ship crewed and operated by the RAN would
provide a true example of the joint nature of the ADF. Sea based air power in the
Australian environment is a basic requirement before Australia can robustly state that
its maritime strategy is in reality maritime. The ADF has the opportunity to gain a
capability to provide control of the air that is truly organic and integral to the force.
This is necessary to achieve the sea control and power projection necessary to
influence events ashore and also to protect Australia’s sea lines of communications. A
portion of this capability could be independent of the limitations of land bases and
capable of utilisation where and whenever it is needed.

From the perspective of Project Sea 4000, the modern surface combatant
retains a vital, indeed fundamental, role to play in the future maritime force structure.
Their mobility and endurance allows the flexibility to maintain a continuous presence
in moving scenes of action. Their sensors and weapons work throughout the maritime
battlespace and span operations against aircraft, ships and submarines, and against
forces and assets ashore. Moreover, mobile naval platforms have the ability to poise
and persist in theatre, often for months at a time. The surface combatant thus remains
a potent and flexible capability to execute the sea control requirement, particularly

when they lever off other assets and advanced intelligence, surveillance fusion and
dissemination systems. Indeed, the flexible response options and sustained presence
of surface combatants in periods short of open hostilities may help to control or
prevent escalation, particularly in complex or ambiguous circumstances where
submarines and aircraft are not free to make full use of their primarily offensive
potential.
The mission requirement is to provide a sea control capability for the ADF. In
this way the role and mission of the AWD could perhaps better be understood in
terms of a sea control combatant.

Flexibility is the answer to uncertainty, and the danger in the Post-Cold War
era is that the central role of sea control for Australia’s strategic security, and the
countering of any potential threats to it, is forgotten. Australia needs an adequate
surface capability in the context of a balanced, integrated and synergistic,
interoperable fleet. Such a fleet would have the ability to deter and respond in a range
of high and low threat environments that are regionally representative. It is a rare
luxury to get the war you expect, and the ADF should provide a wide range of
strategic and operational options in any given situation. These are the priorities that
should drive force structure thinking, with particular emphasis on gaps in present
capability, namely maritime air power, air warfare, strike and command and control.
Historically navies have acted as force multipliers for small nations, and maritime
communications are vital for survival.

The RAN must remain a regional asset for Australia as well as a link with
major allies such as the United States. Past principles of Australian naval strategy
coincide with present and likely future needs: sea control and versatility,
interoperability, and balance between littoral and blue water and regional and out of
area capabilities. In the absence of maritime air power and credible air warfare
capable surface combatants, there is a real danger that the capability of the ADF will
be reduced to a sea denial one, or at best a capability for very limited sea control
tasks. This does not reflect the maritime nature of Australia’s geo-strategic
environment nor does it reflect the realities of the new century.
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Appendix 1
SEA 4000 – Maritime Air Warfare Capability
SEA 4000 seeks to provide the Australian Defence Force with an affordable maritime
air warfare capability as a complementary part of a comprehensive, layered air
defence capability. This capability will be conceptualised, acquired, tested, accepted,
operated and supported, modified, enhanced, and disposed of within a whole-of-life
management philosophy. The proposal seeks the acquisition of at least three air
defence capable ships. SEA 4000 is a multi-stage proposal to acquire this capability.
The estimated cost of SEA 4000 is $3500m-$4500m, with the first vessel to be inservice by 2013.
Background
In October 2001, the Royal Australian Navy decommissioned the last of its Perth
Class air warfare destroyers. Accordingly, Defence has been working for several
years to determine the best option to maintain its ability to conduct maritime air
warfare and effect task group Command and Control from major surface combatants.
In preparation for the Defence White Paper 2000, significant work was undertaken
too identify and quantify the maritime capability developments required to meet
Government’s expectations. This included the development of a Maritime Capability
Options Study and the use of a joint Defence and Industry integrated project team to
collate and analyse information on air warfare platforms currently in build. This work
informed Government during its deliberations for future capability direction and
resulted in the initiation of SEA 4000 to acquire a maritime air warfare capability.
Phase 1 involves Study and Preliminary Design that will examine the details of the
ADF’s future maritime air warfare capability requirements and the options that are
available to meet them. This will include analysis of issues such as acquisition
strategies, capability options, emergent technologies, environmental issues, logistic
cost reduction, crewing issues and interoperability with other platforms and allies.
Risk reduction work will also be undertaken in the areas of combat system
integration, platform propulsion and sensor systems in relation to proposed platforms.
The estimated cost of Phase 1 is $30-50m.
Phase 2 involves a detailed concept design and costing study and analysis based on
options identified in Phase 1.
Phase 3 involves a preliminary and detailed design stage to define the capability
design to be acquired and built.
Phase 4 involves the acquisition and build of the vessels, to commence in 2005/06.
The exact number and timing of each build will be determined in the earlier study and
design stages.

Appendix 2
AIR 6000 – New Aerospace Combat Capability
The AIR 6000 project was implemented to provide the ADF with replacement air
dominance and strike capabilities currently provided by the F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft
fleets. Current planned withdrawal dates for the F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft are 201215 and 2015-20 respectively. The project was to provide up to 100 multi-role aircraft
to replace the current F/A-18 and F-111 fleets. The overall cost of the project was
estimated at $12b. It has risen to around $16b. AIR 6000 was a multi-stage project,
which was still in the first definition stage when it was overtaken by events.
On 29 October 2002 the Government decided to become the eighth partner in the
Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, joining the System Development
and Demonstration (SDD) phase at a cost of $300m. The Joint Strike Fighter is being
developed as a next-generation multi-role fighter for the US Air Force, US Navy and
US Marine Corps. The aircraft is characterised by a low observability design, internal
weapons carriage, an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, advanced
electro-optical and infrared sensors and the ability to employ a wide range of air-tosurface and air-to-air weapons. There were a range of reasons underlying this
decision, including 5th generation advanced stealth and combat characteristics, early
delivery, interoperability, development cost reduction, Australian industry
involvement, and the option to lease interim combat aircraft if delays in the program
impacted on withdrawal of the F/A-18 and F-111 fleets.
The Government decided at that time that the JSF is the aircraft most likely to satisfy
Australia's needs and, while no formal commitment was made for the purchase of the
F-35, effectively eliminated the other contenders from the AIR 6000 project - the
French Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Northrop-Grumman F/A-E/F Super
Hornet, F-22 Raptor, SAAB Gripen and Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker. A commitment to
buy the F-35 is not expected until 2005 when the SDD is more advanced. Should a
commitment be made it is currently anticipated that the conventional version designed
for the USAF will be selected, although the STOVL variant designed for the USMC
and RAF and carrier variant designed for the USN have not been ruled out.
Additionally, the possibility that a mix of F-35 variants, or mix of F-35 with other
aircraft such as the F/A-22 or FB-22 Raptor, may be purchased has not been ruled
out.
The AIR 6000 project has been replaced by the New Air Combat Capability (NACC)
Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is currently managing Australian involvement
in the SDD phase and conducting capability needs analysis to help inform the
Government prior to any decision to be made in the 2005 timeframe. Should the F-35
be procured the first delivery is currently anticipated in 2012.
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Aircraft Carriers in the Royal Australian Navy
The following paper is submitted in accordance with a minute from the
Secretary, Defence Committee, dated 7th January, 1944 –
‘3. The Minister wishes the Defence Committee as the advisory body on
Defence Policy, to keep constantly in mind the question of Post-War Defence
Policy from the following angles:(i)

The experience of this war in relation to the principles of Australia and Empire
Defence, and to the nature, strength, and organization of the Australian Forces
…

4. The Minister desires this minute to be viewed as a standing instruction to the
Defence Committee so that, when a firm basis for the expression of its views has
been established under either 3(i) or (ii), the Committee will submit them for his
consideration.’
The Naval Board considers that a firm basis for the expression of its views in
relation to the value of Carriers to the Royal Australian Navy has been established,
and therefore submit the following memorandum on the subject for consideration.
The Aircraft Carrier has proved itself a necessary part of any Task Force not
only to provide fighter protection for the remainder of the force and itself, but also to
provide a powerful striking force for offensive purposes. Such striking forces have
been used in this war with great effect against land targets, Naval targets in harbour,
and Naval targets at sea.
The importance of the Carrier striking force has proved so great that now in
meetings between Task Forces, each of which contains Carriers, the result of the
battle may well be decided by the Carrier striking forces before the surface forces can
get into gun range.
Nevertheless Carriers cannot afford to take the sea unaccompanied by Cruisers
and/or Capital Ships and Destroyers, which are necessary to provide protection
against attack from the other surface vessels or submarines, and to provide additional
anti-aircraft gun support.
It is not too much to say that the future Fleet will be moulded round the
Carrier.
The most notable examples in this war of the offensive and defensive use of
Carrier-borne aircraft have been as follows:(a)

AGAINST NAVAL TARGETS AT SEA:

(b)

(c)

(d)

(i)

The sinking of the ‘BISMARCK’ – This ship was attacked and
torpedoed by aircraft from the ‘VICTORIOUS’. Later aircraft from the
‘ARK ROYAL’ torpedoed her and slowed her down so that the surface
ships were able to close and finally destroy her.

(ii)

The Coral Sea and Midway Island Battles – These were fought almost
entirely between opposing Carrier forces. The Japanese losses were
heavy and included – 5 Carriers, 3 Cruisers and 5 Destroyers sunk; 1
Carrier, 3 Battleships and 6 Cruisers damaged: whilst the United States
Navy lost 2 Carriers and 2 Destroyers.

AGAINST NAVAL TARGETS IN HARBOUR:
(i)

Taranto – A striking force from one Carrier (‘ILLUSTRIOUS’) carried
out a night attack on the Italian Fleet and was able to sink one Italian
Battleship and severely cripple two others for the loss of one
Swordfish aircraft.

(ii)

Pearl Harbour – A Japanese force of carrier-borne aircraft inflicted
heavy damage on the United States Fleet for the loss of 48 aircraft.
The American losses included 6 Battleships sunk or very severely
damaged, 3 Cruisers damaged, 3 Destroyers sunk, 1 Floating Dock
destroyed, etc., etc.

(iii)

Kaa Fjiord – ‘TIRPITZ’ was attacked on April 3, 1944, by Barracudas
from Carriers, escorted by fighters – 3 hits by 1600 lb. and 5 hits by
500 lb. bombs and 5 probable hits. Damaged caused will take at least
five months to repair. Only 2 Barracudas lost by enemy action plus 1
crashed taking off.

AGAINST LAND TARGETS:
(i)

Tokyo – An attack on the Japanese mainland was carried out by
Carrier-borne aircraft in April, 1942.

(ii)

The Carolines and Marshalls – In two months, i.e., from 1st February
to 1st April, 1944, a force of Battleships and Carriers was able to
neutralise the whole of the mandated Islands causing considerable
damage and loss to Japanese aircraft and shipping, with practically no
loss to themselves.

(iii)

The Marianas – Powerful Carrier Task Forces completely neutralised
Japanese air resistance in this area and successfully covered the
landings of troops.

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS:

Since the introduction of the Escort Carrier for anti-submarine protection of
convoys early in 1943 until the end of 1943, aircraft from these escorts sank 14 and
probably sank 9 German U-boats in the Atlantic alone. In the famous ‘500 mile gap’

where air cover could not be provided by shore-based aircraft, the Escort Carrier has
solved the problem by providing convoys with A/S Air protection.
(e)

(f)

ANTI-LONG RANGE BOMBER AIRCRAFT:
(i)

Russian Convoys – The only fighter cover against shore-based air
attack on the Russian convoy route was provided by Aircraft Carrier
escorts. No Aircraft Carrier escort has been lost on this route.

(ii)

Malta Convoys – In the days when Malta was of vital importance, the
only air escort that could be provided for the desperately need convoys
was given by Aircraft Carriers. Reinforcing Spitfires were flown in
from the decks of Carriers – the only method (except as cargo) that
could be used to bring them within flying range.

COVERING LANDINGS:
(i)

North Africa – In these landings complete fighter cover was provided
over the landing areas by the 12 Aircraft Carriers employed; the
beachheads were beyond fighter range from the airfields under Allied
control. The Aircraft Carriers also supplied attack aircraft during the
operations.

(ii)

Salerno – When the Allied air situation was critical in this area
(September, 1943) 4 Aircraft Carriers were used as mobile airfields to
provide fighter cover until shore bases were available.

(iii)

Hollandia – The fighter cover for this operation was provided entirely
by the Carrier-borne aircraft of the Task Forces. The ‘attack force’
aircraft during daylight hours was also provided by the Aircraft
Carriers, 750 aircraft in all being provided. No losses were suffered by
our forces.

The above examples are sufficient to show the important and varied uses to
which Carriers can be put. They show that they can be used with equal success
against both land and sea targets. They show their value in the covering of troop
landings and in the protection of trade from submarine and aircraft attack. It can be
shown that they are equally useful for attack on enemy trade although the
opportunities for this have been scarce as our command of the sea has virtually closed
the oceans to the enemy.
The strategical ubiquity of the Carrier is one of its most important assets. It
corresponds to a completely mobile Air station of three to five squadrons of Aircraft
complete with fuel, maintenance facilities, bombs and torpedoes which can shift its
position 600 miles a day, and thus in one month it may strike without warning in the
Atlantic and in the next off the coast of Australia. A few Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
in a Carrier thus constitute a greater threat than a similar number of Squadrons in a
shore base where their activities are circumscribed by a definite operational radius.

Great Britain and America have realised the value of sea-based air power and
each is building up a great fleet of Carriers. Great Britain will have at the end of
1944, a total of 53, U.S.A. will have a total of 108, whilst Canada recently have taken
over 2 from the Royal Navy.
The Naval Board therefore recommends that favourable consideration be
given by the Government to the provision of Aircraft Carriers for the Royal
Australian Navy. In this connection it is observed that the Naval Board have been
asked in War Cabinet Agendum No. 342/1944 of 5th July, to report on the number of
personnel required to man a Light Fleet Carrier in December 1944 or as soon
thereafter as possible.
Secretary, Naval Board.

Navy Office,
Melbourne,
17th July, 1944
Australian Archives Accession
MP 1049/5 File 2026/2/925
(Note: The argument set out in this memorandum was accepted by the Defence
Committee, and was the basis for the Chifley Government’s decision to establish an
RAN Fleet Air Arm in May 1947)
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